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Old, new, borrowed and blue: shifts in modern policing.

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Old, new, borrowed and blue

– shifts in modern policing

Abstract

This article analyses ambiguity and complexity in proactive policing practices and identifies the paradox that despite the focus on increasing proactivity, police work remains strongly reactive. Drawing on a set of Norwegian case studies of policing in different domains, the article shows how under an overarching objective of ‘combating crime’, the distinctions between non-coercive (mainly proactive) forms of prevention or (mainly reactive) methods such as investigation or intelligence are seen as unimportant. This creates a demand for professionals working across different crime types, leading to a shift towards high policing in everyday life and tension between experts and generalists. Other, unintended consequences include a fragmentation of tasks and a more general and abstract way of policing. The result is pluralisation and multiagency partnership strategies, where the police conduct high-policing tasks and external actors conduct low-policing tasks. These findings point to the emergence of new forms of hybrid of policing.

Key words: policing, police methods, proactive policing, reactive policing, specialisation

Introduction

Traditionally, crime prevention and crime investigation have been pictured as separate policing tasks (Brodeur 2010). However, since the end of the 1970s, the scholarly literature points to an increased emphasis on proactive¹ measures throughout the field of policing (Goldstein 1990; Manning 2008; Bowling, Reiner and Sheptycki 2019). Since the 1990s, the security agenda has had extensive impact on the practices of plural policing (xx 2017) and proactive policing (Brodeur 2010; Wilson 2020). This proactive turn has been driven by new technologies, logics of rationalisation, global pressure and cutting of public costs, but also by increased

¹ Weisburd et al. (2018: 1) defines proactivity as emphasis on mobilising resources based on police initiatives and targeting the broader underlying forces at work that may be driving crime and disorder. Reactive policing is where the events come after the crime has occurred: mobilising resources based on requests coming from outside the police organisation and focusing on the particulars of a given criminal incident

professionalisation of the police and focus on crises and threat management (Sanders, Weston and Schott 2015). In many countries, the police are undergoing a process of digitalisation and professionalisation, with repeated demands that police work should be knowledge based and that the police need specialised skills to investigate a broadening range of crime categories (Weston, Bennett-Moses and Sanders 2020). In addition, the police are expected to automate patrol work and deal with non-crime-related issues connected to other forms of harm/distress/vulnerability, continually widening the scope of policing (xx 2014; Wilson 2020). This is happening as recorded crime is dropping in most Western countries but also while the perception of ‘the dangerous other’ related to migration, terrorism and other fears is being redefined (Franko 2020; xx 2020; Young 2007). In addition, the expansion of policing highlights a shift towards more multiagency collaboration, and which agencies are responsible for community engagement tasks remains an open question (xx 2017).

Drawing on research in Norway, this article focuses on the nature and implications of where the proactive and reactive aspects of policing activities increasingly overlap. The empirical data is based on six case studies on policing in the domains of immigration, art crime, volume crime, wildlife crime, juvenile delinquency and economic crime. Through the analysis of a large body of data comprising qualitative interviews, surveys, observations and documentary sources, we explore the degree to which the multi-layered processes of proactive and reactive policing in a welfare state like Norway are changing the mode of policing and scope of policing intervention. To do this we first provide an overview of the debates around proactive and reactive policing and then introduce the Norwegian case studies before presenting the methodology. Under findings, we explore the ambiguous practice of proactivity, specialisation and the effects of pluralisation on the division-of-labour between agencies before finally presenting our conclusions.

Proactive and Reactive Elements in Policing

Less spending on public services is shaping the police in the Global North. In an age of austerity, the police are increasingly expected to deliver ‘more for less’, by providing better policing, at lower cost (Innes 2014) and to increasingly define their core focus as crime fighting (Loader 2014). The idea of core police work has changed substantially over the last decades, and the distinction between proactive and reactive policing has gradually merged because of the cost-sensitive environment of policing (Brodeur 2010; Flyghed 2000). Proactivity is central, for

instance, in an intelligence-led approach (James 2013; Sanders, Weston and Schott 2015; Sheptycki 2017). Here, the objective is to allocate resources more rationally and effectively by targeting dangerous and/or prolific offenders or crime ‘hot spots’. However, whether these activities are proactive or reactive is not always clear, particularly because many of the police’s new responsibilities concern vague phenomena, such as harm reduction and crisis management (Kammersgaard 2019; SIPR 2018).

The complexity is especially prominent when considering coercive enforcement and the idea of prevention as a form of soft power. Van Dijk and De Waard (1991) have defined crime prevention as a noncoercive alternative to the enforcement of criminal law, that is, investigation, charge, trial and punishment. Preventive/proactive and investigative/reactive policing are still viewed as fundamentally different and separate activities by the police and are in most countries regulated by different legislation and by separate police and prosecution agencies.² However, while prevention sometimes is seen as less intrusive and a softer way of policing (McCarthy 2014), proactive measures can be highly intrusive. In addition, unlike traditional, reactive investigation which is strictly controlled, proactive investigations are often not legally regulated (Bacon 2017; Bruce 2018). Previous research on innovative police methods reveals a clear need to empirically explore the process of the blurring between proactive and reactive policing in practice and its consequences.

Specialisation, professionalism and managerialism

A major objective of recent police reforms is to organise for and facilitate specialisation with a greater focus on core police tasks to combat, prevent and predict crime (xx. 2013). However, the literature shows that while producing much needed expertise, specialisation within law enforcement is costly and can create organisational divides (Naim 2005: 182; Sheptycki 2002: 43). A profession is a knowledge-based occupation that is acquired through education, occupational practice and experience, consisting of technical and tacit knowledge (Evetts *et al.* 2006). According to Bayley (1985), central features of the modern police are its specialisation and professionalisation, To be classified as a profession means that its members know something that

² In Norway, Police Act 1 regulates the police’s preventive activities, while Criminal Procedure Act 2 regulates the police’s reactive activities, such as crime investigation. This divide between preventive and reactive police work can be traced back at least to Peels 9’s principles of policing from 1829 and the establishment of modern police (xx 2014).

others do not, giving a monopoly over performing certain functions (Laursen 2004). Hence, it is a coveted classification. It is relevant to apply Evetts' (2009) two forms of professionalism in knowledge-based work to the specialisation debate; she distinguishes between the ideal types of 'occupational' and 'organisational' professionalism, which might impact the mode of policing. 'Occupational professionalism' emphasises autonomy and discretionary judgment as essential in defining professionals and depends on shared and prolonged systems of education, vocational training and socialisation. Controls are operationalised by practitioners themselves and guided by codes of professional ethics, which are monitored by professional institutions and associations. The contrasting ideal type in Evetts' (2009: 263) model is 'organisational professionalism', a discourse of control increasingly used by managers; it relies on externalised forms of regulation and accountability measures, such as target setting and performance review, and it involves the increased standardisation of work procedures, practices and managerialist control. It is this last form that might guide the shift towards specialisation, where the overall aim is to embed proactivity in the organisation.

High and low policing and limits for intervention.

The recent digitalisation of the police might change both the social division of labour between visible and invisible policing, and affect how police activities are conducted. In this regard, we use Brodeur's (2007) (2010) reintroduction of the classical distinction between high and low policing, where he describes it not only as a distinction between the different types of policing agencies, but also different types of policing practices (Brodeur 2010: 251). He claims that high policing as a mode of policing is characterised by the wide scope and strategic use of intelligence, the conflation of separate state powers and the use of human sources and undercover operatives (Brodeur 2007: 27–28). High policing is typically invisible and conducted at a distance, while low policing entails the uniformed, more traditional type of policing that typically takes place openly, sometimes visibly on the street and in proximity to the public. This can be seen in relation to Johnston's (2000: 44) continuum between maximal (where there are few limits on the police's capacity for action) and minimal (when the police's capacity for action is restricted) scopes of police interventions. Moreover, Brodeur (2007) argues that high-policing agencies are increasingly involved in low policing and vice versa. Taking into account new empirical developments in the field related to specialisation, the current article explores to what extent such changes are manifested in police

work at different levels, how it affects the blurring between proactive and reactive policing, the consequences for the scope of police intervention and the organisation of multiagency collaboration.

An Introduction to the Case Studies

This article draws upon key findings from the Norwegian research project ‘New Trends in Modern Policing’. The project commenced in in 2015 and is still ongoing, and comprises six case studies. Each case study explored the progressive intertwining of proactive and reactive policing measures in different policing domains, contributing to the overall aims of the project to map this development and analyse the processes that arise related to the use of new policing methods and a changing role for police in society.

“Case studies at a glance”		
Case Study Title	RQ/focus	Data and methods
CS 1 Police methods, target groups and risk management	To what extent does proactive policing affect the police view of different target groups and the management of threats, danger and risk?	41 interviews, 6 focus groups, Survey (n=3131, 32%), documents
CS 2 Theft and trafficking of art: A study on policing, prevention and security	What do we know about art crime characteristics in Norway? Which public and private stakeholders are relevant to regulation, and how can law enforcement responses be improved?	51 interviews with Norwegian and international stakeholders, 24 hours observations, literature analysis
CS 3: Policing the blurred line between organised and economic crime	How does ‘work-related crime’ challenge police organisational boundaries, and how do police perceptions of the phenomenon relate to what are considered suitable means of control?	43 interviews with police, 140 hours observation, policy documents, intelligence data
CS 4 Regulating illegal wolf hunting	How do the police and the Norwegian Nature Inspectorate (SNO) regulate the illegal hunting of wolves?	9 interviews with police and 7 interviews with SNO wardens.
CS 5 Policing mobile property offenders: the blurring boundaries of police methods	How does the police deal with property crimes committed by mobile offenders?	45 interviews with police, 80 hours observation, documents, intelligence data
CS 6 Intelligence and the prevention of youth crime	How is intelligence applied in preventing youth crime?	9 interviews with police, 32 hours observations
CS7 Policing bikers	A study of different approaches to the policing of outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG) in Norway.	Government reports, police cases, archival sources.

The present article draws on mixed methods research, combining data collected through interviews, participant observation, a survey and documentary analysis. Here, 187 qualitative in-depth interviews have been conducted with police officers, other professionals employed in the police and collaborators, including first-line officers, intelligence officers, strategic analysts, criminal investigators and leaders, as well as representatives from collaborating agencies in similar functions, such as the Norwegian Nature Inspectorate and customs. Several hundred observation hours of meetings, patrol work, investigation and stakeouts have been carried out. All police officers in Norway's 12 police districts (excluding national specialist units) were invited to participate in a survey regarding the Norwegian police reform implemented in 2015, resulting in a total number of 9861 responses with a response rate of 32% (3131 completed answers, including 800 pages in free text) .³ Finally, a number of relevant documents, such as white papers and intelligence reports, have been analysed.

Although the case studies differ in their topic, focus and method, they are united in the core research interest of the overarching project "New Trends in Modern Policing" in developing knowledge about the interplay between proactive and reactive forms of policing. Through our analysis of the emerging data, we identified key common and converging findings across our case studies as the project progressed since its inception in 2015. Foremost amongst these are three trends related to blurring the boundaries between proactive and reactive police methods, specialisation and multiagency approaches to policing. Agreeing to foreground these findings in the current article, each project member revisited their empirical data to further explore how their data could contribute to the thematic analysis (Tjora 2018). One of the advantages of using a mixed methods design is that we can draw on the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of the different methods within the project (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). The combination of the different methods allows us to answer a broader range of research questions, thus providing new information at different levels of a sociological description of the research topic (Bjelland 2019; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Erzberger and Kelle 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). Because our data are voluminous, we believe that they are solid enough to enable reliable generalisations and indicate some key aspects relating to contemporary and future policing.

³ This data collection was conducted together with XXX in 2017-2018.

Findings

The Ambiguous Practice of Proactivity

Our findings support previous research that there is a blurring of boundaries between the binaries of proactive and reactive police methods. In our view, this can partly be attributed to the fact that for officers, their overarching goal is simply to combat crime—whether it is by proactive or reactive police methods. The interviewees generally put very little emphasis on the differentiation between proactive and reactive approaches (other than in a strictly legalistic sense, such as when the threshold between intelligence gathering and investigation is crossed). This finding is consistent across all the case studies. The following quote from the study of organised and economic crime illustrates this when discussing whether a method is best understood as forward or backward looking:

You could imagine that we could get rid of illicit businesses using preventive methods, but we would need to challenge each other more on that, including those who work against work-related crime. The onus has been on uncovering crime, so implicitly, I'd say that to uncover, investigate and use penal sanctions is a way to prevent crime by encapsulating it. To investigate is actually a preventive method against crime. Perhaps in time we'll call investigation one of our preventive methods? (CS 3, 26 24.04.01)

It is not seen as important whether a method is classified as proactive or reactive. Rather, the distinctions between noncoercive forms of prevention and other (mainly reactive) intrusive or coercive methods such as investigation, disruption and intelligence are dismissed by many as less significant than the issue of which methods can be successfully combined to pragmatically 'combat' a given problem:

I think once you term something prevention, you've labelled it—just like investigation. Earlier, I mentioned, 'to combat' something. How do you combat something successfully? Is it by labelling [what you do], or is it by figuring out how to actually accomplish it? To 'combat' comprises prevention as well as investigation, but there are other elements as well. It includes partners who can help limit, avert and discover. (CS 3, 044, 29.08.17)

Combating crime de-emphasises differences between proactive and reactive police methods. This further suggests a shift wherein traditional post hoc policing practices become infused with an anticipatory logic where the aim is to mitigate against potential loss and harm (Zedner 2007). Our findings show that especially when working in a specialised task force, the line between prevention

and intelligence is indistinct. Everyone works closely together and cooperates around the goal of combatting crime and therefore everyone ‘does a bit of everything’.

In the cases exploring the policing of work-related crime (CS 3), mobile property offenders (CS 5) and how proactive policing affects different target groups (CS 1), the targets for the interventions mainly consist of the dangerous others: the foreigner, the unknown or the crimmigrant other, and the poor, marginalised and disadvantaged. Amid concerns of global terrorism and radicalisation, the same high risk violence and drug concerns are associated with minority ethnic youth engaged in gang activities (CS6).

When faced with challenges such as unclear residence status, a high degree of mobility, a lack of belonging, unknown identity or uncertainty of age, the distinction between the binaries of proactive and reactive policing become irrelevant to officers. Combatting crime is the main objective, not to incarcerate. The target group consists of ‘the other’—young foreigners or migrants with dual identities and unknown background factors—the unpredictable others, as implied in the following interview with a prosecutor:

The end is not actually a judgement, but it is that we get them expelled.

Interviewer: So a slightly different ending than elsewhere, really?

Yes, we have such a close relationship with [immigration control department] so as soon as we get a legally enforceable judgement it is to transfer them to deportation. Then we get the immigration enforcement agency involved so that they get a deportation decision and are sent out when they have finished serving their sentence. Then they have an entry ban, so if they come back to Norway then we just pick them up and prepare them for jail based on a violation of the entry ban. (CS 5, 17)

Immigration legislation is used pragmatically as a crime prevention tool with deportation considered a form of prevention. This approach illustrates that proactivity as a process is complex—including elements such as surveillance, prevention and intelligence. This is supported by the use of different high-policing tools and marked by a move towards securitisation and preventive justice, leading to more emergency preparedness and crisis management, as illustrated in the following quote by an operational analyst from CS1:

Preferably, we should contribute to anticipating threats. The Police Directorate wanted some kind of basis they could use to make their decisions and priorities on. And they wanted information about events before things

arise, which is not so easy. We also used intelligence reports from the other Nordic countries, and those reports generated from Frontex and Europol. (CS 1, HOIG, IN -Kripas 9)

While to ‘rule with law’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 2015) or ‘ad hoc instrumentalism’ (Sklansky 2012) are not new strategies, the explicit adoption of strategies like these in policy and among practitioners in Norway highlights the importance of defining incidents and persons as targets in police practice. In Weisburd et al.’s (2018) terms, this fits with a person-focused proactive policing style using risk-based tools. The anticipatory logic of security is expressed through precautionary tendencies in public policy (Lomell 2012). High policing and criminalising potentially harmful actions are part of a shift towards the prevention paradigm (Ashworth and Zedner 2014). This shift in preventive justice criminalises actions that are tougher to prove in court, such as grooming, and impacts regular police practice in which more pretrial measures such as fines, control orders, expulsion and risk assessments are used to pre-empt crime.

CS 6 was conducted in Southeast Oslo focusing particularly on the work with young people at risk, juvenile delinquency and criminal networks, including problems related to the recruitment into ‘gangs’ of ethnic minority youths in deprived areas. The case study highlights the intersection and interaction between intelligence and crime prevention. The analysis indicates tensions within the police, where the various fields of expertise (i.e., prevention and intelligence) represent different specialisations. Questioning what intelligence ideally is, an intelligence officer stated the following:

A good enough decision-making base to see which preventive strategy is right. Where should the police apply preventive measures and what is the basis for their knowledge? (CS 6, K2, 28.06.19)

One of the preventers described crime prevention as ‘*a strategy choice, a mind-set, a thought process*’ and highlighted that prevention should not be solely measures or initiatives as a part of intelligence products. The term *fighting crime* is in compliance with the objectives of intelligence because it aims for *identified* crime problems, and here, the other actors (i.e., childcare services) should take care of what *might* arise. This promotes a strategy of creating lists of high-risk groups of (potential) offenders and of incapacitating the most prolific ones, and creates tensions between the intelligence staff and preventers in how to identify and respond to emerging trends related to

youth crime. A police preventer expressed concern regarding the emphasis on crime fighting and a contingency mind-set:

That's why I'm probably a little concerned too, where I see some danger in us turning more to crime fighting than crime prevention. Because it is very much based on intelligence. And that we wear these glasses towards the youth who are already identified on the basis of some indicators... How does this affect our presence and availability and relationships with the whole local community? We're going to overlook a lot. Including information that can help build our understanding in relation to these analyses ... if we only go after those who we already have a lot of information on. And then I think it is also difficult to work with the recruitment [to criminal groups and gangs], compared with early intervention as well. Because they are probably and hopefully not registered yet. (CS 6, A3, 10.10.19)

Crime preventers who conduct patrols express frustration that they are 'feeding' a lot of information into the intelligence system while receiving little in return. The quote also illustrates the reactive elements in proactivity because those who are already considered suspects may become even more noticeable to the police based on previous experiences.

After the 22 July terror attack in Norway¹ and the following police reform, security is increasingly framed as an unquestioned good, and we see a tendency for security measurements to be implemented in a maximal scope targeting those identified as high risk (Zedner 2003). These perceptions underpin the emphasis on combating crime and blurring between the binaries of proactive and reactive police methods. What matters is to pre-empt crime and threats, and the desired outcome is to avoid, disrupt or stop threats—being anticipatory and precautionary. This may also be understood as changing the logic from being phenomenon specific to phenomenon transcending: the potential in methods and specialisation across phenomena are the focus. Within this framework, as seen in CS 3 on organised and economic crime, specialists working in multiagency configurations across crime types are in high demand, as exemplified in the context of combating work-related crimes (xx 2017). The need for specialist knowledge may partly explain why crime prevention is increasingly relying on high-policing methods and why there is a blurring between 'old' and 'new' professionalism.

Organization of Specialist Functions

A second key finding is that the emphasis on proactivity in Norwegian police discourse is bound up with broader institutional changes associated with the professionalisation and specialisation of

the police. While traditional preventive policing has been concerned with community engagement, the focus now is on Intelligence-led policing (ILP), a model concerned with delivering better police work by incorporating information technology and managerial structures (xx. 2018).. ILP aims to imitate a business model with less local administration and by cutting costs wherever possible to establish the core policing mandate as crime fighting. Structural issues are seen as more prominent than enhancing competence. We argue that this move towards ‘organisational proactivity’ has several unintended consequences. The tensions between experts and generalists inadvertently lead to fragmentation and a more systemic, structural, abstract and distanced way of policing crimes and risks through surveillance and other high-policing methods. As indicated by this investigator, the shift makes the police organisation more centralised and alienating:

It has become too big with a lack of transparency. We had a good overview of the old organisation and knew each other. There were no silos between the departments, we contributed where needed. We did different things, now it's more specialised. (CS 1, HOIG FG- Investigation West, 24.11.17)

In line with the shift towards crime fighting, the core tasks of the police are changing to ‘tasks that only the police can perform’. The legitimate basis for action is crime control and intelligence-based risk prevention, which in turn, shapes the proactive interventions and collaboration with external agencies. As a business model, ILP has introduced new proactive functions, roles and organisation of the knowledge work. For example, police employees should be redefined as ‘gatherers of data’ that will later be turned into police analysts’ knowledge products. The discretion of individual police officers is restricted by moving the decision-making further up in the organisation, using intelligence to make analytically based decisions at management level. ILP is more about managing intelligence than analysing and verifying data. However, usually conducted by civilian intelligence officers representing counter-cultural elements (Atkinson, 2013; Weston, Bennett-Moses, Sanders 2020), the ‘intelligence-based police work’ in Norway represents an organisational restructuring of the functions and strong recruitment from the military, with its particular targeted response style. *The perfect obtainer of intelligence is trained within the military, not the Police University College*, a police officer stated during an interview. As highlighted by a strategic analyst, the organisational structure described in the intelligence doctrine is a copy paste of the NATO doctrine, illustrating the militarisation of the police:

The entire I-doctrine is taken from military intelligence. Blueprint. It is far from the police's starting point and the basic principles. But it will come in. So it has a touch point higher up. ... The language and what is valued has changed a lot. (CS 1, 13.10)

The introduction of intelligence as a basis for managers' decisions can be understood as a militarisation of the police (xx 2018). It was implemented both as a response to the terror attack in Norway in 2011 and a growing need for more system accountability in the professional communities' information management. The intelligence doctrine has a military language and logic; it is about countermeasures, fast responses and timeliness. One should incapacitate the opponents and disrupt the criminal activity; it is less about dialogue with communities and more about being ready against terror, making tough priorities, secretly checking and controlling in systems or conversations and becoming a less visible police. Low policing, such as uniformed street patrols and burglary investigations, now employs high-policing methods. Standardisation should also make the 'bits and pieces' in the police system more mobile and perhaps less autonomous. For instance, a police manager reported that police officers should be interchangeable as part of the standardisation:

We want the police to be the last free profession to a lesser extent. [...] We now set up all police cars equally. We support the equipment, installation of the cars. So that they support the tasks of the patrol. What equipment and where the equipment is in the car. What is in the car should be the same regardless of whether it is in Finnmark or Oslo. [...] Then you build operational capacity in the Norwegian police. [...] There is a huge increase in capacity. (CS 1, 24.11.17)

Several interviewees highlighted the perception of being treated as interchangeable components—being ready for responding and reacting. Specialised work processes are also broken down into separate work processes. Managers and specialists are responsible for management and control, and first-line responders are doing specialised tasks. Organisational management is shaped by the intelligence doctrine and increased digitalisation of the work processes. Because of this, six out of ten in XXXX's survey claim that police reform contributes to them feeling less proud about being a police officer:

I feel that I am not able to provide as good a service as I did before. And that is the experience for many. [...] we do not manage the work as well as before. It sounds very nice how it was before, but we had a certain professional pride

*and it is gone. ... It means a lot to us to help people with less serious incidents.
(CS 1, HOIG FG Oslo Vest, 24.11.17)*

The Police Intelligence Doctrine contributes to stronger control of the front line, limits the discretion of the profession and pushes the Norwegian police in a more militarist direction. As a result, the data collectors feel a loss of autonomy. It also cause friction and conflict between the information provider and the collector, as explained by this analyst:

Often, they [the collectors] have something they want to work with, and if they do not fully understand the point of what is being asked, then they may not do it and it is a very tiring way to work. Obviously, sometimes you have information needs that sound quite strange, because they do not realise that it is a big part of a larger context. Then they don't prioritise it. (CS 5, 02.02.17)

Intelligence and specialisation are enacted in a social environment of preparedness and security. The talk about 'remote police reform' highlights these counterproductive consequences of proactivity. The development can be described as a movement away from direct contact with the public towards a more analytical and 'response-oriented' style of policing. The police officers we interviewed were well aware of this development and described police work as being more reactive than ever. The response style makes the patrols more concerned with real-time data. The patrols are assigned to tasks prescribed by the specialised units, and the police are collecting intelligence information and doing investigative interviews (Nesteng 2019; Paulsen and Simensen 2019); this has produced tension because it is perceived as delivering poorer services to the public. This calls into question the coherency of the new professionalism, leading to a fragmented practice where individual tasks are separated from the whole.

Both of Brodeur's (2007: 27–28) central features of high policing—the wide scope and strategic use of intelligence, and the use of human sources and undercover operatives—are prominent and widely used to combat persistent offenders, gangs, illegal hunting of wolves, economic crime and organised crime. Traditionally, police intelligence has been a specialised activity, but it is now intended to be implemented as a systemic and organisational model to prioritise the proactive targeting of serious and prolific offenders. This is embedded in the different levels of police organisation in strategic, everyday routine practice, clearly resonating with the crime fighting mentality inherent in police culture and turning proactivity into reactivity. The underlying

philosophy and principles of intelligence-led policing are ‘including the privilege of the detection, arrest or disruption of “known criminals”’ (Schinkel *et al.* 2018: 637).

Pluralisation and division-of-labour

Our third main finding is related to that of a multiagency approach to crime and harm. Here, a wide range of state agencies are assuming responsibility for policing a number of aspects of economic and social life. This may be seen as a distinct and partly new way of pluralising policing. Our findings show that proactive control work previously reserved for the police is increasingly being conducted not only by private and municipality actors, but also by other state authorities and bodies. Police agencies often compensate for the withdrawing of public police from community work at the municipality level (xx 2017). In this case however, they are less concerned with community engagement than with enforcement activities.

CS7 on the policing of outlaw motorcycle gangs⁴ (OMCG) exemplifies a multiagency approach and pluralisation in policing. In Scandinavia, efforts to prevent recruitment to OMCGs and encourage dissociation and desistance have rested on cross-departmental approaches that have sought to unite both disruptive and rehabilitative responses (Jahnsen 2018). Although clubs vary in their criminal activity, in Norway, members have usually been associated with money collection, the distribution and sale of amphetamines, illegal weapons and more traditional forms of violent crimes. In recent years, the number of OMCGs has grown substantially (xx 2019), and for a long period, much of the activity in trying to prevent this was based on a multiagency approach where local authorities often played a central role. The Norwegian Police Directorate together with the municipal authorities developed a strategy and handbook to deal with the OMCGs to prevent them from becoming established:

Examples of such measures are confiscation of the means of the ‘club’ and liquor licence or any order of moving, dismantling of fences, video cameras etc. Further down on the list of effective measures for the police, are the ones

⁴ The police usually do not define outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) by any academic system or theory but mainly by the colours on their backs. The research points to certain elements that differentiate these groups from common motorcycle clubs (Barker 2017, Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015). They define themselves as outside mainstream, sharing a certain style of dressing, values and a hierarchical organization. Their lifestyle is centred on the bike, values are predominantly macho working class; freedom and brotherhood is central.

aimed at the members, such as confiscation of ‘colours’ and driver’s licence, banishment from the club premises and such. (Politidirektoratet 2014: 22)

CS4 on the policing of wildlife crime is also marked by pluralisation. The responsibility for policing crimes against wildlife falls between the Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) and the local and central police (Økokrim). Under the NEA, the Norwegian Nature Inspectorate (SNO) and the police are the main agencies in the supervision and control of hunting and fishing, and their authority largely overlaps. Many SNO wardens hold limited police authority (Miljødirektoratet, 2020). Section 4 of the Nature Conservation Act (1996) states that ‘the supervision activities of the NEA shall be carried out in close cooperation with and be supplement to the local police’. This indicates that the role of SNO in policing has increased since the law was written; they perform proactive policing by being the eyes and ears of the police and gather intelligence. In many locations, the police are essentially absent after the last two police reforms (xx2018) and environmental crime is not prioritised (xx 2016).

Wardens often stress that they are not police. They view themselves as helpers, providing services, information and aid but also acting as guardians. However, they do have sanctions at their disposal when detecting unlawful activity in the field. In fact, this is not far from the classic ideals of local policing. One warden described his role as follows:

SNO are primarily doing two things, that is the registration of populations [wolves and other predators] and documentation of harms by predators. Especially the last one give us ‘trust from all parties’. We have now reached 2000 cases registered a year in Hedmark County, and there are few complaints. (CS 4)

By being a watchman and documenting harm, which can also be seen as gathering intelligence, the wardens are respected among most hunters. However, they also face many of the same dilemmas as the local police. One is the danger of ‘capture’, that is, choosing a side and identifying with the locals, even if laws have been broken, thereby corrupting themselves (Mawby and Yarwood 2011). This is evident in some cases of illegal hunting where local police not only have chosen a side, but also contributed to the crime (xx 2020). However, all is not rosy, as one warden stated: ‘One has to enjoy being out in the wilderness, and be used to get a lot of negative comments’. Previously, local police sometimes had their own expertise in the field, frequently policing and patrolling rural areas. Senior police officers said that this arrangement has withered

away. The situation has compelled the SNO to step up and become the most important local agency in the policing of wildlife crimes.

Multiagency approaches that proactively target specific crimes or persons, blur the distinction between high and low policing. The biker approach is mainly prevention through control orders, while at the same time constructing such groups as ‘the other’. Measures are often triggered by the establishment of a biker group; that they are in the process of settling down or as a result of pressure to ‘run them out of their clubhouses’. Municipalities and their capacity to perform supervision related to fire safety, serving of alcohol, restrictions on the use of houses, water and so on is often the most central actor, together with the police and additional agencies and services (like NAV—the Employment Agency). The interference cause trouble for the clubs, and take away the incentives of being a biker by restricting the use of colours. These are measures in line with five situational crime prevention techniques: increase effort, increase risk, reduce rewards, reduce provocations and remove excuses (Cornish and Clarke 2003). In the case of illegal hunting, we see that policing depends on the SNO as first-line control in prevention, but also as a central actor in the investigation. There have been clear developments towards the wardens getting a more central role in policing and taking over tasks previously reserved for the police. Their capabilities—but also the formal rules—have changed. Applying Brodeur’s binary between high and low policing, the SNO are doing more low-policing tasks by being uniformed and visible, while the police are increasingly focusing on the high-policing tasks.

It is impossible for the police to conduct all these tasks alone, and other agencies sometimes have better knowledge and a more flexible set of ‘tools’ that can be used (xx 2017). A consequence of multiagency collaboration is that the boundaries between agencies are de-emphasised and their respective information sources and sanctions are considered part of a shared tool kit for those ‘fighting the good fight’. In this third-party policing collaboration, the police become the dominant actor. This conception presumes a shared mandate or purpose between these agencies, which raises several legality questions. It uses legal rules and procedures as tools to achieve targets most effectively, what Sklansky (2012: 161) terms ‘ad hoc instrumentalism’. This widespread practice points to a nonsystematic, random and unpredictable application of the law involving the extensive use of discretion. The danger is that the prosecution process becomes personal and arbitrary—you first identify the individual to target and then seek to identify which law, if any, is being

contravened by the suspect (Sklansky 2012). These strategies where the targets are selected due to predefined identity attributes, are similar to criminalisation and labelling processes. The complexity of these practices and concomitant lack of accountability has been described as challenges to the rule of law (Franko 2020). Also, we see how combating crime is the main goal. In this context, to combat crime primarily refers to everything the police and partnered agencies can do to prevent, investigate, prosecute and disrupt crime. The challenge is that the police are governing too much in their cooperation with other agencies (xx2017). These findings from Norway relates to O'Neill and Loftus' (2013) argument that the state remains powerful because of its access to sanctions and information and that we should not underestimate it despite the fact that much attention is spent on private surveillance practices.

Concluding Remarks

The discourse on policing is typically built around sets of binary distinctions: proactive versus reactive, enforcement versus engagement, generalist versus specialist, high versus low policing, uniformed versus plain clothes officers, crime focused versus noncrime focused and police-centred versus partnership-based. In this article, we have offered a more nuanced, empirically grounded analysis showing how these binary distinctions are much more ambiguous and complex than is often acknowledged in the literature. Moreover, in pinpointing these complexities, we analyse some dimensions of recent developments that might, in a long term perspective, be features of policing that represent continuity rather than abrupt change (Churchill 2018).⁵

More generally, the findings illuminate broader patterns and trends in how policing processes are being reconfigured in response to a set of external requirements, demands and pressures. In Norway there has been recent emphasis on emergency preparedness and crises management particularly in the aftermath of the 22 July terror attack in 2011 (Christensen Lægreid and Rykkja 2018). A police strategy traditionally marked by social crime prevention and community policing in a welfare state (XX 2017), is gradually becoming dominated by performance management and security logic (XX forthcoming). The institutional logics are changing: not in coherent but diverse

⁵ See Churchill (2019: 476) for his seminal historiographical underpinned criticism of discontinuity thesis: “– the idea that ‘modern’ criminal justice is gone (at least as we knew it), and has been replaced by a new, ‘late-modern’ landscape of crime control, characterized by pluralized, preventative and punitive responses to crime.”

ways (Terpstra and Salet 2019). The crime fighting role in tandem with specialisation of the public police and multiagency frameworks dominated by law enforcement, change how policing is exercised. The question is how risk-based forms of thinking impact these trends in police practice and the impact of the growing salience of plural social division.

The pre-emptive strategy targeting emerging threats and potential criminals has been essential in understanding risk-based police strategies since 2000 (Johnston 2000; McCulloch and Wilson XX). Our findings are in line with depictions of these shifts in strategy, marked by centralization of police forces within the national context and the politician's vision of a narrow police role reducing crime and catching criminals (xx 2013). Pragmatically, the most important part is to reduce the levels of crime—surveillance, collecting and gathering of data all support this vision. This points to an increased distinction between core functions and more peripheral ones, but also an emphasis on policing-at-a-distance, having implication for the introduction of risk-based technologies in police organisations.

Across the cases, there is an emphasis on the aim of combating crime. Increasingly, the primary task of policing is seen as one of doing whatever is necessary to prevent the crime from occurring, including stopping and disruption (Hebenton and Seddon 2009: 346). This is fuelled by the emphasis on threats, anticipation of the crimmigrant other and crisis management, conceiving crime as a risk and ordering practices as pre-emptive methods.

The importance of specialist knowledge is central to most discussions of police work. The growth in policing outside the police has been tremendous yet, it is often overlooked (Brodeur 2010; Bowling, Reiner and Sheptycki 2019). Our research finds that the police profession consists of generalists who increasingly have to acquire specialist knowledge to do their work. Furthermore, many of the new responsibilities assigned to the police cannot be dealt with by traditional ways of policing. Some of these crimes are far from new, but there has been pressure on the police to take them more serious: IT-related crimes, transnational crimes, crimmigration, terror, domestic violence, sexual violence, grooming and dealing with the mentally ill. The consequence of specialisation is that other collaborators, for example SNO, are conducting low-policing tasks, while the police themselves are increasingly conducting what Brodeur would define as high policing. However, high policing not only leads to more competent and professional police officers: it is also deskilling front-line police officers. One of our principal findings is the shift

towards high policing in *everyday life*. The sharing of knowledge becomes more automatized. General Service officers, not only civilians, are more engrained and specialised within intelligence-led policing. Because these activities are conducted in an unintentional and automated way, the findings confirm Ericson and Haggerty's (1997: 38) claim of the alienating and deskilling effects of specialised and digitalised knowledge.

The public police specialise in combating crime and in collaborating with other agencies to maximise security. The objective is to introduce the police with minimal scope of intervention based on risk-based forms of police practice and collaboration and to outsource more periphery policing tasks to other agencies. By doing so, community policing is increasingly turned towards policing communities at risk, supported by the implementation of an intelligence organisation. The significant growth in resources to combat terror and control immigration have practical effects not only on the crime rates that might become inflated, but also on the policing of other social problems and how this is conducted. The division of labour between high and low policing is shifting, introducing more high-policing methods to combat low-level crime. The configuration of a crime fighting focus (with a narrow scope on the policing aim) and the specialisation and multiagency collaboration leads to the police becoming more maximal in their intervention, with few limits on the police capacity for action and what is defined as a police problem. Miller (2014) argues that this is a consequence of intelligence-led policing: a politification of social problems. The outcome is a redefining of social problems, particularly through intelligence taking over for prevention. The policing of 'dangerous' crimes and the 'criminal other' pulls the point of gravitation towards militarisation, combating crime and specialisation for the whole force.

By analysing the practice of policing we see both disparity and compliance with the stated aims of how police action should be. In line with previous research, the findings show that policing in practice moves outside the narrow confines of proactive and reactive binaries (see also Johnston 2000: 43, 68). The combination of a more invisible police, together with an emphasis on its narrow crime fighting role, points to a police ideal with a minimal scope of intervention together with proactive police action. However, in practice, this minimal scope is unachievable because of the inherent tendencies in risk-based police forms of policing. This is fuelled by the fact that high policing and the security agenda are changing the functions of low public policing. An added complexity is that traditionally, there has been a strong political will for the police to remain within the realm of the state in some European countries (xx 2017).

These maximal tendencies with risk-based proactivity have the potential to lead to an increasingly more invasive police. As Johnston (2000: 68) argued 20 years ago: ‘After all, the more the police organizations are proactive the less are they likely, of their own accord, to limit the scope of their actions’. This speaks directly to our empirical findings from Norway, pointing at a characteristic in risk-based thinking that cannot be eradicated by minimalistic solutions; it is impossible to minimise the scope of proactive engagement (Johnston 2000: 175- 179). Moreover, the findings identify a police force with surveillance capacity that is both involuntary and with low visibility, making it more difficult for police officers to resist. Contrary to previous research pointing to internal resistance as obstacles to reform (see xx 2013), this makes the sharing of information less dependent on individual engagement, leading to the crime fighting role becoming an extension of more traditional police occupational culture; hence, the expected resistance to change is reduced.

We therefore contribute with empirical evidence on how forms of police action and processes are embedded in a wider social context. The empirical findings suggest the police are becoming less visible in the public space. Indeed, high policing is becoming even more prevalent in the low-policing context at the expense of community engagement and proximity to the citizens and the ideal of policing by consent. Centralisation and specialisation limits the space for localised policing initiatives. What we see is how police forms are changing where there are continuing concerns around security threats and othering processes, playing a salient role in shaping the environment within which different forms of policing operate (xx2017: 5). Our findings indicate the security agenda as posing a prominent threat to more community-oriented policing, with consequences for portraying the young, poor, foreign and disadvantaged as posing risks. The scope is widened by targeting risks with a broader set of tools. The findings indicate that the development of sophisticated new technologies may give rise to the maximum-security society Marx (1988) warned against more than thirty years ago, including in a welfare state like Norway. The change is driven by the combination of pragmatism and unlimited potential contained in these new technologies, the physical environment limiting police officers choices, and auto-surveillance and a focus on anticipating behaviour. The agencies collaborating with the police focus more on enforcement work than community-oriented activities, to borrow the distinction from xx (2017: 2). It remains to be seen which agencies or municipal officers will have the most contact with and influence over local social control when the public police are withdrawing.

Policing is often presented as old fashioned and something stable in a changing world by popular culture and politicians. This research presents a different picture. In most western countries the police are facing tasks unheard of 40 years ago. They are required to tackle organized crime, digital and financial crimes, terrorism, transnational crimes and to deal with problems connected to globalisation and its consequences on environment, economy and populations. The police have to manage problems outside the traditional scope of penal law. To respond to this the Norwegian police have introduced higher levels of professionalization and specialization, the use of intelligence and analysis and employed civilian specialists, changing the mode of policing. There are some Norwegian particularities, most prominently the welfare state and the oil-enriched economy that affect the selected case studies. Criminal and penal politics have, with some exceptions, been described as tolerant, and a certain Scandinavian exceptionalism is often highlighted (Ugelvik 2016). Despite a high degree of political pressure on the police, there is less public and political interest in punitiveness and hot penal issues with a moralistic language (Franko 2020). However, the emphasis on targeting the crimmigrant other is well underpinned (Franko 2020; Todd-Kvam 2018), and further confirmed by this research. Therefore, additional empirical research is needed to determine how the increased criminalisation will affect criminal justice responses, beyond the increased deportation of foreigners. Nevertheless, our findings resonate with research from other western countries identifying the security agenda as posing a prominent threat to more community-oriented policing, shedding light on variations in policing in the western world.

The future trajectory is increasingly towards shifts in visible police practice forms. The security agendas' impact on practising proactive policing in an environment supporting a centralised police require a vision of 'good plural policing' enhancing social justice. Diverse and invasive risk-based policing will require diverse governments. Risk-induced forms have an ever-escalating demand for security. Risk maximises security and makes the question of the legitimate limits of security pertinent. Questioning such limits is particularly difficult where the police also have a relative monopoly and where such initiatives are seen as an indisputable public good. This points to a discrepancy between the modern police organisation and the problems it is facing related to crises in police confidence, trust and legitimacy.

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