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One size fits all? The problems of offering ethical guidance to everyone

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Introduction

The process of ethical review has become a routine aspect of academic studies, but there are serious concerns about how it is being done. A clutch of articles has complained that the standards being applied are inappropriate, restrictive and in some cases downright silly (see Center for Advanced Study, 2005; Tysome, 2006; Murphy and Dingwall, 2007; Hammersley, 2009; Boden et al, 2009; and Schrag, 2011). It is always difficult to generalise across a series of disparate arguments, but looking at these critiques as a whole, what they seem to have in common is a sense of controlled fury. Schrag puts it in these terms:

> The first thing to understand about the critique of ethics committees is that it is grounded in bitter, bitter experience. People who devote their lives to the study of others are often quite concerned with ethics, and when they learn that their universities maintain ethics committees, their first reaction is often eager cooperation. But that goodwill can evaporate quickly when a researcher loses an afternoon to online training that is obviously irrelevant to the ethical challenges she faces, or when a committee imposes reporting requirements or restrictions that make the work difficult or impossible. (Schrag, 2011: 122)

Part of the problem is that ethical review tends to be supplemented by other concerns, which have more to do with institutional governance than with ethics. But the core of the problem is that the ethical positions that are being adopted are often misjudged or misconceived. Hammersley argues that research ethics committees (also known as institutional review boards or IRBs) are applying ethics codes much too literally, in a way that verges on the unethical – unable to address principles in context, and failing to identify ethical conflicts (Hammersley, 2006). It is difficult to say how general this

sort of thing is, because researchers unfortunately are likely to opt out of the process; there is no point working on a proposal that is sure to be rejected.

> The anecdotal litany of IRB zeal includes members of preliterate tribes being asked to sign consent forms; faculty members 'investigated' for writing about their classroom experiences years earlier without advance IRB approval; projects so delayed that students were unable to complete their degrees … Mission creep damages the entire compliance system, because researchers find IRB requirements to be overwhelming and sometimes illogical. One example of this is consent forms running 20 pages or more. They are so long and detailed that most subjects, it has been observed, sign without reading them. (Centre for Advanced Study, 2005: 5, 12)

That last is a shining example of what Corrigan calls 'empty ethics' (Corrigan, 2003) – the triumph of style over substance. Consent is supposed to protect the interests of respondents, but it cannot cover all the circumstances in which the information may be used. Researchers have a duty to protect participants regardless of any formal procedure, and written consent is no guarantee that the rights of a participant will be respected (ASA, 2001: 2).

Conventional ethical guidance, and where it has gone wrong

Conventional representations of research ethics have tended to follow the lead given by medical sciences. Much of the received wisdom in the discussion of research ethics begins with the Nuremberg Code (1947). The Nuremberg trials established ten principles, covering:

- *the importance of the scientific basis of experiments:*
  - 'the experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society'
  - 'the experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study'
  - 'the degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment'
  - 'the experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons …'
- *the duty of the scientist to protect subjects:*
  - 'the experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury'

  - 'no experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur'
  - 'proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject'
  - 'during the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment'
- *the rights of human subjects to have a say:*
  - 'the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential'
  - 'during the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end'

The Nuremberg rules were a response to a particular set of abuses. They emphasise the process of research and the relationship of the researcher to people who participated in the research. They refer primarily to research 'experiments' – the word is found in nine of the ten principles. In an experiment, the researcher introduces some factor into a situation to see what effect it will have. That has an immediate ethical implication. If the researcher is setting out to do things to people, there is an obvious duty not to do bad things: *primum non nocere*. However, even within medical science, experimentation with human participants is only a small part of the range of research activity. Researchers can affect the position of people who are being studied even if that is not what they intend to do: that is the lesson of the 'Hawthorne effect' (Olson et al, 2004). But changing other people is not the primary purpose of most research, and even when it is an objective, the people most affected are not necessarily participants in the research process.

Most ethical codes in the social sciences make recommendations about:

- the impact of research, including:
  - the potential implications of research for participants
  - the potential implications of research for non-participants, and
  - the uses to which research can be put
- the way that participants are treated:
  - informed consent
  - confidentiality and anonymity, and
  - special consideration of vulnerable respondents
- disciplinary considerations, asking researchers to:
  - maintain research of high quality
  - display competence
  - act responsibly towards others in their field, and
  - advance their discipline
- the research relationship, including:
  - the responsibilities of the researcher to the body commissioning the research

- responsibilities to the host institution
- commitments to fellow researchers
- conflicts of interest, and
- integrity in dealing with participants and stakeholders.

The emphasis on the treatment of participants reflects the particular influence of the Nuremberg rules, and arguably the broader influence of medical sciences on other fields of activity. These rules relating to participants impinge in particular on the research process, and because of that they have been taken to apply in almost all research with human subjects. However, they have serious shortcomings. On one hand, they cannot engage with all the ethical issues that arise in the course of research; but on the other, they have been taken to impose limitations on the process of research of all kinds. Among the most prominent restrictions, from a large helping of inappropriate criteria, are rules concerning competence, voluntary participation and informed consent.

Competence

The Socio-Legal Studies Association suggests that it is unethical to do work which one is not competent to tackle. Members should not undertake work of a kind that they are not competent to carry out and should not ask sociolegal researchers under their supervision or guidance to carry out work which those researchers are not competent to carry out, or they themselves are not competent to supervise (SLSA, 2009: 2.2.1). If that was taken literally, learning how to research through practice would be illegitimate, and the demands of a PhD would probably be unachievable: no one can be sure that original insight is within their competence until they produce it. I would be far more worried about a student who was convinced that nothing was beyond their competence than one who had reasonable doubts.

Much of the point of doing research is to find out about things we don't know, and that always raises the possibility that things may be uncovered that we don't know how to interpret or respond to. The British Sociological Association treats competence as a matter of professional integrity: 'While recognising that training and skills are necessary for sociological practice – and, particularly for conduct of social research – sociologists should themselves recognise the boundaries of their professional competence. They should not accept work of a kind that they are not qualified to carry out' (The British Sociologial Association, 2017: 4).

This is dangerous ground. Incompetence, Kruger and Dunning argue, is commonly marked by a failure to understand what competence requires. People who are incompetent often don't realise it; the same skills and knowledge which would lead them to be self-critical are precisely the

skills and knowledge they don't have. 'We propose that those with limited knowledge in a domain suffer a dual burden: not only do they reach mistaken conclusions and make regrettable errors, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it' (Kruger and Dunning, 1999: 1121).

It seems, then, that we are demanding ethical compliance in situations when almost by definition people lack the insight or information to know that their actions might be unethical. That is a recipe for conflict and confusion – not all of it on the part of the researchers. There may be researchers who lack the insight to understand why other people are saying that their work is inadequate; but equally, there are ethical review committees where possibly no one has the specialist knowledge or disciplinary background to understand what the researcher is doing, and they put obstacles in the way of the work (Israel, 2004). Likewise, there are disciplinary researchers who do not understand the scope of alternative methodologies. For example, there are those who are ready to demand that other researchers should confine their research to an approved style of research: 'Graduate students in psychology are routinely taught the importance of delineating one's hypotheses in advance (i.e., prior to collecting data). Established researchers continue to regard it as questionable and possibly unethical to theorize after one's empirical results are known' (Baumeister and Leary, 1997: 313). It seems that by their lights the only competent way to conduct research is deductively. By that test, qualitative, inductive, intensive, abductive, empowering and practice-based research are all 'questionable and possibly unethical'. That says more about the limitations of those imposing these standards than it does about ethical methodology.

Voluntary participation

The UK Research Councils have told universities that 'Research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion,' and that compliance with their recommendations is mandatory. So, the British Society of Criminology states that the people who are being researched must be able to 'Take part in research voluntarily, free from any concern and be able to give freely informed consent in all but exceptional circumstances (exceptional in this context relates to exceptional importance of the topic rather than difficulty of gaining access)' (BSC, 2015). That seems to say that a criminologist cannot report on a trial unless everyone has agreed to be part of both the trial process and the research.

There are different kinds of involuntary participation in research, and it may be helpful to distinguish disengaged and engaged forms. People can be part of research simply because they are being observed, or their data are being used, or they have a part in a situation (for example, someone involved in the operation of a law court or a person in a crowd). This is sometimes,

not always helpfully, referred to as 'covert' research, which seems to imply that the researcher is doing something surreptitious; more precisely, it is research where there is 'limited disclosure' (NHMRC, 2018: 2.3), and the subject may not even know that research is going on. There tends to be a presumption that this is illegitimate, but that is far from clear; there are many circumstances where a researcher may not think it appropriate to engage with the involuntary participant, either because it will change the behaviour that the researcher legitimately wishes to examine, or because there is simply no need to do so. This is typically the case for work done in the public sphere – a broad term which stretches to behaviour in public, socially defined public acts (such as motoring), public affairs and published material.

More problematically, there are also circumstances where there may legitimately be involuntary engagement with the research process. In organisational research, individual respondents are constrained by their organisational roles, their contractual relationships with the organisation, and potentially by legal restrictions. This means that the participation and consent that is required is offered by the organisation, not from the individuals engaged with it – and comments and findings will routinely be reported to the organisation. In other cases, there is a strong case for organisations to be publicly accountable: the Canadian Tri-Boards say explicitly that in critical inquiry 'that is, the analysis of social structures or activities, public policies or other social phenomena', 'permission is not required from an institution, organization or other group in order to conduct research on them' (Government of Canada, 2018, article 3.6). The work done by government is, in general terms, fair game: many researchers would consider that as citizens they have a duty to scrutinise, publicise and hold the government to account. Some information relates to circumstances that the researcher (or any member of the public) could legitimately seek. Freedom of Information requests, made to government, are the right of every citizen. (One of my very first research projects was based on material that local authorities had a statutory obligation to publish and make available; and so my first step, in asking for material, was to find out whether or not the local authorities were complying with the law.) Government activity takes place in the public domain, and consequently it is open to public scrutiny. The idea that no one can find things out about people without asking them personally first is wildly overgeneralised, obstructive and, at times, improper. The examination, scrutiny and criticism of public information are fundamental to a free society.

Informed consent

Voluntary participation depends on consent, but beyond that there is a demand for consent to be 'informed', and that calls for more than acquiescence. Informed consent means that the participants should be told

what the research is for, why it is being done and how the information will be used, and that calls for a process that is distinct from, and prior to, empirical research. A prominent example is the policy of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT's) Committee on the Use of Human Subjects, which requires that nearly all studies involving human subjects must obtain informed consent, usually in writing (COUHES, 2019). The American Anthropological Association puts it in these terms:

> Minimally, informed consent includes sharing with potential participants the research goals, methods, funding sources or sponsors, expected outcomes, anticipated impacts of the research, and the rights and responsibilities of research participants. … Researchers must present to research participants the possible impacts of participation, and make clear that despite their best efforts, confidentiality may be compromised or outcomes may differ from those anticipated. These expectations apply to all field data, regardless of medium. (AAA, 2012)

Grugulis tells us what this means in practice:

> I spent last year conducting an ethnography of a computer games company, watching the way people learned skills and the way they were managed. No under-18s, no members of vulnerable groups, no illegal activities. Everyone was told who I was in advance by the company, both company and individuals would be anonymised in any publications and before observing anyone I would ask their permission. … Enter the ethics committee. They insisted on full written consent from every worker in the offices (about 250), every delivery person and – on the occasions I went off for a chat with informants – every barrista who served us coffee and waitress who brought us pizzas (no, seriously). (Grugulis, 2011)

This is yet another example of a set of rules that do not sit well with the process of research in practice. It is not just that the rule is impractical; what it asks people to do may be impossible. There are many circumstances in which an academic researcher cannot actually tell the participant how the information is going to be used. That happens in part because the information from any individual respondent or participant can usually be understood only in the context of information retrieved from other participants – that is how data analysis is done. 'Social science data', Boden and her colleagues write,

> is not simply 'out there' waiting to be harvested by researchers. Rather, it is constructed in the course of its collection and subsequent analysis. … Social research data is thus necessarily continuously constructed, defined

> and redefined throughout the entire research process and is framed by and produced through social relationships and ongoing processes of analysis and writing, into and through the literature. The requirement for a priori definition of 'data' therefore runs the risk that the processes of ethical bureaucracy will prohibit or inhibit the collection/construction of data as currently understood. (Boden et al, 2009: 738)

It may well be that the researcher does not know what is going to be used in research, and what is not. Whyte's *Street Corner Society*, a sociological classic based on participant observation, explains one of the main justifications of the approach: researchers learn answers to questions that it would not have occurred to them to ask (Whyte, 1955). Researchers may not even know that what they are doing is research. Any researcher's knowledge is based on a range of experiences. Like many people in my field, I was a practitioner before I was an academic. I have written about issues that were based on my own observation or practice – for example, pieces I have written about compulsory treatment for mental illness or the distress of people trying to get access to social housing. The people I have written about did not know I was going to write about them; nor, at the time, did I. I have anonymised the details, and altered some salient facts, so that the people I am writing about are not in any way identifiable; but there was no consent.

Exemptions and exceptions

There is a further set of rules that demands consideration. Faced with the construction of a clumsy and overgeneralised set of rules governing research activity, it is not uncommon for exceptions to be made. Committees that supervise research into healthcare know very well that the same kinds of consideration do not apply to protocols for pharmaceutical testing or invasive surgery as they do to population studies or evaluation of local services. I have had research 'nodded through' ethical review in the past – questionably, because it does not follow that if people are not being cut open or drugged, there are no more ethical issues to consider (see, for example, Spicker and Gordon, 1998: Ch. 11). The MIT procedures allow for requirements for informed consent to be waived if there is no more than a minimal risk of harm to subjects (COUHES, 2019). The US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) already exempts 'benign' behavioural research, whatever that may be, and has consulted about introducing an exemption for minimal risk into the 'common rule' applying to research in government activity (DHHS, 2018). It gives a blanket exemption to work relating to public officials, candidates for public office and public service programmes (DHHS, 1991). Beyond that, going further than most European researchers would advocate, it treats some ethically sensitive work as exempt from ethical examination.

> The following activities are deemed not to be research:
>
> 1. Scholarly and journalistic activities (such as oral history, journalism, biography, literary criticism, legal research and historical scholarship) …;
> 2. Public health surveillance activities …;
> 3. Collection and analysis of information for a criminal justice agency for activities authorized by law …
> 4. Authorized operational activities … in support of intelligence, homeland security, defense or other national security missions. (DHHS, 2018)

Having sat for some years on a university's ethical review board, this all rings alarm bells. The greatest risks of harm seem to me to stem from projects where the researcher is dismissive, or more usually not aware, of potential ethical problems. Exemptions allow this kind of work to pass under the bar. There is no legitimate ethical position that holds that ethical arguments should be deemed never to apply.

The points I have been discussing – competence, voluntary participation and informed consent – can all be read back to the Nuremberg Code. There are obvious reasons why people should not normally be subjected to invasive surgery if they have not agreed to it – that is not true in all circumstances, but it can be accepted as the default position for elective surgery at least. Medical interventions need to be done by competent professionals, subjects must be free to withdraw, everyone must consent to the procedure.

Having said that, the problems identified here are symptomatic of a deeper problem than the interpretation of the Nuremberg Code itself. In the process of constructing generalised rules, the way those rules have been expressed often seems to be at odds with the demands of research in practice. The problem is not that these principles are plainly and flatly wrong – they are right in some contexts and wrong in others – but they are wrong often enough to raise questions about the validity of codes that rely on them. The social scientists who have enshrined these principles in their guidelines might perhaps have found some cases where the rule seemed appropriate, but if so they have ignored the rest. I think it more likely that they have framed their guidance in these terms because expressing ethical principles is difficult, they found similar rules in other codes, and they thought these principles were broadly accepted. However, neither of those explanations would justify the codes in their present form.

Ethical research

Ethical conduct is typically judged in three ways. The first approach is consequentialist: actions are considered in the light of their likely or intended

benefits, or potential harms. The desire to bring about good consequences is referred to as 'beneficence': the question of who benefits, and who is harmed, by the research. The RESPECT code, for example, suggests:

> It should be an overriding aim of socio-economic research that the results should benefit society, either directly or by generally improving human knowledge and understanding. It follows from this aim that in the conduct of the research, researchers should aim to avoid or minimise social harm to groups and individuals. With this in mind, socio-economic researchers and their funders should reflect on the consequences of participation in the research for all research subjects and stakeholders. (RESPECT Project, 2004)

The text of this guidance was developed through a process of negotiation by a group of people who came to it with different issues and agendas, and this brief passage segues across three different interpretations of beneficence. The first sentence is about beneficence in a general sense – the substantive benefits of research. The second sentence reduces this to a much less demanding criterion: 'non-maleficence', or doing no harm. (Even that may not be possible. Some research may be intended specifically to make its subjects worse off – for example, research on the effectiveness of punishment or economic disincentives.) The third sentence is about something different again: the position of people who participate in the research. It often happens that that the people participating in the research are not the subjects of it – a distinction that tends to be lost when well-meaning researchers complain about the use of the term 'subjects' – and, because scientific knowledge leans toward generalisation, it is only to be expected that the people who are most affected by research are not the participants.

The second approach is 'deontological' or principled: there are moral norms, codes and rules to follow, and conduct is ethical when it is consistent with those norms, and unethical when it is not. This has long been the primary paradigm in the governance of research ethics. But the staggering generality of the task should give us pause. Are there common rules, principles or values that can be applied across the range of all kinds of research? Some things are bound to be missed. No matter how good and well-constructed the material, a code of this sort cannot ever deal with the full range of ethical issues and problems that a researcher might encounter. The Social Research Association puts the point directly:

> no declaration could successfully impose a rigid set of rules to which social researchers everywhere should be expected to adhere, and this document does not attempt to do so. The aim of these guidelines is to enable the social researcher's individual ethical judgments and decisions

> to be informed by shared values and experience, rather than to be imposed by the profession. (SRA, 2003: 10)

Taking ethics seriously calls for a different approach to ethical rules. The British Psychological Society's (BPS's) professional guidance used to be highly prescriptive: for example, its 2009 code specifies on informed consent that psychologists should ensure that clients, particularly children and vulnerable adults, are given ample opportunity to understand the nature, purpose and anticipated consequences of any professional services or research participation, so that they may give informed consent to the extent that their capabilities allow. There were two pages on that topic alone. The BPS has radically reformed its approach in recent years – stripping down to core principles and indicating outlines rather than detailed rules (BPS, 2018). It proposes four central principles: respect, competence, responsibility and integrity. The principle of respect is explained in these terms:

> Respect for dignity recognises the inherent worth of all human beings, regardless of perceived or real differences in social status, ethnic origin, gender, capacities, or any other such group-based characteristics. This inherent worth means that all human beings are worthy of equal moral consideration.

Under this general heading, the BPS asks psychologists only to consider:

- Privacy and confidentiality;
- Respect;
- Communities and shared values within them;
- Impacts on the broader environment – living or otherwise;
- Issues of power;
- Consent;
- Self-determination;
- The importance of compassionate care, including empathy, sympathy, generosity, openness, distress tolerance, commitment and courage. (BPS, 2018: 3.1)

This does not try to tell people that there are rules and procedures that they must follow; rather, there are general principles that need to be thought about and taken into account. An ethical psychologist is asked to engage with ethical issues, to treat ethical consideration as a process, and to take a number of issues into consideration. The whole approach tends in the direction of the third main approach to ethical conduct: virtue ethics. It may not be possible to establish every principle, or to be aware of every possible consequence. What matters is that people try to do what is right, even if they get it wrong,

and that they are alert to the issues. This is how we teach people to be moral; not by rules, not by weighing costs and benefits, but by trying to behave well.

Virtue ethics begins, not from general principles, but from the person and the context where ethical principles might apply. Lawton and his colleagues see it as a difference between compliance-based and integrity-based ethical systems. Integrity-based systems emphasise moral sensitivity, the exercise of moral reasoning or judgement, moral motivation (that is, the place accorded to moral values) and moral character (Lawton et al, 2012). People who want to behave ethically need to engage with ethics and values, to examine the dimensions of ethical problems and anticipate their implications. The approach is based on a recognition of the conditional character of ethical behaviour, asking people who want to behave ethically to think about their behaviour in context. Virtue is not a guarantee against unethical behaviour, but it means at least that researchers will try to do what is right. There may be different ways of promoting ethical research in practice, but the common factor in all the stages will not be the programme of research, which is liable to change and morph as new information emerges; it is the presence of the researcher, and it is on the conduct and approach of the researcher that responsiveness to ethical issues depends. It can be fostered by education and training, but responsiveness depends on continuing engagement in ethical reflection.

Rethinking ethical research

Ethical review processes tend to be based on the assumption that the research will be designed by a principal researcher, that review can take place prior to engagement, and that the researcher can then manage the ethical implications in accordance with the guidance offered by ethical codes and the judgement of the review panel. That only works for a limited class of research activity. We need to think about research ethics in context, and to do that we need to think differently about research.

The place to begin is with a simple question: what is research? We need to understand that research happens in all kinds of settings and circumstances, and it takes many different forms. The Common Rule applied by the US Federal Government defines research in these terms: 'systematic investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge' (DHHS, 2018). That is wider than the conventional focus on research with human subjects, but it is still too narrow. Research is about more than the production of generalisable knowledge: investigations and evaluations are more usually particular rather than general. In simple terms, research is the task and process of finding things out. That might take in (among other things) scholarship, exploration, discovery, experimentation, analysis, disciplinary development, and practice. Sometimes researchers know what they want to investigate or examine;

sometimes they do not. Some research is concerned about relationships and generative mechanisms; some is about description and classification. Some research is carefully planned; some is serendipitous. Some research answers questions; some discovers the questions that might be asked later. Policymakers seeking 'ethical evidence' will often encounter many of these forms of research.

The second basic question that we need to consider: how do we know when research is happening? That question is not always obviously or straightforwardly answered. Long before anyone can come up with a 'research proposal', they need to find things out about the subject they are examining. My own work on public services has been built on a process of networking, discussion, engagement, preparing students for practice, visiting offices, asking questions and listening. In a nutshell, the process of preparing research itself begins with research. This matters, not just because it means that a process that focuses on formal research proposals cannot possibly cover the field, but because things can go wrong at any or every stage – the conception of the research, the development of aims, the construction of a plan of work, engagement with the subject matter, reporting and dissemination, and application. It follows that engagement with ethics needs to be continuous, and not confined to any single-stage process.

Third: who is a researcher? Many disciplinary codes, and processes such as ethical review committees, are intended to govern the behaviour of academic researchers. Research is done by many more people than that: journalists, investigators, lawyers, regulators, independent writers, practitioners, students and schoolchildren. If ethical conduct in research is to be identified by the kind of work being done, rather than by the person who is doing it, ethical principles have to apply to every possible group. This is reflected in how this volume addresses a broad range of practitioners, not just academic researchers. It makes no sense to say, for example, that a journalist or writer can legitimately produce a critical biography of an author, but an academic researcher cannot; or even that a child in primary school can be asked by their teacher to interview their grandparents, but that an academic who puts the same questions to the same people has to go through an ethical review process. If it's unethical for some, then, by whatever criteria we may apply, it's presumably unethical for others, too. Policymakers should be concerned about the ethics of all of these activities, not just academic research.

A fourth question: who is responsible for ethical conduct? The researcher is rarely the only person involved in managing the data and the presentation, and cannot presume to control the process: commissioned research has to be reported as it progresses, while in research units the information gets carried back to a research team. Research findings have to be processed, submitted to funders or editors, and may well be subject to peer review. Everyone involved in the process has to take some ethical responsibility. Researchers, stakeholders, peers and the users of research, including think

tanks and policymakers, all have things to say about the process of research; and where there are research participants, there is a strong case for bringing them into the discussion. The key is discursive engagement – encouraging ethical reflection by everyone involved.

Ethical consideration has to be seen as an integral part of research and practice. Because ethical rules cannot be treated as fixed and predictable, there needs to be an ethical discourse to be sure that researchers are aware of, and sensitive to, the ethical dimensions of their work. Ethical issues can arise at every stage of research: education, conception, development, proposal, process, conclusion and dissemination. The key to moral conduct rests, then, not in a single-stage process of review, but in continuous discursive engagement.

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