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3   Habitus: Terrorism and violent dispositions

Introduction

In the previous chapter, long-term processes, the pacification of populations and accompanying internalisation of social constraints were discussed. The duration of uninterrupted processes of pacification of behaviour, norms and emotions (Bogner 1992) are instrumental in the extent to which they are deeply engrained within the habitus and the degree to which taboos over the use of violence permeate through societies. The greater the numbers of generations that transmit passive norms and values to children, the more normative, robust and uncritically internalised they become. And the less likelihood there will be of these people becoming terrorists.

All forms of violence are affected by these processes yet rarely have they been completely eradicated. Emotions such as fear, insecurity, anger, rage and hatred remain embedded within social relations and activities and humans retain the biological capacity for aggression. Within societies, this potential is largely curbed through learning and internalising techniques of self-restraint. Thus there is an increase in 'the social constraint towards self-constraint' (Elias 2000: 365). However, in particular environments emotions can prove more powerful than incomplete processes of self-restraint. Violence in western social spaces is legally restricted to sporting occasions and cultural exhibitions yet remains a feature of school, gang and nightlife cultures. In other words, although there has been a substantial shift in the extent that violence is acceptable, and the locations where it can be practised, residues remain within mainstream societies despite generations of pacification. Particular concentrations of aggression are located within specific habitus. Conversely, in 'failed states' associated with endemic aggression and chaos such as Somalia, violence is deeply embedded within social relations and activities. Since colonialism, chains of interdependence have regularly been interrupted, social and self constraint mechanisms have been displaced and previously controlled hostilities and tensions have burst loose alongside new forms. Traumatic periods with shifting alliances, resources, power relations and socio-economic opportunities and threats inhibit the reformulation of stable habitus in which behaviour can be sufficiently restrained by

self and social constraints. Armed robberies, tribal attacks, kidnapping, murder, political assassination and widespread acts of terrorism are commonplace. People are living with greater danger and uncertainty and as a consequence react to events and experiences more emotively. Violence is an accepted form of response to the surroundings.[1]

Perhaps surprisingly, extensive and widespread levels of violence are not essential for terror groups to form. On the contrary, terror groups emerge in societies which appear at first glance to be pacified. That political aggression does occur suggests that beneath the passive façade, residues of violence remain embedded within social and individual personality structures. Adopting the concept of habitus, in this chapter I examine the extent to which violence is entwined within feelings and behaviours in communities and dispositions. Reasons for the violent past remaining resonate within the present are discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some of the ways through which related ideas, feelings and behaviours are transmitted. I should acknowledge that this is not an exhaustive critical evaluation of the concept. Instead my ambitions are more restrained, orientated towards the application of habitus to processes within terrorism.

Establishing Habitus

Through the contributions of Bourdieu and Elias habitus has become an influential concept within sociological studies that seek to understand conformity and change. Prior to their applications Van Krieken (1998) draws attention to the neglect of dispositions and habits within sociology. As with history, habits also seem to have been disregarded. Yet as Jenkins (2002) and van Krieken (1998) detail Durkheim, Hegel, Husserl and Weber identified the centrality of habits within traditional and modern forms of behaviour.[2] Subsequently, habits became subsumed within the application of the concept of socialisation while 'folkways' largely disappeared from sociological syntax during the 1980s. Through this incorporation, van Krieken argues habit as a concept has become immersed within the wider debate over the extent to which socialisation is deterministic. What Weber (1978) described as the 'inner habitus' has slipped from sociological consciousness.

Building upon the previous chapter there is an obvious overlap between history and habitus. If we are to understand the latter today we must possess knowledge about the social activities and ideas that have re-formulated over generations and which are largely accepted uncritically. Social memory is narrated by legitimised agents of memory and reflective, symbolic practices. Representations of the past are entwined within individual and social habitus and 'the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individuals' (Elias 1996: 19). As such historical narrative helps to shape contemporary meaning and behaviour. The past lives on within collective memory, albeit subject to transformation, intersecting with recent experiences and reflections. In the examples of Golden Ages conversely history is both re-energised and frozen in the present.

By adapting the concept, both Bourdieu and Elias sought to overcome the individual and society dichotomy that has bedevilled sociology. For Elias (1991: 182) 'The social habitus of individuals, forms, as it were, the soil from which grow the personal characteristics through which an individual differs from other members of society'. Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 189-90) considered habitus to be,

> The product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history (e.g. of language, economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions… each *individual system of dispositions* may be seen as a *structural variant* of all the other group or class habitus, expressing the difference between trajectories and positions inside and outside the class.

It is thus both structured and structuring, product and producer of social worlds (Crossley 2003). Elias also draws together the inherent interrelationship between individual and social and in the process helps to explain individual and social commonality and difference. Social habitus refers to learned dispositions that are shared by people in a group, community or society. Individual habitus describes a person's learned and particular emotional and behavioural dispositions.

Following on from these points, I am arguing that studying historical processes will enable greater insight into the experiences of social life as they are lived today. Habitus is not however a rooted, immutable point in human development. Just as individual personalities will change over time, as people learn from others, mature, have different experiences and exposure to transforming agents and conditions, social habitus shifts. Personality structures change in accordance with the nature of the contexts and transitory human activities and interactions. Individual and social norms, values and habits continue to re-formulate within modern societies meaning that individual and social habitus are located at particular periods of history and represent personality structures of a particular social figuration. Crucially though, the complex nature of increasingly convoluted social processes and activities mean that the outcomes of actions and policies will have unintended consequences; the more people who are affected the more difficult the outcomes are to control. This creates problems for individual and social personality structures, namely what happens when the dynamic of social processes is rapidly transformed and the habitus is lagging behind? Does the habitus shift to accommodate the changes or do people seek to protect their identities and/or resist or challenge the broader processes. Elias (1991: 211) describes this as a 'drag effect' and argues that responses to the unplanned development processes will depend,

> on the relative strength of the social shift and deep-rootedness and
> therefore the resistance of the social habitus whether – and how quickly
> – the dynamic of the unplanned social process brings about a more or
> less radical restructuring of this habitus, or whether the social habitus of
> individuals successfully opposes the social dynamic, either by slowing it
> down or blocking it entirely. … One has the impression that the solidity,
> the resistance, the deep-rootedness of the social habitus of individuals in
> a survival unit is greater the longer and more continuous the chain of
> generations within which a certain habitus has been transmitted from
> parents to children.

To some extent, the remainder of the chapter, and part of the following chapter, explore restraints within different habitus and shifts according to intersections with social, cultural, economic and political developments. Social habitus is more closely

examined here and developed through an exploration of individual shifts within processes of radicalisation in the next chapter.

Within the contributions of Bourdieu and Elias there are considerable similarities, including the emphasis upon learned dispositions and the acknowledgment that 'the habitus, is a product of history' (Jenkins 2002: 80). Inevitably there are also differences and aspects of underdevelopment. I have tended to be more sympathetic to Elias' application because of its fluidity and greater emphasis upon historical continuities and legacies of earlier forms of conflict.[3] In this chapter I seek to draw together historical and contemporary forms of habitus that are instrumental within the formation of terrorism.

Violence and restraints within habitus

Across nation-states there have been noticeable shifts in levels of restraints as governments have become more powerful. And if nation-states are to be defined at least in part by the protection and control they provide, then as Weber (1978) identified a monopoly of the means of violence within a designated territory is essential. Providing leaders have sufficient power, this can initially be achieved against the wishes of the population. If however the regime is looking at legitimacy and longevity, its prospects would be enhanced if the social habitus incorporated norms and values that contributed to a shift away from public violence and the need for socially imposed constraints. Instead of excessive and costly displays of military threat that insist upon obedience, individuals internalise constraints over generations. And with the demise of religious institutions, covert and overt responsibility is shared across a multitude of agencies including legal systems, public education, government departments, the mass media and cultural industries. Prohibitive threats are only effective when they are in place and the personnel, armaments and accompanying bureaucracy are expensive. By comparison, when lengthening chains of mutual interdependence are in place and sufficient restraints have been internalised, the state can more confidently reduce levels of physical security. Nevertheless, no state can be completely confident in the balance of self and social restraints. Both are vulnerable to fluctuation according to events and experiences and the durability of passive social relations and activities. For instance, as Bourdieu (2000) discussed with regards to

rising levels of protest in France, some assumptions and habits that are embedded within everyday life can quickly become out of step during moments of crisis and are replaced by more critical forms of social agency.[4] And as Crossley (2003: 49) comments in his critical application of Bourdieu to social movements, considerable emphasis is placed upon the emergence of 'protest repertoires' during times of crises. 'Protest behaviour tends to draw upon a stock of historically and culturally variable "techniques" of protest which agents learn: for example, petitioning, marching, occupation, tunnelling and bombmaking'. Thus, as Elias outlined above, there is a process of adjustment during and following interactions between habitus and the social environment and accompanying threats, opportunities, freedoms and controls.

Violence can therefore be part of protest repertoires particularly during crises. Clearly the stock of techniques to be learnt is crucial to the evolution of terrorism. Attention must also be placed upon the synchronic attitudes towards, and practices of, continuing acts of violence within mainstream society. Areas that are associated with Islamic terrorism today have long been associated with violence. At an international level, Saudi Arabia is one of the most prominent nation-states within perceptions of terrorism. Out of the 19 bombers in the attacks upon America, 15 were Saudis. Furthermore, Niblock (2006) reports that in 2004, 25 per cent of Guantanamo Bay detainees were Saudis and 10,000 of its citizens were estimated to have been recruited into al-Qa'ida forces in Afghanistan, 2001.[5] Within Saudi Arabia there have been regular bursts of political violence, including terror attacks, throughout the first decade of the twenty first century. The immediate forerunners of the late 1990s and 2000s militants were the Wahhabis who seized the Great Mosque in 1979. Their historical lineage can be located with the *Ikhwan* who had fought since 1912 for the formation of the Saudi state. The *Ikhwan* committed thousands of violent killings and mutilations (Allen 2006) until they were defeated by forces loyal to Ibn Saud after challenging his authority. The 1979 militants shared the same Nadji heartland as the *Ikhwan*. Moreover, the association of the region with violence long predates contemporary fears over al-Qa'ida. For instance, in 1863, William Gifford Palgrave when travelling through the region declared it to be 'the genuine Wahhabee country … the stronghold of fanatics, who consider everyone save themselves an infidel or a heretic, and who regard the slaughter of an infidel or a heretic as a duty, at least a

merit…'.[6] This may at first glance seem to connect into Weber's (1966) argument that warriors seeking to conquer the world were the 'primary carrier' of Islam.

Violence within Islam was, for Weber, embedded within the religious discourse as evidenced by the use of force by Muhammed and his successors. Today's application of *jihad* could be considered to be an inevitable component stemming from the discursive foundations, part of an aggressive continuum. For the purposes of this chapter, this is problematic at three levels. First, Turner (1993) points out that Weber's characterisation of Islam grossly overlooks the vicissitudes within Islam, historical transformations and instrumental roles of diplomacy, trade, commerce and conversion within the dynamics of expansion. Second, today as in the eighth century, the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not engage in political violence. Third, Islam becomes both discourse and causal factor for violence and the social processes that contribute to aggressive behaviour are neglected or oversimplified (Sutton and Vertigans 2005). Nevertheless, despite these inaccuracies, the warrior tradition continues to permeate both within Western fears and militant reinterpretations. For example, members associated with al-Qa'ida exemplify this when describing themselves as 'holy warriors.' Hence the contemporary militant memory contains the narrative of the warrior tradition.

Violent pasts are, of course, hardly unusual. Aggressive struggles over discourse, resources and power feature throughout history and across societies. Yet terrorism is not a feature of all societies that have encountered a violent past. Therefore I am not arguing that an aggressive heritage inevitably results in subsequent terror. My central argument here is that ongoing and recent terrorism emerges out of environments where the pacification of behaviour, norms and emotions has been interrupted, partial or lacks longevity. In other words processes of pacification are not robust and normative, uncritically internalised over generations. Numerous illustrative examples can be found within South America where terrorism has been, and continues to be, prominent.

The history of violence and civil wars in Colombia Waldmann (2007:594) suggests extends 150 years: 'almost every aspect of life has been shaped and marked by these forms of violence in one way or another'. Without a secure nationwide monopoly of

violence and with ineffective law, Colombia's system of order is based upon fluid, unstable coalitions of civilian, criminal and government agencies. For Pécaut (discussed in Waldmann) violence and coercion are fixed components within social and political systems and the pursuit of aims. With limited restrictions upon the use of violence, aggressive behaviour becomes normative. Waldmann (2007: 596) argues that in Colombia this has resulted in escalations into 'orgies of violence' within 'a cult of annihilation of enemies.' Other factors to consider within this culture of violence, include the rigid demarcations between friend and foe, a celebration of machismo of which violence is an integral component and fatalism within a 'live for today' approach to life.

In Peru Poole and Rénique (2003) identify the continued presence of violence within employment and economic practices, state abuses and opposition tactics. The terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s extended the usage of violence both in terms of targets, in particular civilians, and the nature of attacks which included torture, rape and executions as military and paramilitary 'death caravans' toured competitively through rural areas. The Peruvian Communist Party – Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) or Shining Path, were heavily involved within the spiralling political violence. The adoption of terror tactics by the Far Left was not unusual. Groups had undertaken economic sabotage and military engagement with government forces. The 1980s marked a shift in tactics as the Shining Path built upon the perceived failures of lesser forms of violence and extended targets to include all those who did not support the group. Spiralling violence was marked even by the standards of preceding generations[7] to such an extent that it was described as the 'manchay tiempo' or time of fear (ibid.). In essence the previous forms of violence informed the group habitus about its essentiality and became the benchmark by which to measure the likely effectiveness of actions. Thus, revolutionary violence was considered to be the only mechanism that could defeat state sponsored violence. With this hypothesis, the nature and breadth of terror that is unleashed becomes an integral measure towards revolution. Reform programmes that reallocated land, created massive agricultural co-operatives, fuelled massive migration to urban areas and,

> hastened the breakdown of Andean society …. When, after 1975, the
> military government went into a crisis … the great associative enterprises

were left like semi-abandoned and demoralized garrisons, scattered in the power vacuum left by the state's retreat from the countryside (Degregori (1997: 40).

The demise of the old oligarchical order, a previous history of authoritarianism and failure of the government to embed regional and national democratic reforms in the late 1970s meant that the appeal of totalitarianism rose as a solution to the disorder and decay. When developed within the culture of violence, the nature of the discursive consciousness and conviction lead to a further diminution of social and individual restraints. The spiralling effect within these habitus is particularly striking. Moss (1997) compares the level of violence within Peru (25,000 deaths) and Sri Lanka (between 70,000 and 90,000) with Italy, around 400 murders. Clearly the amount of killings is heavily influenced by regimes' tactics and the number of insurgents capable of political violence. In Peru there were around 25,000 insurgents compared with a few hundred Italians involved in clandestine violence. Yet the figures fail to explain why violence became so brutally endemic in Peru. In part this can be considered to be a consequence of the correlation between the numbers of insurgents and levels of fear. Simplistically the number of insurgents is reflected in the level of fear amongst the population and government forces contributing to a higher density of violence. In turn this contributes to spiralling levels of uncertainty, insecurity and hatred, which further weaken social restraints against the use of violence. This may partly explain why widespread civil conflicts generate greater number of deaths and atrocities than many other locations experiencing more clearly demarcated forms of terrorism.

Across other regions numerous other more explicitly terror groups have emerged following the demise of norms and values based around family, community customs and religion and prior to the internalisation of a new comprehensive system within individual and social habitus. Italy is a very good example with the situation compounded by malfunctioning political systems, weak national consciousness and migration from southern regions to the north and from rural to urban areas (Pisano 1979, Vinci 1979). The shifting populations placed unbearable burdens upon social services within the popular locations while simultaneously the dispositions of significant numbers of people were lagging behind the social and economic

transformations they were experiencing. Moreover, existing discursive frameworks were in crisis through association with Mussolini's fascism, post Second World War political stagnation, instability, corruption and the gradual weakening of Catholicism's hold upon morality. In these circumstances, groups that offered explanations and solutions found appeal (Jamieson 1989, Lumley 1990, Silj 1979, Tarrow 1989, Weinberg 1986).

State and civil spillover

The centrality of the state in the monopoly of violence and shifting restraints has already been established. Despite the gradual transformation towards pacification, episodes of terrorism indicate that processes are incomplete. In some locations it is possible to argue that nation-states' approaches to violence are contributing to aggression becoming, or remaining, integral within some layers of habitus. Spillover theory suggests that there is a relationship between the extent that a state legitimises violence in certain situations and more illegitimate forms of violence such as armed robbery and murder. Although the state only permits violence within demarcated spheres the accompanying values and justification 'spillover' into other social contexts. Thus to declare that people in favour of the death penalty will be less constrained to support other forms of violence would be a reasonable supposition. Equally in societies where capital punishment is public, members of the civilian population are likely to have a different perspective towards the application of violence. Thus in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim systems of jurisprudence which implement a literal interpretation of Shari'ah law violence is a more integral method of punishment. Chopping off right hands, stoning adulterers and beheading murderers in public both reflect and reinforce habitus and the acceptance of violence as a solution.[8] For Bowers' (1984) brutalization thesis, the death penalty and, by extension, capital punishment desensitise people to killing. Human life is devalued and the policy provides the rationale to attack those who cause offence to the individual or collective identification. The boundaries for spillover become particularly blurred when the same concepts are both implicitly supported by governments and utilised by the opposition to legitimise acts of political violence. Thus the interwoven teaching of *jihad* as a form of attack and sacrifice/martyrdom permeates through Muslim societies alongside the emphasis upon submission to

religious leaders. The repetitive and widespread acceptance of the literal necessity and compatibility between both applications has become part of absolutist narrative and the benchmark for behaviour within political circles and beyond. Compromise and achieving the potentially contradictory standards becomes increasingly difficult. As a consequence, government discourse is often challenged against criteria they helped to formulate for its un-Islamic nature.

Within the West, the United States provides an excellent example of the prevalence of violence and associated ambiguities within even the most modern of nations.[9] Mennell (2007: 1) illuminates this when observing how 'the laws and customs only weakly restrain people from doing harm to themselves and others by the use of guns, and the murder rate is about four times as high per capita as in Western Europe'. The widespread availability of guns is allied to the integral symbolism of weapons within We-images of (white[10]) America. In essence the gun is symbolic within lifestyles of large segments of American society and arouses heightened emotions within the pro and anti lobbies (Crothers 2002, Karl 1995, Levitas 2002). The coinciding huge surges both in gun ownership in the mid nineteenth century and homicide rates would seem to endorse a possible connection. Alongside the individual's right to bear arms, formal levels of pacification are further challenged by state sponsored violence. The death penalty continues to be carried out within particular states. These states were part of the confederacy that fought to retain slavery in the American civil war and included regions where, rarely punished, lynching of blacks continued well into the twentieth century. In these locations, honour between whites continued to be emphasised before and after the civil war. Quarrels were often resolved according to informal codes and violent responses to particular provocations were considered appropriate.[11] White dominance over blacks was normalised throughout slavery and beyond. Power was asserted within daily life in the nature of social interactions and physical, social and psychological demarcations between white and black zones. Violence against blacks was a prominent mechanism both in reinforcing perceptions of white dominance and imposing social restraint upon blacks. Aggressive attacks like these were largely ignored by law enforcement agencies.[12] In comparison with this neglect, today there is considerable public support[13] for the application of the death penalty. However, this apparent contradiction reflects a shift within those same states from popular support for 'extra judicial' murder of overwhelmingly black males

to state sponsored killing of black males who are significantly over represented amongst those who are executed (Zimring 2003).   Arguably the continuation of these policies has meant that ritualised violence has remained embedded within largely right-wing layers of dispositions which Mennell (2007) notes is more strongly represented in America than in most other Western nation-states.

Alongside the incorporation of violence within national habitus, governments also contribute to the interweaving of aggression, ideas and feelings. This has been particularly noticeable within many Muslim nation-states as governments have either utilised anti-American sentiments to generate support or sought to overcome the perceptions of themselves as USA stooges. Thus governments that are considered Western allies such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have publicly or complicitly encouraged anti-Western rhetoric. Abdallah (2006: 46) draws upon the 'paradox of Mubarak's regime … [in] an era in which Egyptian-American relations were consolidated at economic and military levels although political discourse and media exposure were more anti-American.' Arguably such sentiments are even more pronounced in Saudi Arabia where distinctions within Wahhabism between 'loyalty and disassociation' encourage distance from infidels (Hegghammer 2009). Demarcations are further reinforced through perceptions of superiority and lack of social contact with non Muslims which tend to result in portrayals of Westerners being somewhat crude and stereotypical. That terrorism by Saudi nationals has been directed more towards Western targets than the regime is perhaps not surprising in light of this.[14] The fundamental problem with this political manoeuvring is therefore that it contributes to the further normalisation of aggression within the national habitus.

National symbolism also features within sedimented feelings towards violence. Symbols of destruction and aggression are noticeable throughout many leading nation-states with military apparatus integral to the dominance. Power has been secured regularly through political violence or military coups across South America, Asia and Africa. Furthermore, major conflicts continue to threaten or engulf regions in places such as Indonesia, Algeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Chechnya and the Middle East. There are two particular examples of militarism that in part reflect regional uncertainties that I wish to draw upon. Over recent years Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

have invested heavily in armaments. Both have experienced substantial episodes of terrorism within their nation-states. I am not arguing that there is a ludicrously simple causal relationship here. The amount of money spent on tanks does not correlate to the number and magnitude of terror attacks. Nevertheless, this is another facet of the respective societies that further reinforces the incorporation of violence within social and political relations which contribute to the justification of terrorism within particular locations.

Bandura's (1976: 128) observation provides an apt summary for this section: societies with 'extensive training in aggression and [which] make it an index of manliness or personal worth' spend greater 'time threatening, fighting, maiming and killing each other' in comparison to 'cultures where interpersonal aggression is discouraged and devalued'.

Community Layers

Contrary to the popular portrayal of the 'evil' terrorist who by implication is innately wicked, and thus beyond redemption, radical discursive consciousness forms within social interaction. This is not restricted to intergenerational acts of political violence but also the ideas and forms of behaviour which are retained within the broader habitus. These social personality structures do not inevitably mean that all people who hold the related values become violent generally and terrorists in particular. The following chapter aims to detail how complicated and difficult this process is. Nevertheless, the broader communal habitus does contribute to processes of radicalism and provides the normative standards for feelings and behaviour. Immersion within particular social habitus contributes to the internalisation of particular beliefs and values and adaptation of forms of behaviour. Arguably this habitus is instrumental in determining the likelihood that individuals will be exposed to, and internalise, radical discourses and the legitimising experiences.

Nationalist communities are the most obvious example of this. In some instances these are not widely dissimilar from radical ideas within the habitus of terrorists. Such pathways into terrorism often commence with the complimentary discursive consciousness that is acquired within, and shared with, communities. For instance, as

I discussed above, the code of honour and racial supremacy continues to be sedimented within American regionalised characteristics. When this is intersected by the acceptance of armed civilians, complicit allowance of militias and vigilantes and 'ethic of self-help' (Spierenburg 2006: 110), there is a fundamental shift to racially inspired political violence 'in defence' of white rights. However, these factors will only become instrumental if processes of pacification and individual restraints are not well embedded. In America, as Mennell (2007) explains, the higher incidence of affective homicides when compared to West European nations, indicates that '"the muting of the drives" (Elias 2000) has been less effective than in equivalent parts of Europe.' Obviously easier access to guns is also a factor and arguably is indicative of the different approaches and levels of control. Conversely, when restraints are imposed such as New York's drive to reduce gun crime, they can be effective. Nevertheless, the extent to which emphasis can shift over the longer term from government to individual controls will depend heavily upon the restraints becoming sufficiently embedded and robust within individual and social dispositions. As I explained earlier this requires security and trust which cannot be formulated and deeply embedded over the short term. Challenges over the monopoly of violence allied to the insecurities, threats and fears that were prevalent within slavery and subsequent racial structural arrangements inhibited the shift towards self-restraint. Today heightened fears over employment, immigration and insecurities stemming from crime and terrorism have connected into the history of self-defence and militias. 'Citizen volunteers' such as the Minutemen, many of whom are armed and supported by white supremacist groups, in Arizona have worked alongside border patrols in seeking to stem illegal entry. And because of the blurred boundaries between volunteer and extremist groups, the incorporation of the Minutemen provides formal legitimacy to the racial underpinning for the immigration patrols that extends into radical ideas within habitus.

Within communities that are demarcated according to nationality, ethnicity or religion, interaction across the boundaries is usually restricted and the limited social interactions contribute to the foundation of stereotypes which become embedded both within 'We' identification and stigmatisation of the other, following what Fanon (2007: 81) described as the Aristotelian logic of the 'principle of reciprocal exclusivity'. Collective memories abound with narrative and images that are

associated with particular spaces and contribute to the demarcation. Agents of memory create and re-create representations with place, time and peoples. The Palestinian territories and Northern Ireland provide illuminating examples with divisions accepted, encouraged and contributing towards collective forms of identification and detachment. For instance, in 1968 just prior to the 'Troubles', two thirds of all families lived in the streets of Belfast, Northern Ireland, where 91 per cent of households belonged to the same religion (Arthur 1997). Urban interfaces are strategically marked with opposing flags, emblems, murals and graffiti to reinforce collective memories and consciousness. Historical images are utilised to connect with the present. And with the gradual demise of previous generations who had participated in the Somme, Easter Rising, war for independence, partition or civil war, agents of memories have been essential within the utilisation of historical images in the maintenance of common memories. For loyalists, Jarman (1997) argues, Unionist iconography tends to depict the past in terms of blood sacrifice, Catholic duplicity and fear of betrayal (by the British). Sacrifice also features prominently within nationalist iconography. These help to reinforce positive perceptions of the in-group. By comparison, the 'other' is an established figure of hatred with accompanying feelings and emotions inculcated into individuals from childhood. Social exchanges between the opposing groups are restricted to verbal and physical forms of violence. Symbols become integral in reinforcing negative emotions about the other and with limited interaction, there is little opportunity to offset the stereotypes with contradictory experiences. Thus, after over ten years of peace in Northern Ireland physical and psychological divisions remain between the respective We groups and the possibility of more widespread forms of reciprocal political violence remains.

Alongside physical barriers, social and cultural boundaries have reformulated distinctions with habitus. For instance, the Gaelic challenge to Anglicization within Ireland towards the end of the nineteenth century reenergised the Irish language, poems, songs, legends, folk tales and clothes (Foster 1989). In this regard there was a reconnection with the traditional interconnection between literature and politics that has often been described as a 'bloody crossroads' (Kiberd 1992). Folk songs and music could be added to the catalogue. Although initially cultural, Gaelicization was to raise awareness, confidence and assertiveness in a sense of being Irish and related achievements that were to feed into and become interwoven with the republican

movement. Michael Collins, the IRA leader, declared that 'We only succeeded after we had begun to get back to our Irish ways'.[15]

As I discussed in the preceding chapter, previous violent experiences as both aggressor and victim can remain integral to the contemporary. The involvement of females (and males) within Chechen militant groups was heavily influenced by 'a mass societal trauma that still lives on in group consciousness' (Speckhard 2008: 1027). Recent actions by the Russian government are viewed through a continuum that incorporates confrontations between Chechens and infidel Russians since the eighteenth century. Mobilising history includes episodes under the rubric of *jihad* and mass deportation during Stalin's regime (Johnston 2008). When these actions are considered within a habitus that incorporates a duty to revenge, less constraints and greater liberation of women, as discussed in the previous chapter, feelings can transcend into behaviour which in Chechnya has meant women becoming terrorists and attacking Russian targets. However as the preceding chapter also indicated, women can become terrorists within environments that could, with some justification, be classified as patriarchal. In the Palestinian territories, there has been a shift in restraints as females were, initially begrudgingly, allowed to participate within terror attacks. Again if we examine forms of female behaviour that preceded the attacks, females of all ages were centrally located within the first *intifada*. Prior to that, women were involved within the secular precursors of today's more religious terror groups. Leila Khaled is the most notable example. Consequently, although there has been a subsequent shift in gender balance towards further male dominance, the legacy of greater female participation remains within the habitus. Compared to other Arab societies and while acknowledging that the society remain male-dominated, Copeland (2002: C1) argues 'Palestinian women have been the most liberated'. Similarly women continue to acquire higher education and pursue professional careers. For instance, Speckhard (2008) details the achievements and experiences of a couple of female suicide bombers which challenge the popular perception represented by Victor (2004) and the centrality of employment, educational and social restrictions to motivations. Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) also challenge the tendency to categorise Muslim suicide bombers, noticing that support for such attacks[16] and the 'cult of martyrdom' are much less noticeable within Chechnya than in the Palestinian territories.

In the studies that draw upon gender involvement, the numerous similarities between the sexes in terms of experience and motivations were overlooked. And this is symptomatic of most studies of gender which Fausto-Sterling (2000) argues continue to search for difference and not similarities. In terms of habitus, girls also attend kindergartens and school where they are exposed to a curriculum laden with declarations of Palestinian heroism, sacrifice, Israeli brutalities and the religious obligation to fight for Palestine (Burdman 2003, Oliver and Steinberg 2005).

By comparison, if the emotions within the group are more detached from the community, they will be more isolated. Shared historical memories and commonality of feelings between nationalist groups like IRA, ETA, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and Chechen militants communities were arguably factors behind their considerably greater levels of support compared to ideological groups such as Red Army Faction, Red Brigades and Japanese Red Army which failed to connect across their respective societies. And within these cultures of opposition or resistance (Foran 1997), there can be resources, traditions and symbols that stimulate feelings of endurance, determination and sacrifice in circumstances in which victory is by no means guaranteed. Instead, groups may adopt a long term strategy to which members contribute. These individuals may never witness the achievement of their goals and may never expect to. Yet their contributions to the possibility of an eventual victory provide sufficient satisfaction. Nevertheless these commonalities cannot be assumed to invariably provide the basis for nationalist support. Wieviorka (1997) details how this is contingent upon militants and populations sharing the same aspirations and, I would add, fears. Basque nationalism was seriously eroded by democracy alongside stability and prosperity: conditions which undermined the broader demands for independence while contributing to the acceleration of terrorism. Subsequent attempts by trans-national groups such as those associated with al-Qa'ida have also failed to recruit in massive numbers (Vertigans 2009). Arguably this is in part because the internalised historical memories and collective forms of national identification of potential supporters provide a defence against the emotive appeal of radicalism. There is a bounded restraint that is hard for alternative emotions to penetrate. Certainly people are angered by Western policy, outraged by Israeli incursions and morally repulsed by the deaths of women and children. Nevertheless,

the social constraints they have internalised and collective loyalties prevent these emotions from becoming triggers into terrorism. Within national settings such as Chechnya, Northern Ireland, the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka the emotions were more inclusive and representative of the communities. By comparison the feelings of the ideological and trans-national groups were more exclusive, not engaging with non participant's experiences.

Further important distinctions can be located within demarcated public spaces in localities such as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestinian territories, Kashmir, Philippines and Chechnya, large numbers of the respective populations share opinions about the nature of the problems (inequality, repression, poverty) they encounter, the cause (governing nation) and solution (independence). They also tend to share a reconstitution of history with narrative that affirms ethnic unity, heroism, cultural and political demarcations. This has enabled associated terrorists to largely be embedded within the communities. Emotions, discourse and strategic goals continued to be shared with family, friends and neighbours although not necessarily the adoption of violence. Within these localities conflicting beliefs become normative. They became sustained and reinforced by contemporary experiences, common history and discourse that groups such as the IRA, HAMAS, UVF and Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have been able to utilise in order to recruit members and retain wider support. In her study of political violence in Italy, della Porta (1995) identified the importance of police brutality, state authoritarianism and indiscriminate attacks against demonstrators and activists. These events and experiences contributed to an atmosphere in which violence was considered to be an appropriate, indeed the only, appropriate response to violence. Within these dynamics, spirals of hatred accelerate as state and non state actors become embedded within reciprocal forms of violence. If groups and surrounding 'civilians' continue to share sufficient emotions and experiences within these settings and the former are widely considered to be acting in support of the latter then the extent of detachment is restricted. This is not to say there is none; the clandestine nature of terrorism means that even within supportive communities, those participating within actions are unable to share their experiences and feelings with non members. By comparison, with the exception of the above Italian example, groups such as the 'red' groups of the 1970s and 1980s did not share dispositions with most of their societies and the emotional distance between them was greater.

Broader Movement

Forms of discursive consciousness feed into norms, behaviour and emotions, providing frameworks of explanation both for problems faced and solutions. The more successful groups tend to be part of a broader ideological movement with which they share a number of norms and values and which are explored in greater depth in the following chapter. Thus terror groups have formed at the extreme of numerous nationalist, Marxist and religious movements and multiple locations including South America, the Middle East, Western Africa, South and Southeast Asia. With regards to religiously inspired terror groups, Ranstorp (2003: 124) notes that 'Almost all the contemporary terrorist groups with a religious imperative are either offshoots or on the fringe of broader movements'. Today, it is possible to notice a shifting and blurring between ideological demarcations. Hybrids are forming between the discourses as singular forms become discredited by failure or pragmatism. Thus religion and nationalism is interwoven within diverse groups such as the Christian Far Right in America, Hindu Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, International Sikh Youth Federation in India while Marxism and nationalism can still be located within South American terror and guerrilla groups.

The foundations of pathways into terrorism very often occur within the community or nation. For instance, although groups such as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord and The Order were to some extent physically and psychologically detached from mainstream America, there was considerable overlap between their discourse and those of the dominant political hegemony of the period. As Hamm (2007) outlines, during the early 1980s the Christian Right was in the ascendancy and became interwoven within patriotism and conservatism. In this regard, the new movement should be considered as part of the legacy of Puritanism which is rooted within American conservatism, providing the moral framework with which to establish boundaries between good and evil. Populist campaigns that concentrated upon immigration, scarce public services and crime were implicitly underpinned with racial and migrant connotations. Through these relationships, the national religious curriculum within schools shifted in content, the traditional family was promoted as the cornerstone of American life. By comparison, matters such as abortion,[17]

pornography and homosexuality were widely denounced as immoral, the fallout from the 1960s permissiveness and counterculture. Radical groups 'were marching in lockstep with the Reagan-era zeitgeist' (Hamm 2007: 97).[18] These issues were happening alongside the 'great transformation of American society with regard to matters of race' (Omi and Winant 1994: 94) as white supremacy has been challenged from the early 1950s and ultimately replaced by the concept of 'racial equality.' Within the transformation, barriers to political and social participation were formally removed, much to the consternation of the white racialists. For them, as for other members in positions of perceived dominance, the changing nature of the relationship became a challenge to their super-ordination and the basis for their identified superiority. This is because,

> Even under the most favourable circumstances … a chain of several generations is usually needed in the life of a people for completion of the transformation of personality structures which facilitates the secure functioning of a multi-party parliamentary regime' (Elias 1996: 294).

Moreover earlier adoptions of violent behaviour can then become the best predictor of subsequent behaviour. Post et al. (2002) outline the predisposition within groups to become involved in violent campaigns when leaders and/or members have previous experience. The recruitment strategy of the Real IRA which targeted disaffected members of the Provisional IRA is indicative of this. Arguably this can also apply when other discursive groups have practised political violence during a preceding period as outlined in the previous chapter.

Groups not connected to broader social movements have tended to be, as Hewitt (2003: 61) remarks, 'small, short-lived and responsible for only a handful of incidents'. Within Europe it is illustrative to further compare the intensity and extent of 'red' terrorism in Italy and West Germany. In the previous chapter, I outlined historical reasons why terrorism was more extensive in Italy. There were also contemporary issues with which they interacted. Both countries experienced unrest. In Germany this was largely restricted to the student and counter culture movement. By comparison, the wave of unrest that spread within Italy during the late 1960s

incorporated both students and workers within uprisings, protests and strikes (Pisano 1979).

Threats to the habitus and solutions within

Within ideologies such as those associated with militant religious groups, the far right in the United States and, to a lesser extent, loyalists in Northern Ireland and pro government groups and death squads in Central America such as Mano Blanco (White Hand) in Guatemala, principles, beliefs and standards are embedded that stem from the past. To varying degrees, these are ideals that are rooted in perceptions of greatness, a 'Golden Age' when the discourse was implemented in its pure essence accompanied by actions of heroism and devotion that continue to be the source of pride within contemporary forms of identification. Long lasting fragments from previous forms of social habitus usually incorporating symbols and customs prove durable within modern dispositions. That these are socially constructed and the accuracy of the synchronic narrative questionable has become irrelevant with the passage of time. 'All traditions are created … through shared practice, and they can be profoundly and consciously modified and manipulated under the guise of a more legitimate earlier practice' (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996).

Ahmed (2004) and Akbar (2002) outline how the origins of Pakistan have proved instrumental in subsequent fears over challenges to (Sunni) Islam from neighbours, other religions and Islamic denominations, most notably Shi'a.[19] For instance, experiences under British colonialism, the gruesome massacres committed during partition of India, impressions of Islam being under threat, the usage of Islam as the one unifying form of consciousness and subsequent politicization and incorporation of Islam by governing regimes, most notably during the leadership of General Zia ul Haq[20] have all become interwoven within national and trans-national habitus. Akbar (2002) suggests that Zia's policies led to Islam being radicalised with contours reformulated. Hitherto, Christians had largely avoided the outbursts of violence. Now they became incorporated within the revised and extended demarcation lines between the Sunni Muslim 'We' and the remaining groups loosely categorised as the 'Other'. Although they had not been involved with the violence of Partition, the

refocused targeting of enemies included the West and merged with the bitter local history under colonialism.

Comparing the contemporary mundane with the extraordinary past can contribute to wistful longing for tradition and a detachment from the morals and principles of the present. And as Elias (1996) identified with respect to the rise of Nazism in Germany, the appeal of idealised aspects of belief rises during times of crises. Thus Left Wing surges of support in South America, shifts in racial laws in the United States and re-evaluation of political boundaries within Northern Ireland have all been accompanied with a competing and challenging We resurgence in symbols and slogans that connect to a preceding habitus. If the struggle over issues such as inequalities, political representation and lifestyles becomes sufficiently significant then as Stuart Hall (1985: 113) explained with reference to race, 'social reproduction becomes a contested process'. In these environments, social and political consensus is seriously undermined, mutual interdependence and empathy becomes seriously weak. Crucially all the above forms of social protest have transcended into terrorism partly, I argue, because the perceived shifts in national consciousness left the militants feeling like detached outsiders. Consequently, they were less emotionally attached to the nation and its peoples. Elias has pointed out that greater functional democratisation is accompanied by enhanced levels of empathy and the likelihood of inter group tensions diminishes. This does not appear to apply in the above examples. On the contrary, these groups chose to attack when national functional democratisation became more substantial. In essence, greater incorporation of ethnic minorities within power relations and economic opportunities is considered to be at their expense.[21]

Competitive Habitus

Situations with two competing terror groups provide different dynamics. For instance, as Chapter Six outlines, sectarian terror killings were often instrumental within spirals of violence in Columbia, Iraq, Italy and Northern Ireland. A common perception held by one 'side' is that very often they are an extension of the state on whose behalf political violence is committed. In Northern Ireland, loyalists defended their actions as being in accordance with the British government even if the government was not necessarily appreciative of their efforts. Under this reasoning violence can only be

justified as part of a defensive, reactive strategy to republican aggression. When loyalist groups appeared as aggressors then they became detached from the role as defenders of the community and public support diminished. By comparison, Hayes and McAllister (2005) explain that republican violence was embedded within Irish politics to such an extent that it had been enshrined within the Irish republic's constitution which in turn had been heavily influenced by preceding phases of violence. These historical and strategic reasons for the justification of political violence were, Hayes and McAllister (2005) argue, instrumental in understanding different sectarian attitudes to decommissioning.

Exposure to alternative discourses or lifestyles can also contribute to a strengthening of individual and group beliefs. For instance, the emergence of new religious movements and counter cultures during the 1960s in American led to a shift in more conservative forms of Christianity that culminated in the 1970s and 1980s surge in the New Christian Right's cultural and political activism (Dawson 2006). Similarly, rising visibility of secessionist and Marxist guerrillas groups have activated pro state groups in Northern Ireland, Guatemala and El Salvador while the emergence of fascist and pro government groups in Germany, Italy and South America during the 1960s and 1970s were strongly linked with the formation of Far Left groups. By comparison, the damaged German national consciousness and collective feelings of guilt that were internalised by subsequent generations contributed to a lack of positive We-images. For the children of the Nazi generation this contributed to a restricted collective consciousness and certainly a reluctance to express national sentiments. Without nationalism to help bind the defeated nation, emphasis was placed upon development and consumerism without addressing the void within levels of We-ness. Many within the younger generation sought alternative discourses to explain the feelings and fears they were experiencing. In this regard, the decision to reformulate extreme left discursive consciousness was unsurprising (Elias 1996).

Across societies it is possible to observe the greater participation of younger adults within radical politics. Within these generations there is often greater willingness to undertake social critical analysis of national principles and government practices alongside reluctance to compromise. The waves of student protest across Western cities in the late 1960s are indicative of this.[22] From these movements in America,

Japan, Italy and West Germany people became committed both to non violent direct action within social movements and political violence. For those who became engaged in violent action, peaceful protest was considered to have failed and terrorism was considered to be the only solution. The terror (and non violent) leaders and members possessed cultural and social capital with which to critically oppose and formulate alternative discourses and groupings. In the West German example, the above characteristics of the younger generation are, for Elias (1996), given added resonance by the national habitus. He examines the legacy of the German military tradition which was so instrumental in the emergence of Nazism. What is however less immediately apparent is that the sediment of those same values existed within the habitus of the Left Wing groups that were so vehemently opposed to the possibility of fascism returning. Thus characteristics such as absolute conviction, determination and unwavering loyalty to principles alongside a portrayal of compromise as a betrayal of ideals are noticeable across a trajectory that stems from the aristocratic militarism of the nineteenth century.   For Elias, strategies of compromise make for more difficult navigation for individuals across social landscapes. Proscription and prescription provide clearly demarcated routes. Navigating through compromise is much more complex, with both means and ends open to negotiation that requires insights into tact and sensitivities that can only be acquired through exposure. In this regard there was a clear lag between the democratic arrangements adopted by the post Second World War West German state and the more rigid absolutism that continued to reside within layers of social habitus.

Migrant international habitus

Thus far I have concentrated upon figurations and habitus transforming around clearly demarcated areas. Throughout history, individuals have consciously chosen to change their habitus through relocation for social, cultural, economic, political and legal reasons. Elias (1991: 236) describes the demand for a change of social habitus which people aim to achieve through migration. Yet the choice of destination, transition and accommodation are all restricted by the pre-migration habitus. Processes of modification and reinterpretation abound during, and after, migration. Particularly pertinent examples can be found both within Pakistan and Pakistani immigrants to the UK. Migration from rural to urban areas or to different countries can contribute to

what Roy (2004) refers with respect to Muslims as 'deterritorialised communities'. For migrant Muslims, Roy argues, the process of resettlement or uprooting leads to a reassessment of their beliefs and often a subsequent reconstruction of Islamic identity. For migrants and subsequent generations caught between cultural norms and values from the country of origin and those of the new home country, a process of deculturation can be experienced as the 'pristine ethnic culture' fades with each generation. Communities become places of shelter from recurrent problems that migrants encounter (Elias 1991). For second and third generations different problems arise as they acquire the social habitus of their parents and language, customs and morals of the host country. Personal, generational, ethnic and nationalist tensions arise as individuals seek to reconcile values and forms of behaviour that are often contradictory. There are a number of alternatives:

i) Some members of the later generations remain integrated within the habitus of their parents.

ii) People can become detached and shift towards the dominant mainstream culture. However levels of discrimination, racism and defined contours of national identity may limit this option.

iii) And of most interest here, individuals can formulate hybrid responses to the situations in which they are located. For these people, religion and ethnicity become sources of shared commonality and solidarity, proving feelings of unity, beliefs, rituals and prescriptions amidst displaced collective memories and discarded, outmoded forms of behaviour.

Transnational movements, allegiances and explanations can appeal to these people through a form of international habitus. The attraction of global *jihad* and the al-Qa'ida franchise should be considered within this broader movement and habitus. Both Gunaratna (2003) and Sageman (2004) have identified the disproportionate involvement of migrants within major terror attacks since the late twentieth century. Again though, it is important to stress that there are historical precedents. For instance, Akbar (2002) notes how, in the late twelfth century, responses to Saladin's call for a *jihad* against Richard the Lionheart[23] came from as far away as India. Of course this was long before the emergence of processes of globalisation that are often viewed as inherent within forms of international Islamic militancy.

Yet what the studies of the impact of immigration upon radicalisation often overlook is that it is male centric. Female migrants do not feature prominently within terror groups in the West. The lack of women in contemporary Muslim groups is all too easily explained by patriarchal, traditional families and communities. Certainly there are elements of this. Nevertheless for the 'traditional' to be a universal feature we would expect male British Muslim bombers to originate from such families. This has often not been the case. Moreover, as Speckhard (2008) explains, the experiences of first to third generation females differ from males, not only in the potential restrictions that are placed upon the behaviour of many women, limiting opportunities for radicalisation. Unlike males, female migrants do not suffer the drop in status that many men experience on arrival. In short, these women had already been awarded secondary status. Speckhard (2008) argues that many girls are more flexible in their approach to learning and study harder at school than boys who struggle to adapt to the family's drop in status. As a consequence they are able to extend their knowledge and interests beyond de-territorial experiences and become more integrated into the host society. Hence, unlike females who do not become radicalised because of their restricted enclosure within familial safeguards, the incorporation of some of the other women within societal employment, political and cultural spheres can diminish the likelihood of their radicalisation.

The Political Solution: Freedom or Suppression

Political arrangements can also be instrumental in radicalising layers of habitus. Shifts in balance between social and self restraints with greater emphasis upon the latter can create spaces for terrorism to emerge particularly within democracies. There is a long standing belief that terrorism emerges when movements are denied other political forms of expression. However Hafez (2003) and Rashid (2002) have identified a number of recent instances of the 'successful' repression of opposition in Algeria, Central Asia, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. In situations such as these personality structures are aligned with the dictatorial regimes and there is a greater willingness by individuals to accept orders and be guided by external constraints and hierarchies of constraint. And if people do not obey they are quickly encouraged to adapt their personalities or are constrained by state forces of surveillance and correction (Elias 1996). Numerous historical instances of this can be drawn upon. Anarchists in

Germany and Russia were largely eradicated through persecution, imprisonment and execution (Aydinli 2008, Bach Jensen 2004). Thus these radical groups were suppressed. However, the underlying processes that led to their formulation were not addressed. Consequently systemic problems remained and anarchism was to be replaced by other powerful forms of radical discourse, namely communism, socialism and fascism.

By comparison within some democratic arrangements, militant movements have become incorporated within mainstream society over generations and contribute to the internalisation of pacification. In Woodcock's (2004: 917) study of anarchism, he referred to the substantial levels of excitement and persecution. As one Anarchist wrote, with respect to the lack of anarchist fervour in northern Europe, the few anarchists enjoyed 'the prestige that in northern lands is granted to those voices crying in the wilderness, which form the conveniently externalized consciences of peoples largely devoted to the acquisition and enjoyment of material prosperity'.

Nevertheless, democracy is not a universal panacea. Terrorism occurs across a multitude of political arrangements including democracy (Gurr 1998 and Lutz and Lutz 2005). For instance, terrorism has been prominent within functional democracies across Western Europe, North America, Japan and on occasion within some South and Central American states such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Chile.[24] Therefore, terrorism can be operational within countries where the state's monopoly on violence is tenuous such as Colombia and Somalia, where it is all embracing like some of the above examples and perhaps more surprisingly to Western perceptions, in liberal democracies. Under repressive regimes, challenges to governments are often curtailed within extensive apparatus of control. Therefore as Elias (1996: 235) argues, 'human groups usually revolt against what they experience as oppression not when the oppression is at its strongest, but precisely when it begins to weaken' which, in this instance, also accords with the political opportunity structure thesis. The actions of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom) or ETA are a case in point. Although ETA formed during the Franco dictatorship, their actions intensified as the Franco regime weakened. With the transition to democracy, 'it became more violent and more separatist. … Terrorism escalated just as democracy had indisputably established itself' (Wieviorka 1997: 295). Furthermore, migrants from authoritarian

regimes to liberal democracies have also reconstructed discursive consciousness and become more radical. The most notable examples were the Hamburg cell that was instrumental in the September 2001 attacks on America. They appear to have consciously decided to adopt political violence as a form of behaviour after arriving in Germany from more authoritarian regimes.

Further distinctions within the spectrum of dominant political arrangements need to be drawn to accommodate groups such as the loyalists in Northern Ireland and Far Right in America. Other groups may denounce oppression, injustice and police brutality but the reported incidents lack the extensive, pernicious nature of the constraints imposed upon preceding generations in Germany and Italy and contemporaneous Egypt, China and Russia. At this point, there is a danger of apparent contradiction as all three countries have encountered terrorism[25] and of the former two countries, Italy under Mussolini experienced episodes of terrorism, including attempts on Il Duce's life. Consequently, I should stress that there is not a political system that can be guaranteed to incorporate potential radicalisation and prevent attacks of political violence. As I explained earlier, the likelihood of this eventuality is heavily influenced by the duration that self-restraints have been internalised and levels of mutual interdependence, functional democratisation, stability and security. Democratic institutions and accompanying civil liberties, security, pathways for consensus and compromise and self-controls must become developed and embedded within dispositions and behaviour before tensions can be contained within the democratic framework. Therefore, in situations where authoritarian regimes are overthrown and replaced by democratic institutions there will be a lag between the new political structures and individual dispositions which are more attuned to formal processes of decision-making and visible forms of external constraint.[26] For Elias (1996: 291) the long process of attunement in Britain has contributed to it being 'one of the few countries in which, so far, a parliamentary state structure and an individual personality structure have become attuned to each other in a comparatively friction-free way.'[27]

Conclusion

In summary, just like other forms of behaviour political violence is part of individual and social dispositions. And as with other forms of social behaviour, the forms did not emerge in a vacuum nor could the roots be unearthed within the soiled minds of crazed individuals. Terrorism is learned, it relies upon communication, shared and competing norms and values and levels of social and self-restraints. Processes of social control and interwoven forms of collective identification and functional democratisation were insufficiently developed or in some instances had become threateningly overdeveloped at the expense of the previously self declared dominant groups. In other words processes of pacification are partial, incomplete or can be undermined. For terrorists this has meant that violence as a form of behaviour can be adopted because radical norms and values have proved more influential or the restraints they have internalised are not considered to apply within particular settings. In some instances violence has been encouraged by communities within these localities. Nationalist struggles would be such an example.

That pathways into terrorism so often emerge in places with histories of political violence, state sanctioned capital punishment or the cultural normalisation of aggressive behaviour is not coincidental. As this chapter has shown, contemporary habitus in these locations contain violent sediment from the past or in other words dispositions are 'soiled' with aggressive ideas and forms of behaviour of history. Through the intergenerational transmission of narrative, mythology and symbols violence has been retained and is expressed as a form of political action during the intersection with particular conditions. These include perceived threats to, insecurities of, and uncertainties within, the habitus which contribute to challenges to the opposing other. The habitus therefore becomes both the source of protection and protectors. In the following chapter, processes through which groups form and individuals join and thus become 'protectors' of habitus or intended creators of new forms of disposition are explored.

There is a danger here that this emphasis upon dispositions could be read to imply that identifying the responsible habitus will enable counter terrorism to be more precisely targeted and ultimately victorious. Or in other words, I have created the sociological

equivalent of the psychological profile. I hasten to add that this is not the intention. Within the remainder of this book I reiterate, with almost repetitive regularity, that just as there is no single profile nor is there one habitus in which terrorism forms. On the contrary, the multiple locations, ideas, emotions and forms of behaviour are indicative of distinct forms of habitus. Such differences should not however preclude investigation. The study of individual processes of radicalisation did not end with the realisation that Osama bin Laden and Leila Khaled have fundamentally different personalities. Much can be learnt about individual pathways into terrorism. Similarly, considerably more information can be obtained about the social figurations in which people's journeys in and out of terrorism occur. Consequently, in the following chapter the socialising agents that interweave the history and contemporary habitus and broader movements and terror groups are explored. Through this exploration we can postulate the processes whereby people join and form groups.

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[1] Yet it would be a mistake to consider violence to permeate throughout all Somali interactions. Alongside a backdrop of southern state lawlessness, informal mechanisms and systems of governance have (re) emerged to varying degrees, imposing forms of regulation and achieving revised levels of security. Security is most prominent in nomadic areas where traditional regulatory arrangements and structures have been less adversely affected by colonialism and subsequent Somali governments. Radical Islamic groups are also providing forms of constraint (Menkhaus 2003, 2004, Møller 2009, Vertigans 2010).

[2] I am arguing that habits are a component of habitus, the two are not synonymous.

[3] Elias' application also has components that could be refined. First Van Krieken (1998) notes the inconsistency in which the durability of habitus in changing social conditions is discussed. In particular, he asks would a different habitus rapidly follow on from social transformations or would there be a possible 'lag' whereby the social changes moved ahead of the psychological structure? Second Crossley's (2003) observation that Bourdieu tends to neglect wider preconditions for protest and movement formation such as political opportunities, resources and mobilisation networks can also be applied to Elias. Third, in comparison to Bourdieu, Elias tends to be vague regarding the mechanics of habitus, indeed arguably he generally under utilised the concept. For instance, the processes through which agents were provided with practical consciousness that is integral for social reproduction are underdeveloped. By comparison Bourdieu details how individuals experience habitus phenomenologically as 'second nature' (Thorpe 2010). Nevertheless Elias' less mechanical and more fluid approach allows for different layers within national and transnational consciousness that both integrate and detach terrorists from broader social relations which Bourdieu's greater emphasis upon the socio-economic location hinders.

[4] With this observation Bourdieu seems to be at least implicitly undermining Crossley's (2003) critical remark that he neglects the possibility of habitus falling out of alignment.

[5] Substantial funding from within the kingdom has been, and continues to be, received by radical Islamic groups within Afghanistan.

[6] Cited in Allen (2006: 235).

[7] Degregori (1997) traces the rejection of the West and the appropriation of Western instruments of domination to the sixteenth century.

[8] Almana (1982: 241) declares that in establishing the modern judicial framework, King Ibn Saud referred to the saying of the Prophet Muhammed that 'harsh punishments are often necessary for the protection of the innocent'. Forceful remedies were to be the solution to lawlessness.

[9] Hewitt (2003) details the range of groups that have undertaken terror attacks in America. These include white and black racists, Islamic militants, communists, neo-Nazis, militant Jews, anti-abortionists and Puerto Rican secessionists.

[10] There are also grounds for supposition that the gun has quickly attained tremendous symbolism within black 'ghetto' culture but for more contemporary factors such as popular culture, diminished opportunities and shifting social and self restraints (Wacquant 2004).

[11] Further details can be found in Mennell 2007, Nisbett and Cohen 1996, Wyatt-Brown 1982.

[12] The roots for white supremacy can be located within the culture of the early European settlers and given legal emphasis through legislation such as the Naturalization Act, 1790. The Act included within the criteria for citizenship the requirement for being white and which contributed towards a racial character within reformulated nationalism (Johnson and Frombgen 2009).

[13] Mennell (2007) describe the extent of the support. Such was the backlash against the possible abolition that politicians formed policy to accord with the vocal, vociferous opposition.

[14] There are a number of factors which can help to explain the limited focus on Saudi targets including the longevity and charisma of the Saud ruling family, relative wealth, cooptation and rehabilitation of rivals and militants, incorporation of religious leaders, traditional familial relations and tribal crosscutting loyalties which weaken other alliances. Hegghammer (2009) details how the militants' initial emphasis was on the 'Crusaders' and the government through its security services only became targeted when they were seen to be intervening on behalf of the West. For groups associated with al-Qa'ida this may be part of a two-stage approach namely to mobilise the population against the crusaders before overthrowing the regime.

[15] Collins is cited in Kiberd (1992: 231).

[16] For instance none of their respondents proudly acknowledged their son or daughter to be a martyr. This is in marked contrast to the territories where Palestinian expressions of pride and even 'celebrations' have been well-documented.

[17] These sentiments can be found within publications across the Far Right. Eric Rudolph (2005), an anti-abortion bomber, provides an illustrative reflection upon the immorality of abortion which he connects to other forms of immorality. 'Thousands of years of moral progress were sacrificed upon the altar of selfishness and materialism. A new barbarism, a culture of death has now taken root in America'. The act of abortion is 'the vomitorium of modernity helping the hedonistic partiers disgorge the unwanted consequences of their sexual license'.

[18] A similar correlation can be made between Reagan's approach to abortion and associated violence. Blanchard and Prewitt (1993) point to the more aggressive stance against family planning and abortion by the Reagan administration compared to the previous Carter government. Anti-abortion violence dramatically increased. For the authors this was evidence that Reagan was considered to tacitly approve the tactics. However Hewitt (2003) challenges the data and argues that the violence remained after Reagan's departure and even increased. Moreover the murders committed by anti-abortionists were during Clinton's Presidency, who was much more pro-choice. Despite appearing contradictory, it is conceivable that both explanations offer important insights. Reagan did contribute towards a more politicised form of anti-abortionism and supporters could easily have mis/understood his actions and rhetorics to be complicitly supportive. By comparison, under Clinton, conservative morality was felt to be threatened and some of the abortion restrictions imposed under Reagan and George Bush were lifted which anti-abortionists viewed as threatening to their beliefs.

[19] The perceived threat from the nearest theological rival partly helps to explains the brutality of attacks against Sh'ites by militants. For Devji (2005) the growing similarity between radical Sunnis and Shi'ites and competition over ideas and behaviour is contributing to more indiscriminate attacks by the former on the latter.

[20] General Zia ul Haq governed from 1977 until his death in 1988.

[21] Parallels can be drawn with the surge of lynching that occurred in the southern states following the civil war and fears of greater black political and economic participation (Lane 1997, Mennell 2007). For Mennell (2007: 147) the decline of lynching and vigilantism (discussed in previous chapter) is indicative of 'the taming of warriors' that signified the extension and greater efficiency of state monopoly of violence and greater trust of the government. Arguably the former is proving more effective in restraining the Far Right than feelings of trust which are seriously lacking.

[22] Nevertheless despite the younger spread of members, it is important to acknowledge that membership of terror groups is not necessarily 'ageist.' A cursory glance at the leadership of leading

terror groups such as al-Qa'ida, Aum Supreme Truth and IRA indicate that experience is also highly regarded at senior levels. And while Elias develops upon the youth of the West German Red Army Faction he fails to acknowledge that both Horst Mahler and Ulrike Meinhof were well into their 30s when they became involved.

[23] Akbar mentions that the jihad was against Richard II but his rule was two hundred years later.

[24] The perpetrators of terrorism within Guatamala and Chile have been somewhat different. Levenson (2003) points out with regards to the former that 93 per cent of the acts of violence and terror that resulted in the deaths of 200,000 between 1962 and 1996 were attributed to the state. At the time, the political system was nominally based upon the Western democratic model. Similarly Chile under Pinochet reacted during periods of fear over a potential coup within spiralling levels of hatred and insecurity and persecuted and assassinated opposition groups and personnel (Zárate 2003).

[25] Egypt has regularly encountered terrorism. The most prominent surge in radicalisation arguably occurred when President Sadat lessened social restraints upon political activism. After failing to deliver promises that contributed to opposition being further radicalised, he was assassinated by militants who had formed and acted within the looser frameworks of restraint. Both China and Russia have largely encountered secessionist groups that share considerable similarities with other struggles for independence.

[26] An observation that appeared to have bypassed the American administration whose perception that democracy would be the panacea to problems within the Middle East generally and Iraq in particular has been proved to be fatally naïve.

[27] For anyone wondering about the extent to which the situation in Northern Ireland contradicts this statement, the short answer is that it does not. Northern Ireland is not part of Britain (it is part of the UK) and the island's colonial status meant that it was not part of the longer term processes of attunement. Moreover, following partition subsequent levels of established security and mutual interdependence have remained low which has prevented closer alignment between parliamentary and personality structures.