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

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Islam and the construction of modern nationalism: The unintended consequences of state sponsored socialisation

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Introduction

Around the world approaches by Muslim governments to introduce secularisation and create national consciousness have relied heavily upon processes of state sponsored socialisation. Across the overwhelming majority of Muslim societies, secular structures, processes and national identities are, to varying degrees, in place. Overall, however, the increased prominence of Islam generally, and militant strands in particular, and the extent to which large numbers of people most strongly associate with religion rather than nation indicates that state sponsored socialisation has only been partially successful. Islam is embedded within constructions of nationalism and in some instances religious influences are contributing to processes of radicalisation and challenges to secular governments. To help explain this apparent paradox, in this chapter the emergence of Muslim nation-states and implementation of formal socialising processes is explored, and the concept of 'unintended consequences' is applied to nation-state policies and international relations. These consequences, some of which stem from previous generations, continue to resonate today, contributing towards processes of radicalisation across Muslims societies and communities.

Particular attention is placed upon failures and inconsistencies within attempts to control populations through socialisation, especially within education. Incorporating Islam within the framework for national identification has had unforeseen and contradictory social and political outcomes which include demarcations between secularists and Islamicists and greater awareness of challenging militant Islamic discourse and the appreciation of terror tactics. Both militant national and trans-national groups are explored to attain a greater understanding of collective identities that are part of their appeal and the processes that contribute towards their formation. By acknowledging complexities within contemporary societies that are embedded

within opaque global relations, it is suggested that accurately predicting the long term consequences of social, political and economic actions has become increasingly difficult. This is exacerbated by governments' adaptations of short term 'solutions' to long term problems.

Creating Nationalism

Unlike the general timelines of Western nationalism, Muslim nation-states tended to be achieved following campaigns for independence in the first half of the twentieth century. The late formation of these countries can be heavily attributed to the consequences of Western colonialism and imperialism that resulted in huge regions being subjected to foreign control. For militant Muslims who argue that for the *ummah* (global community) and transcending national boundaries within an all-encompassing Islamic state, nationalism is a foreign imposition. Habeck (2006) provides support for this view, suggesting that national consciousness, and in particular underpinning racial and ethnic identifications, was introduced to try shift allegiance away from the broader religious consciousness. Arguably this was part of the strategy to divide and conquer and can be noticed across colonised territories. Ironically though, the religions of the colonised were to frequently become invigorated in response to colonialists approaches. For example, in Sri Lanka and India, Buddhists and Hindus, Hindus and Muslims respectively, religion became embedded within more politicised forms of collective, ethnic and ultimately national identification (Lapidus 2002). Similarly religion became a common form of unification between otherwise disparate groups across East and West Africa, Central, Southern and Southeast Asia, providing sources of solidarity that were strengthened during the conflicts and which were to become interwoven within subsequent successful national struggles for independence.

With the formation of new nation-states with Muslim majorities, the first governments were confronted with the challenge of creating, embedding and sustaining national-consciousness. To differing degrees, newly formed governments adopted elements of state building that were instrumental in the formation of Western nations. However the Western versions evolved gradually, associated with industrial

modernisation and processes of technological advancement, growth of commerce, urbanisation, expansion of bureaucracy, the division of labour and increased literacy. In other words, the structural conditions, individual and social habitus [1] and spatialities were significantly different and could not be applied en masse. Nevertheless considerable imitation of Western ways of thinking and behaving were adopted and adapted, not always appropriately as will be discussed below. To try develop culturally, socially, economically and politically, a range of modernisation processes were introduced both to transform agricultural and industrial infrastructures and to help generate national consciousness within the new boundaries. Both were to prove problematic. It was considered that to modernise required modern identities which necessitated the eradication of old ways of thinking and behaving. This led, particularly in countries seeking to rapidly secularise such as Turkey, see below, to religious influence being undermined and attempts to diminish Islamic identification. The reasoning for the displacement of Islam relates to the consideration that religion was detrimental to progress. Basing the argument upon Western 'progress', modernisers like the Turkish leader, Kemal Mustafa Atatürk, argued that the lack of religious institutions within power arrangements in the West suggested similar secular arrangements should be adopted. Islam was subjected to state control and not vice versa. Furthermore Islam was viewed as a potential threat to the task of creating national identification. People were being encouraged to adopt nationalism as their primary collective allegiance and there were considerable concerns that religion would hinder both this and attempts to develop modern identities and infrastructures.[2] Consequently nationalism was promoted while simultaneously undermining Islam in order to create collective identification and loyalties to modern values and artificial demarcations that were often the result of power struggles, negotiation, compromise, and ultimately bureaucrats' rulers.

Post independence, administrative and legal systems were introduced across Muslim societies that originated from Western arrangements. Processes to change forms of consciousness and norms of behaviour were embedded within structural

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[1] Norbert Elias' (1978, 1996, 2000, Mennell 1992) concept of habitus is applied in this chapter. Individual habitus refers to acquired emotional and behavioural dispositions that are unique to the individual. Learned characteristics that are shared with other members of the same group/s are aspects of the social habitus. National and religious identifications are usually part of the social habitus because they are shared by the group, cult, movement or nation.

[2] Further details can be found in Arkoun (1988), Kepel (2004), Mardin (1989) and Vertigans (2003).

transformations. At one level, the internalisation of national consciousness had already commenced for many of the new state citizens. Independence for many nation-states was, at least in part, the outcome of struggles against colonialists and invaders, discussed above. During the conflicts, attempting to defeat the colonialists proved to be a tremendous unifier, transcending ethnic, religious, tribal and language differences. However, on achieving independence, the goal was achieved, the enemy had been withdrawn, was defeated. With this outcome, the strength of the crosscutting loyalty to the nation was seriously weakened. Following the demise of the threatening 'other' to stigmatise and invoke collective effervescence, there were limited commonalities that could draw together the disparate groups to be found within the new boundaries. By comparison, in many more established nation-states, the sense of belonging to a territory and peoples had already become solidified, moulded into a printed history of the nation that entwined the present with symbols and narratives from the past. For peoples in these nation-states today, this form of collective consciousness is accepted uncritically, seemingly shared by the living and the dead. The precise origins of the nation and selection, reformulation and fabrication of characteristics of the contemporary national 'character' are discarded during the formative processes.

For the new Muslim governments these processes had to condensed in the haste to create new loyalties, explanations and sources of meaning that could provide nationalist frameworks of understanding and collective identification. And in comparison with the emergence of Western nationalism which in some respects was the unintentional outcome of longer term interwoven social, psychological, economic and political processes (Elias 1996), these new nation-states deliberately designed programmes for national consciousness. To some extent, this was to be achieved through the widespread application of what Anderson (2006) described as 'print capitalism' and interrelated processes of growing educational programmes and rates of literacy which had proved instrumental in the emergence of national consciousness in the West. These processes were to be integral in the formation of a common oral and written language and universal laws that were dispersed within the national boundaries by newly created centralised institutions. Within many Muslim nation-states these processes were implemented with some success. Religion was formally subjected to state control, scientific methodology became more prominent, increasing

numbers of people adopted more ‘Western’ dispositions and contributed to an increasing challenge to divinity and fatalism. Underpinning these changes were revised forms of social restraint and legislation that weakened the influence of religious institutions. However the changes were not restricted to undermining Islamic courts and mosques. If a new kind of ‘modern’ consciousness and better informed and controlled populace was to be created then the roles of existing, more ‘traditional’ socialising agents also had to be reconsidered. The widespread introduction of schools, and ultimately higher education, became central to these approaches. With the huge expansion of learning opportunities large swathes of populations were able to acquire academic skills and thus contribute towards the emergence of a better qualified workforce and the modernisation of the industrial and administrative infrastructure. Alongside this formal curriculum, the teaching programme was also designed to incorporate national and modern values and ways of thinking. Education therefore was intended to entwine the development of academic and applied skills and knowledge with collective consciousness. For the Muslim governments modernisation could only be achieved through transforming both behavioural and emotional dispositions.

If this was to happen loyalties to existing local elite, family, tribal or community memberships had to be replaced or at least diminished in significance. Individuals had to be encouraged to relegate or dismiss their existing allegiances and accept the new national consciousness as their primary source of allegiance. In well established nation-states like the UK, this was a gradual process, as national identity became ingrained within social habitus that was transmitted across generations. The durability of this collective consciousness is reflected in the ability to react and accommodate the nation-state’s constant flux and shifting dynamics. However, providing frameworks of understanding and legitimacy for new boundaries and political elites posed a considerable dilemma. Links had to be established with history, narrative, slogans and images to provide meaning and historical legitimacy. Conversely governments also wanted distance between the present and the recent past to strengthen the demarcations between the (‘progressive’) modern and (‘backward’) tradition. Lapidus (2002: 819) elucidates upon how Muslim governments sought to achieve this, in different ways, through building ‘upon a fusion of historical lineage, ethnic, linguistic, and Islamic symbols recast in linguistic-ethnic and nationalist

terms.' Because there was a requirement for recent history to be detached from the present periods were selected that were considered successful and in which the values that were being challenged were not prominent. Arguably one of the most extreme attempts to plumb the past in order to underpin the present was the Egyptian emphasis upon a pre-Islamic history that stemmed from the Pharaohs (Gershoni and Jankowski 1987). In the newly formed Turkish and Iranian republics, similar attempts were introduced by Ataturk and Reza Shah respectively, who also distanced the history of their nations from Islam through the adaptation of what was largely a fictitious Turkic and Persian past. This was to become a template that was adopted by many modernising Muslim governments. Despite the considered attempts to encourage historical and contemporary integration, the deliberate omission of time periods resulted in a lack of continuity across language, symbols and culture (Vertigans 2009). Consequently the acceptance and internalisation of these 'imagined pasts' within modern consciousness was by no means universal and nation-states needed to consider alternative methods of generating nation consciousness, particularly as the so called traditional Muslims had their own history to draw upon and with which they could challenge secular processes of modernisation.

The 'Islamic Nation'

Despite government policies that were designed both to eradicate the influence of religion and replace Islamic loyalties with those of the nascent nation-states, Islam and its histories remained embedded within individual and social habitus. And by contrast to the secular adaptation of a longer term and disjointed history, religious figures were able to draw upon heroes, battles and victories that were more engrained within local cultures and thus had greater resonance for many than the oft fictitious past of the new nations. Consequently in the secularists and Islamists discursive battle of the 'Golden Ages', the latter had greater credibility because their narrative was already established. This enabled Islamists to draw upon the past with greater confidence, utilising events and narrative in order to provide meaning for contemporary experiences. Furthermore by distinguishing between the expansions of the Muslim empires and their decline, most notably the Ottomans and abolition of the

caliphate[3], Islamists challenged the ruling secularists' argument that secularisation is required because religion within government is antiquated and incommensurate with progress. On the contrary, for twentieth century Islamists like al-Banna (1906-49), Mawdudi (1903-79) and Qutb (1906-66, discussed below), 'Golden Ages' provided clear evidence, particularly the period of the prophet Muhammed and the four *caliphs,* of what religion was capable of when practised in accordance with theological doctrine. By extension the decline of the empires was not the consequence of too much religion but too little. These differing positions defined the ideological struggle over the nature of Muslim governments with both positions utilising the past in order to legitimise their moral and political legacies, collective characteristics and contemporary application of discourse in the evolution of the nation-states. That the accuracy for these counter claims for discursive purity is somewhat contested with origins clouded in myths and multiple tribal, ethnic, familial and pagan pre-Islamic influences should not, as Dieckhoff (2005), observed detract from the impact upon social consciousness when the 'Golden Age' is invoked. For the secularists, the immediate problem they faced was that the Islamists 'Golden Age' was more convincing than their own. If they were to win the battle of ideas, they had to deliver in the present and provide evidence of their capabilities in the future. In other words their actions had to provide the credibility for their discourses that their historical narrative often could not. As part of this programme of delivery, the Islamists would be proved to be anachronisms. Paradoxically their actions were to both deliver improvements and strengthen the appeal of religion.

Creating and Challenging National Consensus: The intended and unintended consequences of government actions

At this point it is important to establish the concept of 'unintended consequences' which will be applied to help explain the apparent contradictory outcomes of government policies. Within social science, the concept has a long history, with the most obvious early example being Adam Smith's 'hidden hand of the market' (Mennell 1977, van Krieken 1998). Within sociology, the American sociologist

[3] Caliphate is the title for the successor to the Prophet Muhammed. The Ottomans effectively captured the title from the Egyptian Mamluks in the sixteenth century. Towards the end of the Ottoman period the title was largely detached from the populace and, at the time, its abolition attracted limited popular protest (Lewis 1974).

Robert Merton has been particularly prominent with his emphasis upon 'the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated into reality' which 'operates only in the absence of deliberate institutional controls' (1967: 436). For Merton therefore, while acknowledging that social processes can result in ironies and paradoxes (Vertigans and Sutton 2006), careful deliberation and organisation through institutional controls can minimise these unwanted outcomes. By contrast, as Mennell (1977: 100) outlines, Norbert Elias considered unintentional outcomes to be inevitable. This is because,

> as people have come to occupy more and more differentiated and specialised social positions, they have spun ever more complicated webs of interdependence, in which first hundreds, the thousands and finally millions have been caught up; the resulting figurations are neither planned nor within the control of any individual or group of individuals.

The impact of this understanding of the complex, opaque and constraining processes in which we are all immersed is considerable. For Elias (1978, 2000 [1939]), and contrary to Merton, governments like other groups of individuals, cannot possess the knowledge and foresight to be able to precisely and accurately calculate the impact of their policies and actions. Unintended consequences are not wry infrequent occurrences. Instead they are manifest within daily life and are instrumental in the shaping of individual and social experiences and identification. When applying this insight into post independent Muslim governments, these problems are magnified as they seek to rapidly transform huge swathes of economic, agricultural, administrative and industrial activities alongside legal, cultural, social and political ways of constraining and liberating behaviour. With limited relevant precedents, governments could not precisely establish the impact of their policies and the interacting multitude of local, national and international events and processes upon individual behavioural and emotional dispositions. Nor, could they determine when individual and social habitus would shift to accord with the broader changes. Consequently governments were operating in conditions that did not allow any institution to possess complete control over either their actions or their outcomes. Inevitably therefore unintended consequences across Muslim societies were, and are, widespread and inevitable and

levels of uncertainty can only increase as the nation-states continue to modernise and further complicate the nature of social relationships and interdependencies.

The complexities of societies and interwoven global processes has partly meant that despite the post independence rhetorical attacks upon religion, for millions of people, within many modernising nation-states, Islam remained integral to personal identification. Indeed contrary to those early intentions, Islam has arguably grown in significance and religious institutions continue to provide spiritual and social services, particularly in localities where government activities are restricted. There has been a tendency to associate this broader resurgence generally and growing militancy, in particular, as a reaction to the dominant secularisation thesis. However as the following examples indicate, more radical forms of Islam have gained momentum during periods when nation-states have been more supportive of religion with the nature of their secularisation less oppressive or have conversely deliberately sought to embed religion within the early formative stages of the nation-state. Three very different examples illuminate this.

Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and formation of the Turkish republic, Kemal Atatürk implemented a thorough programme of secularisation. The programme included the adaptation of Swiss, Italian and German legal codes, the unification of education, abolition of numerous religious institutes and the subjugation of Islam to state control.[4] Atatürk's policies were to be hugely influential, resulting in Turkey becoming arguably the most secular Muslim nation-state and his model was imitated by other modernising governments including Algeria, Iran and Tunisia. Nevertheless, despite this contemporary impression of Atatürk as the arch secularist, in the early days of the republic, religious leaders were incorporated within government as he sought to build consensual support in, and immediately after, the War of Independence. When the leaders were no longer considered necessary or appropriate then they were discarded.[5] In the process however Atatürk established another legacy, namely the utilisation of Islam to justify actions, legitimise policies

[4] The reforms are discussed in greater detail in Berkes 1964, Geyikdağı1984, Mardin 1989, Toprak 1981, Vertigans 2003.
[5] The diminution of religious figures is reflected in the drop of involvement with the governing party. In 1920 the *ulema* provided 20 per cent of delegates at the liberation leaders' Congress. This dropped to seven in 1923 and two in 1939.

and underpin support. The entwining of politics and religion accelerated with the introduction of democracy in 1950 when levels of support for religious practice and facilities became electoral issues with numerous concessions made that subsequently contributed to the widespread introduction of religious schools and huge increase in the number of mosques.[6] Furthermore, the appeal of Islam within politics was to result in the formation of numerous religious parties. In the 1970s the National Salvation Party, which campaigned on a relatively moderate religious platform, became a coalition member of government. As a consequence, the party was able to utilise the system of patronage which existed within Turkish politics, and install supporters within important state institutions where religious influences increased.

The incorporation of religion within politics has been hugely controversial and numerous parties have been banned for breach of the constitution. Today the governing party is the democratically elected Justice and Development Party which is a mildly Islamic party. Nevertheless since it was first elected in 2002 the party's policies and actions have caused tremendous consternation to the secular military and intelligentsia as they struggle to balance the demands of the secular constitution and the more religious beliefs of their members and supporters. To date, though these contradictions have not resulted in the emergence of a significant militant threat. This can be partly attributed to the relative success of Atatürk's reforms and ironically the ways in which subsequent politicians were able to strengthen Turkish nationalism through reference to the battles, symbols and narrative of the preceding Ottoman Empire. In addition, the presence of Kurdish nationalism and the conflict in the Southeast of the country has conversely strengthened Turkish nationalism. For Elias (1996), people these types of situations form social bonds around common defence to their lives and the survival of their group and, by extension, nation. The collective 'we' gains priority over the 'I' and this reflects the shift in emphasis from the survival of the individual to the group (nation). Thus in times of crisis and heightened fear, collective effervescence provide the basis for solidarity. Kurdish nationalism generally, and the use of terrorism in particular, provide a threat that in turn provides a source of unity for Turks. By comparison with Turkey, some less secular nation-

[6] Further details can be found in Ahmad (1977), Heper (1985) and Vertigans (2003).

states are facing more threatening contradictions to their created senses of national identity, perhaps none more so then Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The location of Saudi Arabia is central to Islam because the two most sacred sites at Mecca and Medina are based within its boundaries.[7] This can be seen as instrumental both in the rationale for its existence and destruction. When the nation-state was formed in 1932, religion was integral to that process, incorporated within political arrangements as the Saudi kingdom sought to establish itself as defender of the faith. As a consequence successive governments have promoted their role and by extension the Wahhabi strand of Islam that they adhere to. The promotion of Wahhabism has resulted in considerable investment in religious and educational institutions both within Saudi Arabia and around the world. At one level, this approach has been very successful. Adherence to Wahhabism has risen within the nation-state and has grown dramatically in other countries. For example, in South and Southeast Asia the appearance of millions of women has changed markedly in accordance with the dress code and gender distinctions associated with this more rigid and austere form of Islam. However this very success has caused unintentional problems. Firstly, the emphasis upon the trans-national role of the Saudi government and the centrality of Islam to collective identification has contributed to Saudi nationalism being weak. Today the primary allegiance of large numbers of citizens is to religion and not the nation-state (Devji 2005). This may help to explain the recent importation and rapid nationalisation of foreign sports stars in an effort to enhance Saudi athletics and football teams; a policy which is presumably designed at least in part to utilise sport as a method of generating and reinforcing national consciousness.

Secondly, educating Muslims within and beyond Saudi Arabia about the absolutism of Islam creates something of a credibility problem for the government. The internalisation of rigid standards and forms of behaviour means that people are more informed about Wahhabism which becomes the benchmark on which to judge the actions and policies of others, including the government. This judgement is increasingly unfavourable as more Muslims realise that the Saudi government do not actually implement Wahhabism in the manner in which it is taught. For example, the

[7] Burke (2003), Halliday (2002), Jerichow (1997) and Niblock (2006) discuss the following aspects in greater detail.

rulers lack religious legitimacy, the *shari'ah* is not implemented, secular processes remaining prominent and some conservative and traditional aspects forms of Islam, which are embedded within taught Wahhabism, are largely excluded across the political, legal and public educational institutions.

Finally, by attempting to appeal to Muslims across boundaries, particularly through the application of the concept of the *ummah*, the Saudi government is raising awareness about the periods when Islamic empires were dominant across regions that were not demarcated by contemporary boundaries. At the extreme of this perception are militants like Sayyid Qutb[8] who argued that a 'Muslim's nationality is his religion'. Bin Laden has also sought to connect into this broader debate, arguing 'that God blesses our *umma* with a state that includes all Muslims under its authority'.[9] Looked at from this perspective, and following on from the above contradictions, for many Muslims Saudi Arabia, the territorial entity, is a physical obstacle to the formation of the global *ummah*. In other words, the implementation of one Muslim community across the world will ultimately require the disappearance or destruction of existing nation-states, including Saudi Arabia.[10]

Pakistan was created in 1947 following partition of India. Both partition and the preceding years were extremely traumatic and instrumental in the discursive consciousness that was to be introduced. Like so many other newly formed nation-states, the government sought to underpin national unity with particular forms of

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[8] Sayyid Qutb is cited in Faksh (1997: 10). Qutb was an Egyptian militant who was imprisoned and ultimately executed in 1966. His views have continued to be hugely influential and he is widely acknowledged as one of the leading militant ideologues.
[9] Bin Laden is cited in Lawrence (2005: 202). Khosrokhavar (2005.: 61) explains when examining Qutb's contributions, the neo-*umma* that is now promoted transcends national boundaries. Loyalties are primarily based upon beliefs and not characteristics that are usually associated with nationalism such as ethnicity, race or existing nation. Instead of closely defined geographical boundaries, 'a mythical Islamic community' is promoted.
[10] It should be stressed that this applies predominantly to the Sunni denomination within Islam and to which between 85 to 90 per cent of Muslims belong. By comparison, *Shi'ism* has been less associated with trans-nationalism, partly because their empires were less substantial and the denomination has generally been less numerically popular that *Sunnism.* Shi'ism has also been more closely entwined within more modern forms of government, most notably within Iran following the 1979 revolution and the utilisation of religion to legitimise the new regime. This was contrary to the then Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's (1900-1989) declaration that Islam has no frontiers. Alongside this national approach, the Iranians did however also utilise Islamic traditions and perceptions of ideological commonality across geographical and theological boundaries to increase influence and ultimately export their revolution. However this has proved to only be partially successful, with the Lebanese group Hezbollah arguably their most influential protégé.

commonality. Again, as with other nations, the strongest form of collective identification at that time had been transformed and strengthened by events and experiences leading up to independence. In Pakistan, this was Islam and it was religion that was to be the cornerstone of national consciousness that would overcome ethnic, linguistic and socio-economic differences alongside physical geographical separation in the case of East and West Pakistan.[11] Although lacking Saudi Arabia's well grounded association with Islam, the emergent Pakistan also sought to interweave religion and national identification. The *shari'ah* became the template for individual and social behaviour providing the benchmark for judging government and civil societal behaviour. This was emphasised in 1949 when a resolution was passed which declared, 'sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty Alone.' Consequently power can only be exercised in Pakistan 'within the limits prescribed by Him'. Since those early days, the nation-state has swayed between secular and Islamic influences.[12] However the legacy of the General Zia-ul-Haq's administration (1977-88), especially the range of concessions awarded and extensive programmes of Islamification that were introduced continues to resonate. For example, the interference in affairs in neighbouring Afghanistan was to continue after ul-Haq's death and today's conflict in the SWAT region and regular terror attacks upon the nation's major cities can be traced to support provided to the (Afghan) Taliban. Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan in establishing itself as the 'land of the pure' and emphasising the integration of religion and politics was contributing to unachievable expectations. Encouragement of the Afghan Taliban also needs to be considered from a similar perspective. Seemingly overlooking the potential significance of the lack of boundary controls over the Pakistani region that bordered Afghanistan, for reasons of realpolitik, the government sought to encourage a brand of Islamic interpretation that was incommensurate with the nature of governance in Pakistan. When considering all these factors, it was perhaps inevitable that Pakistan's attempts to gain greater control should ultimately result in greater threat and insecurity.

[11] The subsequent independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971 following the war of independence highlights that these problems were not successfully overcome across the boundaries of post 1947 partition Pakistan.
[12] Ahmad (1994), Ahmed (2004) and Saikal (2003) discuss these issues in detail.

Within state sponsored approaches to socialisation, particular attention needs to be placed upon the roles of teaching within the modernisation programmes. Governments have sought to improve the levels of competencies, skills and qualifications and invested in educational systems to deliver graduates who are capable of participating within, and developing, the economy. As I discussed above, schools have also been instrumental in the transmission of the hidden curriculum, to 'imbue pupils with the new patriotism… . This can be seen in the mobilisation of "national" history, geography and the "national curriculum" (McCrone 1998: 47). Thus in one of the first modernisation schemes in a Muslim society, schools and universities in Turkey were integral components within processes that aimed to '"Turkicize" the people, their language and their culture' (Kazamias 1966: 148). They were what Williamson (1987: 11) described as a 'vehicle for national integration, economic regeneration and modernization.'

Studies of these processes have however tended to overlook the extent to which religion is entwined within national curricula, even within the West, most notably the United States. As Smith (2003) has argued, religion can be instrumental in helping to define and underpin ideas and policies and reinforce national loyalties. In Muslim societies this is particularly noticeable as even the more secular governments, for example Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, concluded that religious values, symbols and narrative should be incorporated within school curricula. There have been numerous consequences of this. At an immediate level, children are exposed throughout their schooling to religious teachings and this is very often more radical than they would otherwise have encountered from other socialising agents. For example, Kepel (2004), Rahman (1998) and Stern (2003) have identified the emphasis placed upon concepts such as *jihad* within school curricula and textbooks. This is not to state that children inevitably internalise Islamic doctrine. I am however declaring that exposure to this type of learning can lead to internalisation when individuals are also exposed to conditions or experiences that can be considered to legitimise more radical taught forms of Islam (which are briefly elaborated upon below). And over the longer term, improved and extended religious education provides pupils with knowledge which they can then disseminate in their subsequent careers and within peer groups. Furthermore the acquisition of skills and attributes and familiarity with modern communications and technology means that many

gradates are potentially highly useful members of militant, especially terror, groups. In other words, schools and universities are exposing graduates to both strands of radicalism and the logistical resources that are integral in processes through which individuals become involved with terror groups.

There are a number of reasons for the adoption of Islam within state institutions. The societies were to differing levels, experiencing modernisation and associated urbanisation, people were relocating, rural communities were weakened, and not recreated, in the expanding urban areas. For the migrants, and indeed many existing residents who felt threatened by the changes, there were concerns about the levels of alienation and anomie they were encountering as their previous norms, values and relationships were displaced or considered irrelevant. In addition, the electoral appeal of Islam, discussed above, resulted in religious education becoming a populist electoral tool. Conversely the rise of other forms of political ideologies, particularly those associated with socialism and communism resulted in governments covertly and overtly supporting religious institutions as a means of counteracting the rise of secular challenging discourse. Furthermore when secular nationalism was decreasing in popularity or failed to engage with the broader populace, religious leaders and institutions were incorporated within political arrangements to help legitimise government actions.[13]

Ultimately the 'top-down' approach that was adopted by most Muslim nation-states failed to engage sufficient numbers of their populations. Engendering national consciousness across boundaries that frequently did not arouse attachments or loyalties was always going to be difficult. Nevertheless the top down approaches did not connect with civil societies and large sectors of the populations were not incorporated within the modernising agendas. Equally, attempts to generate other, even broader forms of collective consciousness also failed. The most notable failure was the Nasser led Arab nationalism which suffered to some extent from inner tensions within the 'Arabs', a lack of historical legitimacy and ultimately, and most decisively, the embarrassing defeat for a coalition of Arab nation-states in the 1967 war against Israel. This failure also exemplifies one of the fundamental problems

[13] Further details can be found within Abuza 2003, Byman and Green 1999, Esposito 1999, Gerges 2005, Mardin 1989 and Vertigans 2003.

facing relative new nation-states, namely that the nationalism is largely based upon the implicit and explicit belief of superiority over other nations. Without recourse to history it is very difficult to provide 'evidence' to support this claim, particularly when comparing cultural, economic, political and social achievements on a global scale. To return to an earlier point, the history of Islam can provide evidence for claims of superiority. However the particular difficulty facing those who hold such views relates to the contradiction between the past and present. The past symbols the power and superiority of Islam, the present its relative weakness and as such a threat to their habitus and resultant source of uncertainty and insecurity. For many of these believers, they must struggle to address the decline, to defend their religion and confront the existing arrangements.

The involvement of Islamic leaders within positions of authority has had two unintentional consequences. By requiring leaders to strengthen the popularity of the government, there was an acknowledgement that Islam was integral. And the dependency upon religious leaders presented them with opportunities to negotiate over the terms of their engagement and in particular to gain concessions for their support. Kepel (2004) outlines one of the most notable examples in Saudi Arabia. Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi government wanted theological legitimacy for the highly controversial deployment of American troops on the 'land of the holy sites.' In return for supportive *fatwas*, the government agreed to promote more radical interpretations and to allow the enforcement of 'Islamic' morality. Enforcement has been disproportionately directed at women whose appearance and activities has become increasingly standardised and restricted. At a societal level, these concessions have contributed to a further radicalisation of normative standards of religiosity. The outcome was that the ideological distance from normative religious interpretations to militancy diminished and with it the likelihood of more people making the transition into radicalism increased. And of course, the concomitant level of theological expectations against which the government was measured rose accordingly. Conversely the engagement of senior members of the *ulema* within state institutions and deeply unpopular decisions contributed to a reduction in their own credibility. They had contributed to raising the levels of religiosity and in turn had unintentionally helped to establish a theological benchmark that they were seen to be failing.

The outcome of the deliberate interweaving of secular political arrangements and national consciousness is that religion has continued to be prominent within collective identification. Arguably Islam has become more significant both within individual and social habitus in accordance with government attempts to utilise the religion for political ends. Clearly therefore in the short term the policy has been successful. However in the longer term, as the above examples of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indicate, the pragmatic application of Islam and the deliberate raising of normative levels of religiosity is hugely problematic over the longer term if the nation-states do not accord with the dispositions they are encouraging.

Alongside the incorporation of religious institutions within political arrangements, a number of leaders have also portrayed themselves as devout committed Muslims. Again, it is possible to notice that individual leaders are establishing the criteria for them to be measured against which it is impossible for them to meet without the implementation of the *shari'ah*. Furthermore even this unlikely application would be subjected to considerably different interpretations according to the historical/contemporary mix. Probably one of the best examples of this was when Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. He immediately sought to distance himself from his predecessor's unpopular secular policies and ultimately doomed attempt to create Arab nationalism. Instead Sadat emphasised the role of Islam within national identity and he was represented as the 'pious president.' Initially he was successful, Islamic scholars and institutions were incorporated within power arrangements that would have been inconceivable under Nasser. The portrayal of the 'pious president' connected with the populace but arguably led to his assassination. This is because Sadat and his advisers began to have serious misgivings about the power that religious institutions were acquiring and the extent of their dissent at a time when broader civil protests were mounting against some of his unpopular economic policies. Consequently he began to distance himself from some of the early policies and to curtail some of the influence of religious leaders and groups including mass arrests of perceived dissidents. In the process the hopes that he had fashioned were shattered resulting in widespread dissent and disillusionment. Indeed because of this perceived betrayal, the anger and hatred felt

towards him may well have exceeded that directed towards the secular Nasser.[14] A leading Egyptian militant illuminates upon the impact of this in the events which ultimately led to Sadat's assassination. For the militants, the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and Sadat reneging upon his perceived promise to install the *shari'ah* were instrumental in his death. Conversely, the same respondent stated,

> thanks to Sadat, a new healthy Islamic generation was born unfettered and unscarred by persecution and torture like the previous generation in the 1950s and 1960s. My generation had no complexes and no nightmares and we paved the way for all subsequent Islamic and jihadist waves in the Muslim world, not just Egypt (quoted in Gerges 2006: 47).

For this respondent, the freedoms introduced by Sadat enabled Islamists to interact and organise towards the implementation of the *shari'ah* in a manner that was impossible under Nasser's regime. Consequently like democracy, discussed in the Turkish example above, enhancing opportunities for communication, interaction and dissemination can unintentionally contribute towards radicalisation. On the reverse of this, it is important to stress contradictions also exist within strategies of state repression that can both prevent terrorism and mobilise militant opposition. Thus attempts at both accommodation and repression can ultimately be self defeating. Hafez (2003) study of a range of societies led him to conclude that overall the denial of political inclusion is instrumental within radicalisation. This is particularly noticeable in contexts where levels of political participation shifted from forms of popular inclusion to exclusion. For example, in Algeria the cancellation of the second round of parliamentary elections after the resounding victory of the Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS), a religious party, in the first stage had led to a surge of militant violence. In countries where participation has been denied such as Chechnya and Tajikistan or taken away, e.g. Algeria and Egypt, 'rebellion became a legitimate strategy for countering repressive state policies' Hafez (2003: 103). Some of the issues facing these governments are similar to those confronting Western administrations within the 'war on terror' umbrella. There is a difficult balance between controlling direct threats, addressing the underlying causes for militancy and

[14] The rise of militancy in Egypt is discussed in detail in al-Zayyat 2004, Gerges 2005, 2006, Kepel 2005 and Milton-Edwards 2005.

the disproportionate or unjust application of state violence and repressive mechanisms which could be considered as evidence for the 'terrorists' discourse. Events and controversies following the 2003 American led invasion of Iraq would be a particular example of this.

Nevertheless when examining the impact of repression over the shorter term, forcible and widespread restraints can seriously reduce the national threat of Islamic militancy. For example, the security clampdown during the 1990s in Egypt and to some extent Algeria, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia significantly weakened the threat of terrorism within these nation-states. Of course, the threat remains but it has diminished. Crucially, the unintended outcome of the effectiveness of the counter terror strategies has contributed to terror groups not attracting broad support and their failures to seriously challenge governments has, al-Zayyat (2004) and Gerges (2005) suggest, been instrumental in the shift of focus for some groups from the 'near enemy' to the 'far enemy' of America and the West more generally, under the al-Qa'ida umbrella.

Clearly the resurgence of Islam generally, and militancy in particular, is not simply the determinist outcome of people being informed about more radical interpretations of religion. If these beliefs are to be accepted and behavioural patterns changed then there has to be some evidence that supports both sides of the militants' discourse, namely that the society is badly flawed and Islamic systems and procedures are a better alternative. Within many Muslim societies, and indeed non Muslim societies, there are multiple problems that are associated with processes such as modernisation, secularisation and globalisation including unrepresentative, corrupt, disorganised governments and weak civil societies. People can witness these factors at local, national or international levels. Within more established nation-states, strengths and flaws within popular participation have gradually been acknowledged and accommodated. Consequently although these types of problems create anger, anguish and insecurities they are rarely considered synonymous with democracy nor lead to significant ideological or physical conflict. These forms of conflict have become institutionalised, incorporated within political arrangements. However in societies where modernisation has been rapid and the individual and social habitus has yet to 'catch up' (Elias 1996), the perceptions of these problems are magnified, symbolic of the system's inherent failings with less exposure to systematic successes that have

been internalised over generations. Consequently loyalty to political parties and systems is less embedded, vulnerable to rising fears and perceived threats. For example, in the UK the economic downturn and parliamentary problems have led to an increase in protest support for the far right but this is relatively restricted. Any challenge to the British government will be from within the institutional framework and will not incorporate greater demands for religious involvement within politics. By contrast, periodic political scandals and downturns in the performance of Muslim nation-states are immediately accompanied by a concomitant decline in support for governing secular mainstream parties and a surge in support for political forms of religion. Contrary to most Western nation-states, religion remains embedded with individual habitus and a viable political alternative to other forms of discourse. And one of the reasons why Islam continues to have the potential to mobilise political support stems from the early history. From its origins and the period of Muhammed and his four immediate successors, Islam has provided a comprehensive framework for life. The early empires were based upon Islamic practice and behaviour. Although the extent to which there was a pragmatic division of power and integration between religious, secular and pre-Islamic influences remains heavily contested, millions of people associate their ways of behaving and thinking with the advent of Islam. Similarly the expansion of the religion across large swathes of territory is also considered to be the outcome of adherence to Islamic tenets. Conversely the decline of related empires, most notably the Ottoman, was associated with a preceding decline in religious practices. In other words the rise of the West and weakening of Muslim regions was not a consequence of the superiority of the procedures and beliefs of the former but the weaknesses of Muslims during that period.[15]

Within these environments, a collective ethnic consciousness that may have existed during anti-colonial movements has frequently not been sufficiently transformed into a social national consciousness. By comparison, Islamic interpretations remained throughout processes of modernisation, deeply ingrained within social processes and traditions, retaining the potential for radical mobilisation if secularisation should be seen to have failed. And the nation-states' formal processes are failing to deliver promises of superior performance and related rules of closure are de-legitimised. For

[15] Hassan 2002, Lewis 2002, Mandaville 2001 and Sutton and Vertigans 2005 discuss these issues in detail.

Muslims, the poor performance extends beyond market economics to cause tensions across all aspects of society where Islam has not been applied.

Within international relations many Muslim governments face further contradictory demands. At one level, close relationships with the United States are considered essential in development and to safeguard sovereignty. Yet these relationships are also the source of considerable unrest within the nation as governments risk being perceived as American satellites or stooges. Through this association national governments become entwined within processes of anti-Americanism. Governments must therefore be sensitive to these conflicting national and international requirements and many seek to engage in, or at least to be implicitly permitting, anti-Western rhetoric while covertly developing closer relations with Western nation-states. Such a policy is not without problems. The increasingly pervasive media via the internet can bypass most forms of censorship and raise awareness of the contradictions in government policies and actions. And by allowing or even encouraging anti Western sentiments, governments are also contributing to levels of antagonism and associated slogans and images becoming more accepted and embedded within social habitus and thus further distanced from the direction that governments ultimately want to travel.

Alongside the pragmatic decision-making that has resulted in the enemy shifting outwards, the formation of contemporary trans-national identification has been considerably aided through globalisation and the transcendence of geographical boundaries.[16] Tremendous advancements in media, communications, transportation and extensive patterns of migration means that peoples are exposed to new experiences and messages with different frameworks of meaning. Through these new and multiple influences, new forms of identity have formed that are meaningful in these evolving figurations. For many people, new loyalties form which transcend national, racial, ethnic and socio-economic barriers (Turner 1994, van der Veer 1994). The re-emphasis upon the *ummah* is part of this broader shift in collective forms of identification and the concomitant huge increase in transnational and global Muslim movements. These include 'such diverse groups as publication and propaganda

[16] Further details can be found in Bunt 2003, Sakr 2001 and Sutton and Vertigans 2005.

organizations, missionary (*da'wa*) societies, Sufi brotherhoods, banks, youth associations, emigrant communities with international ties and others' (Lapidus 2002: 868). For the vast majority of Muslims, these new relationships are assimilated, evolving individual and social habitus, constituting different ways of working, studying, shopping, communicating and believing that accord with their experiences. The *ummah* provides peaceful networks, interrelationships and collective senses of identification. Although this *ummah* is not in direct conflict with nation-states, it clearly provides different forms of explanation and meaning that can implicitly challenge nationalism and weaken national allegiance. At the extreme of those increasingly emphasising the global community are groups associated with al-Qa'ida, discussed above, who are also utilising developments within globalisation to generate greater interest and support to explicitly challenge nation-states.

Conclusion

The demise of the Ottoman Empire and Western colonialism were instrumental in the formation of independent Muslim nation-states. Emergent governments adopted multiple forms of discourse, policies and structures as they attempted to generate and embed national consciousness and modernisation. All nation-states have, to varying degrees, implemented programmes of secularisation ranging from the more covert methods introduced by nation-states like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to the explicitly secular regimes in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. Interesting, and perhaps surprisingly, in light of the preceding sentence, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia currently face the most threatening challenge from militant Islamists. However, nation-states pursuing more rigorous secular processes have also become increasingly embedded with religious symbols and rhetoric while institutions have been penetrated by significant numbers of religious personnel. The incorporation of Islam within cultural, economic, legal political and social realms reflects the limited success of secular national consciousness. Governments struggled to convince their citizens about the discontinuous histories of their 'peoples.' Consequently when people were requiring meaning during persistent periods of uncertainty and transformation, national frameworks of understanding were unable to provide adequate explanations. In these circumstances even secular governments increasingly adopted religious symbols and

narratives to justify experiences and legitimise the national concept. Like their Islamist rivals, they too utilised the Islamic 'Golden Age' in order to underpin the present to connect with collective forms of identification. By interweaving religion within nationalism, national elites have been able to strengthen national consciousness that accords with individual and social habitus. However governments' lack of theological legitimacy and inconsistent approach has meant that the credibility of their 'conversions' has often been weak. Conversely, despite this, the introduction and support for the greater implementation of Islamic values and practices has contributed to normative levels of behaviour becoming more devout and in some instances more radical. For governments this unintentionally helped in the reinvigoration of Islamic influences within challenging political discourse across societies. In other words, national administrations have unintentionally assisted in the development of what is arguably the biggest threat to their dominance, namely more radical Islamic groups. Therefore, governments which have most actively sought to raise the profile of religion, with Islamic leaders participating within political processes, have raised normative standards of behaviour and expectations across society that they cannot address. By comparison while processes of radicalisation can be observed in more secular nation-states, the Islamists threat is less extensive and prominent. However the shift towards greater levels of Islamification within these nations is likely to be accompanied by a rise in the Islamic threat.

The formation and popularity of these groups and the transcending of national boundaries associated with 'al-Qa'ida' has also been enabled by the surge in global communications. Faster and more pervasive methods of communication both enable improved forms of interaction between groups, members and potential supporters and information to be gained about national and international policies and events that may previously have been suppressed, ignored or barely reported. The outcome of this double-sided edge to global communication is that people are exposed both to information about more militant forms of Islam and images and narrative that may well connect with the discourse and enhance the likelihood of support.

In summary, Muslim governments have faced dilemmas since their formation regarding the nature of their administration and how to engage and restrain sufficiently large numbers of people. Clearly restraint is much easier if individuals

internalise controls that moderate their own behaviour. At times when nation-states were facing growing unrest, greater emphasis has been placed upon Islam as a way of providing meaning, purpose and norms and values which when internalised provide the framework for individual constraint. However Islam can also be a mobilising force for change if state sponsored emotional and behavioural dispositions are not matched by the sponsor. In conditions where governments are seen to be failing at multiple levels large numbers of people are attracted by the possibilities of an alternative ideology that is, as various state institutions inform, legitimised by the past. For Muslim administrations this is perhaps the overriding unintended consequence and redressing the secular/religion balance without undermining already fragile forms of national consciousness is hugely problematic. Governments' successes and/or failures in achieving this will be fundamental in determining the longevity and pervasiveness of the militant Islamic threat. The task facing these nation-states is extremely difficult. When taking into consideration, the reality and seriousness of unintended consequences and the unforeseen nature and extent of ripples caused by government actions within complex interwoven global relations and activities, the challenge is magnified to an extent that the outcomes cannot be confidently predicted.

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