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Chapter 6

THE 'INS' AND 'OUTS' OF TERRORISM: THE ROLES OF EMOTIONS THROUGHOUT 'TERRORISTS'' CAREERS

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a subject that arouses considerable emotions. These emotions are largely associated with public reactions to attacks and particular events. Analysis of terrorism and 'terrorists,' in particular, also identifies the significance of emotions such as hatred, fear, humiliation, jealousy and anger in individual involvement in attacks. However the exploration of 'terrorist' emotions tends to be partial, restricted to individuals or groups with 'hatred' and 'anger' frequently applied in isolation to explain acts of terrorism. This paper proposes to connect these emotions to the environments in which they form in order to understand the conditions in which personal feelings contribute to political violence. Comparative analysis is undertaken between a range of different groups including 'Islamic', nationalists in Northern Ireland, 'reds' in Germany and Italy and racialists in the United States. By comparing different groups it is intended to identify commonalities and distinctions in the emotional experiences that result in people becoming 'terrorists.' The paper concludes with an examination of the emotions which are instrumental in people leaving terror groups.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I argue that the possibilities of addressing the causes of, and defeating, terrorism will be enhanced by a greater understanding of the emotions felt by people when they join and ultimately leave groups. In order to illuminate the significance of feelings, processes of collective identification within broader movements, communities and groups are explored. Attempts to achieve this are hampered by the limited analytical application of emotions to

terrorism. Consequently I draw upon examples of processes from the study of social movements and which can be applied to terror groups. Although even within the exploration of more mainstream forms of social and political protest, the impact of emotions upon the structuring and driving of social action has only recently been acknowledged (Jasper 1998, Goodwin et al. 2007). As Goodwin et al. (2007: 413) declare, emotions,

> have been considered too personal, too idiosyncratic, too inchoate, or too irrational to be modelled or measured properly… . In the structural and organisational paradigm that has dominated research, emotions have been dismissed as unimportant, epiphenomenal, or invariable, providing little explanatory power.

Emotions are integral to the success or otherwise of terrorism. Although there is no consensus about what terrorism actually is[1], there is much wider acceptance that the associated acts of violence aim to scare and terrorize. In other words, they seek to raise levels of insecurities, unpredictability and fears through emotional arousal. For the impact of terror attacks to transcend the immediate devastation, there must be a lasting legacy that connects with and magnifies existing uncertainties and concerns. As part of this connection, civilians have to consider the emotionality of terrorism and the omni-present threat and, in most instances, not rationalise the minimal likelihood that they will be caught up in an act of political violence.

EMOTIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM

It is not difficult, with hindsight, to locate emotions within the formulation of the 'war on terror' as the American administration sought to react to the unprecedented attack and regain control over political and social processes. However the rapid development of policy during a period of collective effervescence meant that there was an element of inevitability that emotional detachment and synoptic picture would both be restricted. Consequently there was always a strong possibility that rationality would be subservient to emotions within the 'war.'

Gordon and Arian's (2001) study of the level of threat within various conflict situations and information processing discovered similar findings. They concluded that a relationship exists between the extent of threat and the likelihood that the reactive policy would maintain or intensify conflict. Thus the greater the perceived threat, the greater the likelihood that the policy choice would be incendiary with decision-making dominated by emotion and not logic or rational consideration. On the reverse, when the threat is limited or diminished, policy choices become more conciliatory. For example, Israelis support for a Palestinian state has tended to rise when they feel less threatened by the Palestinians. Equally, Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israelis dropped from 57 per cent in November 1994 to 18 per cent less than 12 months later when news began to circulate about a probable peace agreement. Levels of support for political violence were to subsequently fluctuate in parallel with rising and dashed hopes for peace and related feelings of mis/trust. Conversely, in Northern Ireland, there was a surge of loyalist violence when relations between the British government and republican movement

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[1] Terrorism is defined in this chapter as 'processes of intentional political violence designed to damage, destroy, kill, injure, scare and intimidate.' Terrorists are individuals who participate in terrorism.

were improving. For the loyalists, closer ties were considered to be an indicator of British concessions towards a united Ireland which had to be confronted (Taylor 1998).

The immediacy of reflex responses helps to understand why terror groups seek to provoke governments into rapid retaliation which is usually emotionally driven as the reactions to the 2001 attacks reflected, as discussed above. However, even these more 'primitive' forms of emotion are embedded within complex evaluative processes that are heavily contingent upon the wider social habitus in which they are experienced. Thus expressions of reflex emotions, such as anger, vary across time periods and societies.

RATIONAL VERSUS EMOTIONAL TERRORISTS

The argument regarding the irrationality of collective action (Olson 1963) that has been noticeable within studies of social movements since the 1960s can help to classify some of the attempts to understand terror groups. Groups striving for national goals and a greater share of resources can be accommodated within Western analysis and the embedded understanding of materialism as a universal expectation. Such an approach is badly flawed although it has to be acknowledged that there is a materialistic element within many nationalist groups. By comparison, groups not in pursuit of any immediately obvious collective goods are even more problematic to explain. And under the irrationality argument, it is also difficult to grasp why individuals should invest time, effort and often financial resources into collective action when they bear all the risk and non participants would share the rewards if the collective goals be achieved. As Sageman (2004) comments with regards to terrorist involvement, this creates a 'free rider paradox', namely that participation in terrorism may not be a consequence of utilitarian ideals. Other subsequent studies of social movements can help illuminate motivations behind non material involvement. For instance, Marweek and Ames, (1993), Oliver (1984) and Opps (1989) have all identified the significance of values and group solidarities within collective action. And by sharing social interdependence and a collective sense of identification amongst members, individual concerns regarding personal risks and consequence of their actions can be weakened.

Other studies such as Flam (1990), Jasper (1997) and Melucci (1989) have argued against over extending the rational criteria because many participants do not carefully select from a range of options according to a cost-benefit analysis that is underpinned by rationality. Instead they stress the need to incorporate emotions within understanding about why people become involved with social movements. By drawing upon these difficult perspectives and applying them to terrorism, it is possible to provide a more holistic exploration of individual involvement. The remainder of this chapter examines the roles of emotions within processes into and out of terror groups. Decisions to join, remain and leave frequently develop over time and through processes. It will be argued that emotional experiences frequently act as triggers to those decisions, contributing to individual protest, mobilisation, activism, levels of support and collectively to the formation, organisation, direction, continuation and disengagement of groups. In other words, emotions are integral to terror groups commencing, operating and ending, indeed they could not operate without related affective experiences. Crucially though this is contingent upon the extent of interaction with particular forms of existing individual and social habitus.

To return to an earlier point, terrorism as a strategy can be adopted for a number of reasons, some of which are rational and not mutually exclusive. As a form of political activity, terrorism is considered to be the best, possibly the only, option with which to overcome malfunctioning political systems, consensual political participation, repression and address military imbalance with asymmetrical conflict. Other groups such as a number of Islamic militants and American far right have adopted the self perceived anarchist concept of vanguard (Vertigans 2008). For these groups, their actions are designed to mobilise support, to wake up populations to what is happening and what needs to happen. Emotions can be interwoven within these logical inferences. For example, Crenshaw (2003: 98) suggests that groups turn to terrorism 'because they are impatient with time-consuming legal methods of eliciting support or advertising their cause, because they distrust the regime or are not capable of, or interested in, mobilizing majority support.'

BROADER MOVEMENT'S EMOTIONS

In Flam's (2005) analysis of social movements she draws attention to the manner in which the effectiveness of different civil groups was transformed when they were able to direct anger towards their opponent. In this regard, emotions were re-framed and anger replaced feelings of vulnerability, guilt and shame. Such re-framing can be applied to terror groups. Of course it is not simply the case that people became angry and overcome their feelings of inferiority. These emotions had to be challenged with pride replacing shame. Probably the best, and most notorious, terror attacks that achieved this was the success of the 11 September attacks. Suddenly, not only was the all dominant United States vulnerable and seriously weakened but people associated with Islam were responsible. At the time the attacks caused a reawakening about the capabilities of Islam and aroused a sense of pride, even among some people who were not supportive of the attacks.

Furthermore, terror groups generally tend to have belonged, albeit at the extreme of the spectrum, to broader movements of protest. These movements had already challenged the dominant discourse and senses of futility and humiliation while simultaneously 'proving' the justification and potential of political protest. Movements such as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, organisations such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Christian Identity and militia hybrid in the US and the first *Intifada* in the Palestinian territories were all to varying degrees successful in raising the profiles of social, economic and political problems and the legitimacy of challenging the status quo. Arguably it was the failure of these groups to achieve what some of the more radical supporters wanted that led to violent splinters emerging. It is difficult to contemplate the terror groups emerging without the more passive protest groups initially challenging the hegemonic dominance and transforming emotions of apathy, disillusionment, frustration and shame into pride, anger, hatred and hope. These emotions were to become fundamental in the shift towards violence.

Through this transfer, the government became the source of blame and targeted for action, rather than previously when individuals had internalised responsibility for their predicaments. Equally, Glazer and Glazer (1999) discuss the example of dissidents in Czechoslovakia and the ways in which anger was utilised to overcome fears through collective solidarity and peer support. In situations such as this, the re-framing of emotions is often a complex process that

is contingent upon standards of justice, levels of participation, solidarity and leadership that exist within societies and communities.[2] Thus these variables, rarely acting in isolation, are fundamental in understanding why some acts and policies contribute to shifting of levels of indignation and the formulation of alternate diagnosis of the problems and solutions. However, picking upon a point that is developed below, while the prominence of anger may be a useful emotion for mobilising recruits and encouraging activism both to social movements and terror groups, the latter's group security and prospects would be severely threatened if unrestrained. Consequently anger needs to be managed within groups in a manner that encourages engagement but within acceptable, controlled behavioural parameters.

COMMUNAL EMOTIONS

Within communities that are demarcated according to nationality, ethnicity or religion, there is a danger that if interaction across the boundaries is restricted then stereotypes will abound. For instance, in Northern Ireland and Palestinian territories, divisions are accepted and encouraged. The 'other' is 'bad' and a figure of hatred that is inculcated into individuals from childhood. Social exchanges are often limited to violence or through symbols of violence which reinforce the negative emotions about the other while there is little opportunity to provide positive impressions. After over ten years of peace in Northern Ireland these physical and psychological divisions remain.

Within terror groups, the rational-emotional balance will be instrumental in the extent to which members become isolated or better integrated within wider society. For example, if emotionality within groups is shared to varying degrees outwith the group over matters such as feelings of injustice, anger at armed government intrusions, air raids and suffocating repression, then there is greater likelihood of broader support for the militants and less detachment from surrounding environments. However if the emotions within the group are more exclusive, they will be more isolated. Thus, the commonality of feelings between nationalist groups like IRA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and communities contributed to much greater levels of support than for ideological groups such as Red Army Faction, Red Brigades and Japanese Red Army which failed to connect across their respective societies. Subsequent attempts by trans-national groups such as those associated with al-Qa'ida have also failed to recruit in massive numbers (Vertigans 2009). Arguably this is in part because the internalised historical memories and collective forms of national identification of potential supporters provide a defence against the emotive appeal of radicalism. There is a bounded restraint that is hard for alternative emotions to penetrate. Certainly people are angered by Western policy, outraged by Israeli incursions and morally outraged at the deaths of women and children. Nevertheless the social constraints they have internalised and collective loyalties prevent these emotions from becoming triggers into terrorism. Within national settings such as Chechnya, Northern Ireland, the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka the emotions were more inclusive and representative of the communities while the feelings of the ideological groups were more exclusive, not engaging with non participant's experiences. And within these cultures of opposition or resistance (Foran 1997), there can be resources, traditions and symbols that stimulate feelings of endurance,

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[2] Fireman et al (1979) and Moore (1978) raise a number of these points.

determination and sacrifice in circumstances in which victory is by no means guaranteed. Instead, groups may adopt a long term strategy to which members contribute. These individuals may never witness the achievement of their goals and may never expect to. Yet their contributions to the possibility of an eventual victory provide sufficient satisfaction.

Terror groups and governments want to generate and reinforce moral empathy through symbols, rituals, markers and integration within real or imagined communities. Both engage with emotions and strive to evoke positive feelings for themselves and negative associations with the other that frequently relies upon processes of demonization which often revolve around evil characteristics of the other. In areas where governments are in control they aim to cement particular emotions within society that support and supplement their intentions through love, loyalty and gratitude and help as Flam (2005) remarks, preserve the status quo. For those groups and movements offering an alternative perspective, they offer what Flam (2005) described in relation to social movements, but which applies equally here, as subversive counter-emotions such as hatred, distrust, contempt, shame and possibly hope for a different future. Together these approaches help to both provide a different emotional (re-) framing of reality and to generate compassion for perceived victims either within or across national boundaries. The latter example applies to transnational groups such as the late nineteenth and early twentieth century anarchists and those associated with al-Qa'ida approximately one century later. As with a number of other factors, in comparison with nationalist groups, it is more difficult for those associated with al-Qa'ida to formulate international levels of compassion as a benchmark of morality to be transgressed by the 'far enemy', thereby mobilising tremendous outrage. Clearly this does happen. US government policy and actions post 2001 have fuelled feelings of anti-Americanism and individuals have been sufficiently angered to search out possibilities for terrorism. Yet in comparison with levels of compassion aroused for Palestinian experiences and the extent of support that accompanies Israeli breaches of the moral framework, out of targeted audience of 1.3 billion Muslims, the numbers involved with al-Qa'ida are minimal.

Further important distinctions can be located within communal frameworks. During the recent periods of widespread political violence within strongly nationalist communities such as the (Catholic) republican and (Protestant) loyalists in Northern Ireland, (Hindu) Tamils in Sri Lanka and (Sunni Muslim) Palestinians in the territories, terrorists have been largely embedded within the communities. They continued to share emotions, discourse and strategic goals with family, friends and neighbours although not necessarily the adoption of violence. Silke (2008) reports on the ways in which terror groups and members are regarded as courageous, honourable and important. Conflicting beliefs become normative, sustained by reinforcing contemporary experiences, common history and discourse that groups such as the IRA, HAMAS, UVF and Tamil Tigers utilise(d) to recruit members and retain wider support. As della Porta (1995) identified in her study of political violence in Italy, police brutality, state authoritarianism and indiscriminate attacks against demonstrators and activists contributed to an atmosphere in which violence was considered to an appropriate, indeed only, appropriate response to violence. In this sense, spirals of hatred accelerate as state and non state actors become engrossed in reciprocal forms of violence. By representing the terror attacks against a backdrop of historical and recent enemy repression and brutalities, there is social recognition for their actions. In these settings, if groups and surrounding 'civilians' continue to share sufficient emotions and experiences, and the former are widely considered to be acting in support of the latter then the extent of disengagement is restricted. This is not to say there is none, the clandestine nature of terrorism means that even within supportive communities, those

participating within actions are largely unable to share their experiences and feelings with non members. By comparison, groups such as the 'red' groups of the 1970s and 1980s did not share dispositions with most of their societies and the emotional distance between them was greater.

EMOTIONAL CONTROLS WITHIN

Within terror groups, tensions can be noticed during processes of calculation, planning, preparation and logistical arrangements and the motivations for individual engagement that include anger, desperation, revenge and envy. Terror groups face a dilemma as many people are recruited through their emotional reactions and relationships that pre-date the group and develop with existing members. Yet if groups are to be successful, those emotions must be controlled, subservient to the collective goals that require careful, deliberated consideration of targets, methods, fatalities, media coverage and wider impact. Consequently the initial emotions can continue to inform behaviour and collective forms of identification but not at the expense of the strategic goals. A 'terrorist' who could not control their burning anger over the perceived injustices of her/his homeland would find it difficult to be a 'sleeper', hidden anonymously within targeted communities. Daily interactions with the 'other' that rely upon constrained expression of emotions would also be problematic. Similarly, and in more dramatic settings, terrorists on their way to plant or detonate bombs and to blow up themselves or others, must be able to manage and conceal their emotions, the fear, anger, excitement etc. Otherwise they would be more likely to arouse suspicion, the mission would fail and the perpetrator could expect arrest or death. In this regard, terrorism is fundamentally different from some other forms of political violence, particularly warfare and battles that have required impassioned flurries and emotional inspired fights to the death.

Facing the distinct possibility of death, individuals understandably are less constrained and much more immediately reactive through drives and impulses to the dangers of the situation. For the successful terror group the importance of longer-term goals must be greater than that placed upon individual affective behaviour and impulses. Certainly these can be accommodated and utilised but this has to be to the benefit of the group whose members share unifying social interdependences which emphasise discourse over the individual. Crucially, as Elias (2000) outlined, the interplay between rationalities and emotions shifts, often in conjunction with the tensions between and within competing groups. Thus, the emotional-rationality[3] continuum within terror groups will fluctuate according to the pressures and experiences of group members throughout their careers within political violence and their encounters within, and outwith, the group. To draw a parallel with the above example of the 'war on terror,' a devastating attack by a national or foreign government upon a residential area that was considered to be supportive of militants would create heightened emotionality and demands for large-scale revenge. In such emotive periods, it would be difficult for the terror leaders to postpone retaliation until they were confident that emotions were subservient to purposive rationality, to use Weber's term. Even if the leaders could plan with a measure of detachment and were able to balance this interplay, it is unlikely that their supporters and activists would allow time for sober reflection.

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[3] I am not suggesting that emotions are inherently irrational or that rationality and affective experiences are incompatible. On the contrary, expressive and instrumental forms of action combine both the emotional and rational (Eyerman 2005).

RECRUITMENT

For individuals to join terror groups, and in particular, commit acts of political violence, then their individual emotions have to be transformed. Therefore they have to become detached from contradictory cognitive and normative patterns and competing socialising agencies who do not share the same commitment to terrorism. Examples include family members, friends, employers, many media outlets, school teachers whose norms and values disposition are more consensual and clearly demarcated from the radicals. During the process of radicalisation, the potential terrorist has to disengage from these social restraints, and often the agents themselves, if they are to join groups, and undertake attacks. In the process existing affective ties become weaker allowing closer relations with alternative social bonds. To put this crudely, the terror group has to appeal more than other potentially contradictory forms of relationship. At a societal level, individual emotional attachment shifts from the consensual to the conflicting. This requires the construction and internalisation of new social bonds that incorporate the individual and group. Through the formulation of alternative beliefs and in particular distinctive patterns of behaviour and accompanying cognitive and affective transformation, demarcation boundaries are constructed which vary from weak to strong according to the extent to which groups connect into the broader habitus. Collins' (2001) application to social movements of Durkheim's concept of collective effervescence is also appropriate for the transference of civilians into terrorists. And as Durkheim identified, collective effervescence is a powerful force for unifying in support, and defence, of, the consensus. The immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks upon America and subsequent US administration's reactions, which it has to be recalled were enthusiastically supported, are a very good example of this.

The impact of suffering witnessed both personally or virtually has been well documented. For instance Burke (2006), Khatib (2003) and Sageman (2008) detail the impact of videos and internet upon the radicalisation of Muslims. Images of atrocities and humiliations have been instrumental in mobilising terror opposition to the responsible forces. One particularly prominent example is that of Mohammed al-Dura. He was a twelve year old boy who was killed when caught between Israeli and Palestinian crossfire. The visual coverage of his death was, Sageman (ibid) reports, one of the most watched Internet videos and became instrumental both in the second *intifada* and processes of radicalisation beyond the territories. Emotions associated with moral outrage and desire for retaliation are more likely to be aroused by this kind of incident, with the youth and innocence of the victim integral to subsequent feelings.

Through temporal periods of heightened emotions, people's loyalties can shift and the collective 'we' takes precedence over the individual 'I.' At such times, emotional and cognitive (re) framing can occur and people become part of wider groupings that provide frameworks of explanation and purpose that is often lacking during periods of uncertainty and crisis. Thus terror groups are often able to recruit more when the perceived threat is greater, witnessed, for example, in the rapid growth in recruitment to loyalist groups in Northern Ireland during the Republican hunger strikes in 1981 (Taylor 2000, Vertigans 2008). The subsequent challenge for the terror groups is to retain these new members when the collective effervescence dissipates. In the emerging emotive spaces terror groups need to provide suitable alternatives

that will provide the member with other affective experiences to justify the continuation of their involvement.

For the new terrorist, the group therefore assumes magnified importance, the source of both political and social allegiance. Trust and respect become integral to group relationships and the success or otherwise of the strategy of political violence. The basis for establishing trust and respect stems from the interplay between affective emotions and cognitive processes. Evidence will be sought and reasons provided for whom to trust but this will often be heavily influenced by how we feel about the individuals and the extent to which they share our ideas, beliefs and general disposition (Hardin 2006). In this regard terrorists are no different, if possibly more thorough and conscious in their deliberation.

Friendship is integral to processes of recruitment. Khaled al-Berry (2005: 8) explains that when he joined a radical Egyptian group, 'I wasn't attracted to their brand of religion: I was attracted to them as people ... it's like a new group of friends. At that time you already like them and want to be one of them because you like their courage and sense of devotion.' Analogies with the family are also drawn when militants discuss the appeal of the group and their experiences within. As a respondent informed Della Porta (1992) the 'comrades became my family ... it is the sense of a family'. There are a number of reasons for this, including the nature of the group dynamics when threatened. Furthermore, and more pragmatically, members tended to be of similar ages and shared cultural tastes. And many individuals shared political ties with friends and family prior to joining the group which for Novaro (1991: 110) 'suggests that here ... affective or social relationships have preconditioned and favoured individual mobilization and successive involvement in the armed struggle.'

A number of people are recruited to terror groups after witnessing or hearing about particular attacks that impact upon them to such an extent that they want to gain revenge. MacDonald and Cusack (2005), Silke (2003) and Taylor (1998, 2000) detail how the actions of republican and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland tended to be reciprocal as each group sought to revenge attacks by the other in spirals of violence. Other groups have been motivated by the actions of national security forces as witnessed by the anger and mobilisation of support following the deaths of left-wing protestors and subsequent transformation into terrorism, death of activists in terror actions (Ayers 2003, Jacobs 1997, MacDonald 1991), rival terror attacks (Jamieson 1989) and the killing of right wing militants by American federal agents which led to them being declared martyrs within the broader movement. The deaths were seen to be symptomatic of the threat of the US government (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 2000, Flynn and Gerhardt 1989, Levitas 2002). From the 1990s, concern over controls over gun ownership was heavily influenced by emotional attachment to the American constitution and the right to bear arms. Crucially the historical legacy of American independence has become interwoven with rising fears about a 'New World Order' and the need for individuals and militias to be able to protect themselves from the threat of international armies and in some accounts, the American administration (Crothers 2002). These fears seem to have been influential in the radicalisation of the Oklahoma bomber, Timothy McVeigh (Michel and Herbeck 2001). And at an international level, American involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and complicit support for Israel has contributed to rising levels of anti-Americanism which finds expression at the violent extreme as declarations of revenge for Muslim deaths that the administration has been held accountable for. Conversely the perceived international failures of America has Dees (1996: 75) argues, 'left millions [of Americans] angry and unsure of America's role in the world'. The challenge to American hegemony

whether from communists out-with or liberals within has become central to far right discourse over the post Vietnam years (Vertigans 2008). Finally, as the example of Mohammed al-Dura showed, the internet has enabled images of the deaths of Muslims to be transmitted around the world, mobilising both national and international opposition.

Although groups' discourses and their actions can be closely scrutinised, ultimately the extent to which they can arouse support and spur on recruitment will be heavily influenced by the extent to which ideology engages with peoples' experiences and emotions. Support for the sectarian paramilitaries in Northern Ireland was hugely influenced by the nature of the threat that the respective communities faced from the 'other' and the constant fear of attack. Taking this point further, the pre-existence of fears and insecurity can make it easier for terror groups to attract members. For instance, the declarations by the Japanese Aum Supreme Truth[4] regarding a looming apocalypse arguably were allocated greater credibility because they connected with wider concerns within Japan about world destruction. For Reader (2000) this is partly the legacy of the huge psychological, as well as physical, impact of the atomic bombs dropped upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Spiralling violence is further exacerbated when there are three organisations involved. Most struggles involving terrorism tend to between terror groups and the state. In some instances though, in addition to the state, there are two competing groups such as republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland and left wing and fascist groups in Italy. Groups challenging the nature of the nation-state such as the IRA and Italian Red Brigades and Prima Linea have therefore to confront and confound government counter-terror strategies and rival terror tactics which magnified the extent of the legal and illegal threat they faced. The dual threat can be seen to have further fuelled levels of fear and insecurity and strengthened group allegiance and solidarities. In such situations, particularly when interwoven with common historical memories, the fear of the rival 'other' becomes magnified. For example, in Italy the threat of the fascists was exaggerated by 'red' groups' whose impressions were influenced by the history of fascism in Italy, apparent complicity between the police and black groups and their more indiscriminate approach to bombing.[5]

Again triggers should not be examined in isolation. Clearly they are fundamental to processes of radicalisation but their impact is variable even within the same context. For instance, particular killings were often instrumental in individual's immersion within spirals of violence in Northern Ireland. Since the peace process, attacks have continued but they are often isolated acts that are no longer part of concerted campaigns. And instead of violence, fear and insecurities permeating the social habitus, peace and hope have become dominant. Consequently terror activities have not reignited emotions to heightened levels that would have led to growing support for the armed return of paramilitaries. This is not to say that political violence will not return to Northern Ireland. Instead as Horgan (2005) argues, triggers become instigators when combined with certain preconditions such as lack of political representation, discrimination and extremist ideologies. Thus the likelihood of terrorism returning is heavily determined by the presence and interactions of triggers and preconditions.

In addition to the more anticipated emotions, the appeal of perceived thrills, excitement, glory and status are often overlooked. MacDonald's (1991: 212) discussion with a range of

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[4] The Aum Supreme Truth attained notoriety following the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground.
[5] Fascists were responsible for the most deadly single attacks. The highest number of fatalities was recorded in the bombing in Bologna in 1980 which left 85 people dead.

female terrorists identified that for leading figures such as the RAF's Astrid Proll involvement with the group brought excitement. Proll explained that 'you must understand that then the most fantastic thing in the world was not to be a rock star, but a revolutionary'. Della Porta's (1992) research into Italian red groups also reported upon how participants expressed feelings of excitement and happiness within dynamic, interesting periods. Others reported upon the levels of satisfaction that engagement brought and, in particular, successful attacks. One of della Porta's (1992: 283) respondents exemplified this when declaring 'the very fact of seeing that thing burning and falling down made me happy.' Hoffman (1998) discusses leading figures from a number of red groups and IRA who have referred to the senses of power and excitement that they felt when immersed within terror cells. By comparison, for those who are also interwoven within civilian communities, the normative life surrounding them could appear tedious and uninspiring. Across terror groups, recruits have been attracted by the promise of excitement, particularly when often compared with mundane daily mainstream existence. Furthermore, within nationalist, religious and ideological groups, members have reported feelings of pride and preferential treatment. For instance, as one Palestinian terrorist informs Post and Denny (2002) '[r]ecruits were treated with great respect. A youngster who belonged to Hamas or Fatah was regarded more highly than one who didn't belong to a group, and got better treatment than unaffiliated kids.' Finally, the extent to which groups connect into a long history of sacrifice and martyrdom has tremendous emotional repercussions. For instance, within the Palestinian territories and elements within other Muslim societies including Chechnya, Pakistan and Afghanistan there are declarations of pride over the terror attacks of sons, daughters, fathers, uncles etc. and in particular those who are killed in action.

With the exception of the 'red' groups and factions within some national groups such as the Tamil Tigers, males dominate terrorism. In light of the macho behaviour and nature of the social relationships this is hardly surprising. For example, the high risks to be found through participating within terrorism and the possibility of arrest, injury or death are more likely to appeal to younger males who lack familial responsibilities.[6] Excitement and danger allied to the possibility of using weapons are emotions and images that permeate male cultures. Terrorism provides an opportunity for some males to explore these in reality. However life as a terrorist often restricts social interactions and activities and requires considerable patience and consideration as individuals wait, seemingly endlessly, for something to happen. Thus excitement is often replaced by prolonged periods of boredom. As Horgan (2009: 22) explains, 'A common realisation for new recruits is the crushing disparity between the fantasies that moulded their initial search for a place in the movement, with the subsequent reality of involvement'. Certainly this reflects the experiences of many who become involved in terror groups but there is a danger that the impact of 'fantasy' could be overstated. Other terrorists join groups both for more pragmatic and discursive reasons, including the appeal of the group and the desire to disseminate ideology.

Within processes of radicalisation, a number of emotional barriers are gradually broken down through involvement with broader political movements and an incremental shift through to increasingly radical forms of political engagement. For the first generation of participants in the terror group this largely occurred over several stages. For these individuals their engagement 'did not generally take place in the part of single, isolated subjects but started from a network of which the individuals were a part' (Novaro 1991: 162). For subsequent

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[6] This is by no means universal with many older, married males belonging to terror groups.

generations, these emotional journeys are condensed because the founding members had already established an explanatory framework that sought to overcome moral ambiguities (Vertigans 2008).

GROUP RETENTION

Building upon this, the continuation of terror groups is influenced by the affective dynamics within. Just like involvement with other types of groups, emotions are created, replaced and transformed when individuals become part of a terror cell. Individual affective experiences that were instrumental in decisions to join may well remain important but are now alongside collective experiences that members share and discuss which become the basis for commonality and help to blur boundaries between 'we'/'I'. Within social movements, Jasper (1998) refers to the reciprocal emotions of the movement, by which he means the feelings that participants have towards each other.

Group dynamics continue to evolve according to situations, personalities and longevity. Basic factors such as aging need to be considered. A member aged nineteen is extremely unlikely to hold the same interests and behavioural patterns ten, fifteen, twenty years later. This transformation of loyalties and the subservience of the individual to the collective entity contribute to a sense of belonging and strengthen commitment. As one respondent informed della Porta (2009: 82) 'I am unable to cultivate relationships outside the organization. With comrades from the organization, these are also relationships for life; they are, above all, friendships.' Groups are strengthened by these social bonds of loyalty between members and by extension to the group and discourse. Intense feelings of solidarity and loyalty, discussed above, to the group and each other have contributed to members retaining involvement because to leave would be a sense of betrayal to their comrades. For instance della Porta (1995) reports on the reluctance of left-wing activists to leave groups with decisions to quit often only being taken collectively when facing trial and imprisonment. However among the same groups, the death of members on operations could cause a crisis of confidence in the appropriateness of terrorism and individual engagement (della Porta 2009).

LEAVING

Processes of disengagement have been relatively neglected both within studies of social movements more generally and terrorism in particular. The limited research that has been undertaken identifies the significance of emotions and affective bonds. For instance, Klandermans (2003) examination of the dynamics of disengagement from social movements identifies a reduction in levels of commitment, diminishing feelings of gratification which can combine with precipitating events. In this regard it is possible to argue that triggering experiences can be instrumental both within decisions to join and leave terror groups. Horgan (2009) identifies how people become disillusioned with involvement in terror groups. In particular, the discrepancy between initial ideals and reality and disagreement over tactics, politics and ideology are all instrumental in people leaving groups.

In Garfinkel's (2007: 1) exploration of the psychological transformation from violent activity to non violent involvement identified that 'change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor or friend who supports or affirms peaceful behavior'. Furthermore, Barrett and Bokhari (2009) report on how changes to member's other or new relationships such as family life, marriage and fatherhood can contribute to the nature of involvement within terror groups being transformed and possibly ending. Consequently personal relationships outwith the group can be involved within processes of disengagement and are an example of how emotional life beyond terrorism can be instrumental in government efforts to encourage the withdrawal of members. Boucek's (2009) study of extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia provides further examples. In his analysis, the involvement of the family and extended network of Islamist militants' was essential to the success of the demobilization program. Processes of withdrawal would also be more inviting if mechanisms were provided that enabled the expression of emotions and contributed to the initial radicalisation. As Barrett and Bokhari (2009: 175) suggest, there is often a need for 'the creation of space and opportunity to vent frustration outside terrorism'. Clearly appropriate political and civic channels for debate and engagement would help to incorporate reformed terrorists' emotions within the mainstream.

Revulsion can also be instrumental in people leaving groups. Group attacks can be viewed as unnecessarily causing death and destruction. Della Porta (2009) reports upon the impact the Red Brigades killing of the former Prime Minister Aldo Moro and subsequently a trade unionist, Guido Rossa, had upon activists. The killings were considered to be cruel and excessive. Alternatively terrorists may cause such revulsion among the wider population that the continuation of this form of political violence becomes untenable. For the reasons identified above, this is particularly noticeable for nationalist groups. Because of their close proximity and reliance upon communities for support and legitimisation, acts of terrorism must be carefully considered with fatalities minimised. When the attacks caused extensive devastation and people are killed then there is a significant risk that not only the enemy but also intended supporters will be repulsed. A very good example of this was the 1998 Omagh bombing which killed 29 people. Even against the backdrop of the Troubles this attack was widely condemned across both Protestant and Catholic communities, within Northern Ireland and around the world. Despite apologising and denying that the bomb was intended to kill, the perpetrators, the Real IRA were reviled and lost considerable support within the republican movement.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, millions of people experience extremes across the spectrum of emotions ranging from intense love and devotion to intense hatred. When these heightened emotions are internalised, only very few contribute to processes of terrorism. Studies that examine emotions in isolation lack any real insight into understanding why some people experience moral outrage and become terrorists while others incorporate anger within their identification yet are not mobilised to commit acts of political violence. Of course groups seek to evoke specific emotions in order to mobilise support and recruits. But the process lacks the determinism that

helps to easily explain away the engagement of a cross-section of populations that often includes charming and engaging individuals and not the sullen, dull, brainwashed empty vessels that are widely conjured up. For the emotion to resonate and amplify feelings of injustice or outrage, it has to resonate with individual and social habitus, connect with existing feelings, insecurities and fears. Consequently if emotions are to be triggers into terrorism, they must contribute to the mobilisation of individuals and a re-framing of reality. For this to be happen, the nature of the interaction between individual and group discourses, interpretations and experiences have to be identified. Only then can a greater insight into the roles of emotions be established.

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