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Title: Stakeholder and public perceptions of CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS – results from UK focus groups and implications for policy

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Abstract: Interest is growing in carbon dioxide enhanced oil recovery (CO₂-EOR) as an additional economic incentive for CO₂ injection and demonstration of storage feasibility. However, given increasing societal concern over fossil fuel energy, could CO₂-EOR unintentionally hinder conventional CCS by reducing support from neutral or cautiously supportive voices? This paper assesses how stakeholders and citizens respond to four scenarios for CCS with CO₂-EOR in the North Sea, and draws societal implications for deployment in other mature basins. Based on focus group data from Aberdeen, Edinburgh and London, we argue that scenarios emphasising maximising oil recovery may be met with scepticism or even opposition, and that there is an expectation for national governments to lead and ensure CO₂-EOR (and CCS more generally) are undertaken in the public interest. Nonetheless, our data also suggests a certain degree of pragmatism as to the embeddedness of fossil fuels in society, and thus that there may be qualified support for CCS with CO₂-EOR as making best use of existing fields whilst decarbonising the power and industrial sectors. However, for this support to emerge there is an imperative for coherent and credible policy that positions CO₂-EOR firmly within a managed transition towards a low-carbon economy.

Keywords: carbon dioxide capture and storage; CO₂-enhanced oil recovery; North Sea; public perceptions of CCS; stakeholder perceptions of CCS.

Research highlights:

- Empirical study into stakeholder and public perceptions of CO₂-EOR;
- Scenarios for CO₂-EOR in North Sea with CCS trialed with focus groups;
- Limited support for CO₂-EOR with maximising recovery focus;
- Qualified support for CO₂-EOR as part of managed low-carbon transition;
- Shows importance of credible and coherent energy and climate policies.

1 1. Introduction and background

2

3 The slower-than-anticipated progress of full-scale integrated carbon dioxide capture and storage
4 (CCS) projects in recent years has opened up debates on whether carbon dioxide-enhanced oil
5 recovery (hereafter CO₂-EOR) can help pave the way for CO₂ storage by giving an additional
6 economic incentive for CO₂ injection and also demonstrating the technical feasibility of long-term
7 CO₂ storage (e.g. Kemp and Kasim, 2013). However, of increasing importance given the recent
8 prominence of the perceived deleterious effects of fossil fuels within debates on the future of national
9 energy mixes (Corry and Riesch, 2012) is the role of public and stakeholder perception in influencing
10 how CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS is viewed by policymakers. Whilst there is the potential for CO₂-
11 EOR to stimulate CCS, could it therefore also be the case that CO₂-EOR may unintentionally hinder
12 CCS by tipping the ‘reluctant acceptance’ or ‘neutral’ stance publics and key stakeholders may hold
13 for conventional CCS (Littlecott, 2012; Mabon et al, 2014) towards scepticism or even opposition?

14

15 We assess this issue through data collected from focus groups undertaken in the United Kingdom
16 between spring and autumn 2014, during which potential scenarios for deployment of CO₂-EOR in the
17 North Sea were trialled with participants in order to gain feedback and stimulate discussion. At the
18 time of the research the UK government CCS Commercialisation competition was under
19 consideration, with both candidates (Peterhead in north-east Scotland and White Rose in Yorkshire)
20 intending to utilise sub-seabed storage in the North Sea. With the UK CCS Commercialisation
21 competition subsequently being withdrawn in autumn 2015, CO₂-EOR may theoretically at least be an
22 alternative source of funding for moving towards storage deployment, and in any case remains an
23 option elsewhere in the world. Price volatility has also brought into focus the future of oil and gas
24 production and associated employment in the North Sea, with Scottish Green Party co-convener
25 Patrick Harvie provoking debate in January 2016 by advocating a ‘managed decline’ of North Sea oil
26 and gas extraction in tandem with a transition to a more sustainable employment base for north-east
27 Scotland (Scottish Green Party, 2016). The findings of our data therefore have continued relevance to

28 both the future of the North Sea with respect to oil production versus climate change imperatives, and
29 to CO₂-EOR with CCS beyond the immediate deployment of power sector CCS in the UK.

30

31 After reviewing literature on governance of CO₂-EOR and outlining our research method, we discuss
32 three key questions arising from participants' responses: what is the purpose of CO₂-EOR; who
33 benefits; and is CO₂-EOR appropriate in the sense of being technically or economically viable. We
34 identify challenges and opportunities for policymakers arising from these participant questions,
35 arguing that there may in cases be a certain degree of pragmatism among more environmentally-
36 leaning stakeholders and citizens as to the realities of the role of fossil fuels in the energy system. We
37 suggest CO₂-EOR has potential to appeal to a wide range of constituencies as a means of extracting
38 remaining required oil in a more sensitive manner, but at the same time caution that governments must
39 create conditions for credible scenarios for CO₂-EOR, situated firmly in the context of a managed
40 transition for the North Sea and oil- and gas-producing regions like it, if CO₂-EOR is to garner societal
41 support in this way.

42

43 2. Literature survey

44

45 Research into public and stakeholder perceptions of CCS is now well-established (see Ashworth et al,
46 2015), hence in the interest of brevity we focus on work into public and stakeholder views on CCS in
47 the context of CO₂-EOR. Much thinking in this area concerns the potential of CO₂-EOR to make CCS
48 more attractive to both stakeholders (for instance policymakers, investors and developers) and publics
49 by giving additional economic incentives. In a comparison of policy stakeholders across four US
50 states, Chaudhry et al (2013) found greater (albeit not universal) support for CCS in Texas – largely
51 due to the possibility of using captured CO₂ for EOR in the state's oil fields. Research with
52 stakeholders in Saudi Arabia (Liu et al, 2012) and China (Reiner and Liang, 2012) has likewise found
53 there tends to be more enthusiasm for CCS when it is linked with the possibility of CO₂-EOR to boost
54 yields from existing nearby oil fields. For publics too, Hovorka and Tinker (2010) believe CO₂-EOR
55 offers advantages over sequestration in brine formations due to the potential for royalties, fees for

56 surface access and potential for jobs in host communities. In practice, Sacuta and Anderson (2014)
57 note positive discussions around the Weyburn CO₂-EOR project, Boyd (2015) linking this to the role
58 of the operators as major employers in the community.
59
60 Boyd (2015) also, however, sees trust in developers and local pride in technological innovation as
61 factors informing support in Weyburn. It may hence also be the case that existing understanding of the
62 organisations and technologies associated with subsurface operations in specific locations suitable for
63 CO₂-EOR offers a starting point towards more general societal support for CO₂ storage. Both Melzer
64 (2012) and Sacuta et al (2013) indicate positive experiences with CO₂-EOR on specific projects
65 arising from public familiarity with oil infrastructure and processes may lead to broader social
66 acceptance of CO₂ storage, Nunez-Lopez et al (2008) and Hovorka and Tinker (2010) both suggesting
67 the value of CO₂-EOR in demonstrating the ability in practice to trap hydrocarbons over periods of
68 geological time.
69
70 Nonetheless, CO₂-EOR is not universally portrayed as a bridge towards full CCS. Sacuta and
71 Anderson (2014) stress the need to distinguish between CCS and CO₂-EOR in public engagement,
72 Setiawan and Cuppen (2013) arguing in the context of Indonesia that stakeholders do not see a clear
73 connection between CCS and EOR, instead associating CCS with centralised coal-burning power
74 plants. Stakeholders or publics without so much exposure to oil extraction thus may not so readily see
75 value in utilising captured CO₂ for oil recovery. Even where there is familiarity with oil operations, the
76 links between CO₂ and EOR may not be viewed favourably – Melzer (2012: 12) warns incentivising
77 operators to undertake CO₂-EOR may “be met with cries of corporate welfare given to an industry
78 already burdened with image problems”, Mabon and Shackley (2015) noting Scottish environmental
79 stakeholders expressed concern that EOR utilising CO₂ captured from CCS processes may shift CCS
80 from being a ‘bridge’ to renewables to a means of perpetuating a fossil fuel economy.
81
82 At the very least, positive experience in one location should not be taken to mean CO₂-EOR in the
83 context of CCS will be supported more widely. Klock et al (2010) indicate the possibility for

84 heterogeneity in stakeholder perceptions of CO₂ utilisation in Norway by suggesting the distribution of
85 value and risk among value chain stakeholders ought to be researched further. Boyd (2015) warns of
86 over-generalising from her Weyburn findings, noting perceived benefits and risks may differ
87 depending on local contexts.

88

89 In sum, research to date into public and stakeholder perceptions of CCS in the context of CO₂-EOR
90 suggests a more favourable stance towards CCS might be expected among both communities and
91 stakeholders spatially proximate to existing oil extraction infrastructure, where there could be
92 perceived economic and job benefits, and that familiarity with oil and gas processes in such locations
93 could offer a pathway to wider societal support for CO₂ storage. Equally, though, the link between
94 CO₂-EOR and CCS may not be clearly understood and a range of societal perspectives on CO₂-EOR
95 can exist – including possible hostility towards ‘prolonging’ fossil fuel extraction. This research builds
96 on these findings by considering how CO₂-EOR may be perceived in a mature oil-producing region
97 that enjoys significant income and employment benefits, yet also one where there is also good
98 understanding of and civic pride in alternative renewable energy sources (Warren and McFadyen,
99 2010) and awareness of climate issues.

100

101 3. Method

102

103 Seven discussion groups were convened between spring and autumn 2014 in several locations across
104 the UK. The aim was to encapsulate a range of familiarity with/proximity to potential North Sea CO₂-
105 EOR sites and associated infrastructure, and to capture a range of public and stakeholder perspectives.
106 Three discussion groups were carried out in Aberdeen (one with members of the public, one with
107 stakeholders with an interest in the marine environment, one with early career oil and gas
108 professionals studying at a local university) due to its close proximity to current oil and gas production
109 and a basin geologically suitable for sub-seabed CO₂ storage and/or CO₂-EOR; two in Edinburgh (one
110 with members of the public, one with academics and other professionals with an interest in
111 environmental issues but not working on CCS directly) due to its greater distance from oil production

112 and high visibility of environmental issues as a result of the city being the seat of the Scottish
113 Parliament; and two in London (one with representatives of the financial sector, particularly ‘green
114 investment’, and one with environmental NGOs) – whilst London is outwith Scotland, the clustering
115 of ‘green investment’ stakeholders and NGOs made it a relevant site, particularly given the ability of
116 national-level NGOs to shape public opinion (Littlecott, 2012).

117

118 Each group lasted two hours. After a short introductory presentation on climate change, the need for
119 decarbonisation and the possible role of CCS, a 5-10 minute facilitated discussion solicited
120 participants’ initial thoughts on CCS as a whole system and energy/climate change more broadly.
121 Participants then received a presentation on EOR (noting in particular that CO₂-EOR is just one form
122 of EOR), with a slightly longer (10-15 minute) facilitated discussion to get initial reactions to CO₂-
123 EOR. The researchers then presented four scenarios for CO₂-EOR in the North Sea (see below), before
124 progressing to the main (30-40 minute) facilitated discussion on CO₂-EOR. As a conclusion to each
125 session, participants were asked (a) which of the four scenarios they *wanted* to happen; and (b) which
126 of the four they thought was *most likely* to happen. Research team members undertook all presentation
127 and facilitation.

128

129 Each session was audio-recorded and transcribed, with transcripts anonymised to remove reference to
130 particular individuals and (where appropriate) organisations. Through a review of relevant literature
131 into public and stakeholder perceptions of CO₂-EOR, key themes driving perception of CO₂-EOR
132 were identified (see Section 2 above). The transcripts of the focus groups were re-read, seeking to
133 identify places where themes raised in previous research were either confirmed or challenged.
134 Particular attention was paid to any new themes arising that may not have been identified in earlier
135 studies. The data was thus analysed in an iterative way, reading first to identify relevant themes, and
136 then refining these themes and concepts accordingly in light of their relation to findings from other
137 studies. To increase the validity of conclusions drawn, the researchers read the transcripts
138 independently of one another and then compared their findings afterwards. Additionally, the
139 perceptions of each group on CO₂-EOR were plotted onto a matrix according to how strongly they

140 identified with the four scenarios presented (see Section 4.1) and what they saw as the barriers and
141 enablers to CO₂-EOR (see Section 5).

142

143 Given continuing low public awareness of CCS (Ashworth et al, 2015) let alone CO₂-EOR, to
144 stimulate discussion four different ‘scenarios’ were constructed for the future of the North Sea. These
145 focused on (a) the extent to which CO₂ storage was deployed; and (b) the extent of climate ambition.

146 These were loosely aligned with the economic scenarios developed by Durusut et al (2013):

147

148 1. Maximise recovery, limited climate focus – this was also termed the ‘Wood Review’ scenario
149 for ease of participant identification. This scenario would aim to maximise oil recovery,
150 injecting only enough CO₂ to recover as much oil as is potentially viable;

151

152 2. Maximise recovery, maximise climate focus – this was termed the ‘CO₂-EOR’ scenario.
153 Under this scenario, oil would be recovered to a high degree, but large quantities of CO₂
154 would also be injected as part of climate change mitigation;

155

156 3. Limited recovery, maximise climate focus – this was termed the ‘low carbon’ scenario. This
157 scenario would see limited CO₂ injection for CO₂-EOR purposes, but a high drive for
158 decarbonisation, with a focus on offshore renewable development and CO₂ storage in the
159 North Sea;

160

161 4. Limited recovery, limited climate focus – this was termed the ‘decline’ scenario. This scenario
162 would see a decline in oil production in the North Sea, with nothing replacing it.

163

164 These scenarios were selected as they provided polarised positions for both climate focus and recovery
165 ambitions, thus giving participants a sense of the markedly different contexts into which CO₂-EOR
166 could be deployed. It was made clear from the outset that these scenarios were only ‘caricatures’,

167 developed to provoke discussion within the groups on possible trajectories for the North Sea.
168 Participants were encouraged to challenge the scenario framings and/or to suggest alternative
169 conceptualisations of their own. The details within each of these scenarios were deliberately kept to a
170 minimum during presentation, in order to encourage the participants themselves to consider the
171 conditions that could lead to the emergence of such a scenario, and to think about the context (if any)
172 in which such a scenario could be desirable. We now evaluate participants' responses to these
173 scenarios, offer suggestions for how stakeholders and publics feel CO₂-EOR in the North Sea ought to
174 be governed, and reflect on what the implications of this are for the governance of CCS more
175 generally.

176

177 4. Results

178

179 4.1. Response to scenarios

180


181 We first provide a general overview of how the groups responded to the specific scenarios presented to
182 them. As mentioned in Section 3, at the end of the session participants were asked which scenario they
183 *wanted* to happen, and which they thought was *most likely* to happen. Figure 1 provides an overview
184 of the general consensus within each group as to where their opinions lay on desired versus expected
185 scenarios, showing also the difference between preference and expectation. Whilst there was no major
186 debate or disagreement in this regard within any of the groups by the end of the sessions, it should be
187 noted that these positions are a composite assessment of multiple views expressed in each focus group
188 discussion and therefore not necessarily reflective of individual participant views or nuanced
189 differences of opinion that may have occurred between participants within groups. Such differences
190 are picked up on in the qualitative analysis of discussion transcripts following in Section 4.2.

191

192 Figure 1: desired and expected outcomes of CO₂-EOR scenarios from focus groups (adapted from
193 Mabon and Littlecott, 2015)

194

Desired scenario (start of arrow) and expected scenario (point of arrow)



- A1 A2 Aberdeen public
- B1 B2 Edinburgh public
- C1 C2 Offshore stakeholders
- D1 D2 Energy/climate professionals
- E1 E2 Finance
- F1 F2 NGOs
- G1 G2 Early career professionals with experience in new oil fields

195

196

197 The first thing to note is that all groups tended to see scenarios with higher climate ambition as more
 198 desirable (i.e. 'CO₂-EOR focus' and 'low-carbon focus'). Participants believed it was important for
 199 policy to reflect a need to mitigate climate change via a transition to a low-carbon economy. This was
 200 true even when stakeholders simultaneously were positive about the potential development of CO₂-
 201 EOR. In part this can be explained by the fact the highest levels of CO₂-EOR deployment are
 202 associated with action on climate change, given that this is the basis on which (in the UK at least)
 203 significant volumes of CO₂ would be provided via onshore power or industrial CCS projects.

204 However, within the groups there was near-universal acceptance of the need for climate action, and for
 205 North Sea objectives to be coherent with such climate mitigation. The strong preference for scenarios
 206 with a high climate ambition provides an opportunity for policy makers to appeal to the aspirations of
 207 multiple stakeholders. Framings that place CO₂-EOR within a wider view of North Sea transition into
 208 the future are likely to be more favourably received. Conversely, approaches that only seek to

209 maximise North Sea recovery goals without attention to climate goals are likely to be viewed
210 negatively, and may even in cases be a trigger for opposition to CO₂-EOR.

211
212 The second response to the scenarios was the clear gap between desired and expected outcomes across
213 all stakeholder groups. This notably includes a retreat from climate change aspirations back towards
214 what were perceived to be ‘business as usual’ objectives on fossil fuel extraction – aligned with the
215 ‘Wood Review’ scenario. As well as reflecting participants’ concerns over the effects on climate
216 change mitigation efforts if CO₂-EOR was framed purely in terms of maximising recovery, this also
217 hints at lack of confidence in and scepticism of governments’ ability to drive long-term change over
218 periods transcending electoral cycles. This was particularly true for stakeholders most closely linked to
219 the pursuit of current objectives on oil and gas production. For instance, participants in the Aberdeen
220 offshore stakeholders focus group strongly underlined the challenge of technical credibility of any
221 proposed policy framework, given the lag-times and inertia of private sector investment cycles in
222 North Sea assets. Their view was therefore that ‘decline’ was the most likely outcome rather than
223 increased investment in either oil production or broader North Sea transition activities (including CO₂-
224 EOR).

225
226 The combined impact of these two trends (desire for future-orientated objectives, but gap between
227 desired and expected outcomes) suggests governing the deployment of CO₂-EOR in the context of
228 CCS is a challenging area for policy makers where aspirations are difficult to deliver in reality.
229 However, the broad support for scenarios with high climate goals does provide an opportunity for
230 policy makers to develop longer-term and coherent objectives in association with diverse stakeholders
231 as a means of addressing multiple concerns. We now turn to the participants’ own responses to the
232 scenarios to develop the above points and consider in more depth the conditions under which – if any
233 – CO₂-EOR could be viewed as an acceptable and viable part of Scotland’s energy transition.

234
235 4.2. Participants’ own responses

236

237 As per Section 3, the scenarios presented to participants were intended to provoke discussion – of
238 equal if not greater interest than establishing which of the four prescribed scenarios the groups
239 favoured the most were the responses they raised themselves. The transcripts were analysed in relation
240 to the themes emerging from extant literature into CO₂-EOR, and it transpired that the themes outlined
241 in Section 2 did also emerge in our UK-specific data, namely: (a) CO₂-EOR as a means of bringing
242 economic benefit and employment to communities reliant on oil extraction; (b) CO₂-EOR as a
243 potential pathway to wider CO₂ storage; and (c) the possibility for CO₂-EOR not to be perceived as
244 part of CCS and/or climate change mitigation. The responses from the UK focus group participants
245 added extra nuance to these themes, however, raising additional questions around the wider context of
246 CO₂-EOR deployment. Rather than automatically seeing CO₂-EOR as a pathway to CO₂ storage,
247 participants questioned what the actual purpose of CO₂-EOR is. Likewise, rather than assuming CO₂-
248 EOR would bring economic benefit to communities reliant on and familiar with oil infrastructure,
249 questions arose over who would actually benefit from CO₂-EOR. And more than challenging the links
250 between CO₂-EOR and CCS, some participants questioned the moral propriety of prolonging fossil
251 fuel extraction whilst others questioned its very economic and technical viability. We thus consider
252 these three overarching themes – what the purpose of CO₂-EOR is, who benefits, and whether it is
253 appropriate in terms of being worthwhile or viable – in turn.

254

255 4.2.1. What is the purpose of CO₂-EOR?

256

257 Nearly all participants – stakeholders and publics – agreed human-induced climate change was
258 occurring, and that changes to energy production and consumption were required to reduce climate
259 risks. Within this, there was also good general agreement that CCS and associated CO₂-EOR could in
260 principle be considered part of the suite of low-carbon energy sources that may be drawn on to
261 mitigate climate change:

262

263 *On a case to case basis per if you start to work out barrel costs, it doesn't make any sense to do CCS*
264 *but if you then take a step back and look at the fact that the climate is changing and is going to have a*

265 *negative impact on a variety of things, including our economics, if you look at that scale surely we*
266 *need to make these technologies as part of a portfolio of successful things, something to aspire to*
267 *perhaps* (marine biologist, Aberdeen offshore stakeholders, M)

268
269 *[CO₂-EOR with CCS] will give you, you kind of, giving yourself more time to buy something else,*
270 *another sort of energy source basically cause the way I have understood it is that if you are able to get*
271 *more oil what seems to be over CO₂, into the atmosphere, then you are able to delay the climate*
272 *change process, giving you time for the technology to develop which over time is a cleaner energy*
273 *source* (citizen, Aberdeen public, M)

274
275 There was less agreement on how CO₂-EOR and CCS would be deployed in practice, with discussion
276 over whether carbon dioxide storage was indeed part of a move to a decarbonised energy system, or
277 whether it gave means to uncritically perpetuate a fossil fuel-based economy. Some participants
278 particularly worried about reliance on 'technical fixes' and short-term economic gain without wider
279 reflection on societal governance and organisation or longer-term climate and energy issues:

280
281 *[CO₂-EOR] has to be in that context of significant global leadership and sort of a shift towards a true*
282 *transition rather than a just a technical fix in terms of CO₂ emissions* (sustainability consultant,
283 Edinburgh climate professionals, M)

284
285 *If it's driven by climate and it's driven by a vision that says hey, this is going to make it more socially*
286 *and politically acceptable to use these things as part of a transition, and there is a real defined*
287 *transition* (researcher, London NGOs, F)

288
289 Nonetheless, there was also recognition of the embeddedness of fossil fuels within contemporary
290 society, both in terms of reliance on oil and also on coal- and gas-fired power stations for electricity (it
291 is interesting to note that only limited mention was made of CO₂ emissions from industrial sources
292 such as steel and cement works, and when these were discussed they were raised by stakeholders with

293 significant energy and environmental knowledge). Under this more pragmatic stance – which was also
294 adopted by some stakeholders more cautious or critical of fossil fuels – CO₂-EOR combined with CCS
295 was perceived as a means of decarbonising remaining thermal power plants, whilst also extracting
296 remaining required oil in a more sensitive manner:

297
298 *We think as part of the UK's climate targets for 2030, there is still room for some gas by 2030 and if*
299 *you can capture some of the carbon from that good. If you can link that with industrial process*
300 *emissions as well to capture some of that, we're supportive* (economist, London NGOs, M)

301
302 *Well I think, just trying to be pragmatic about it, ideally we probably wouldn't be using fossil fuels, we*
303 *all agree that if we had that option, but we're clearly going to. Governments are not going to give up*
304 *and we all live lives that are dependent on it, so I guess the question in that context of where does one*
305 *aim for the most sensible outcome, putting aside any sort of aspirations of going back five thousand*
306 *years in time and having a different life* (finance stakeholder, London finance stakeholders, M)

307
308 As well as being part of a transition to a low-carbon energy system, there was also some (albeit
309 limited) discussion of the role of CO₂-EOR in a transition to more socially sustainable ways of living.
310 What is meant by this is giving a less sudden and more realistic trajectory away from employment in
311 fossil fuel-based industries, especially in locations like Aberdeen where the local economy is heavily
312 dependent on oil and gas industries. 'Social sustainability' in this sense also means a more gentle
313 transition away from fossil fuels, with CO₂-EOR giving extra time to address issues such as
314 intermittency and potentially high consumer bills perceived as being associated with a rapid transition
315 to renewables:

316
317 *I imagine this is part of a, you know, progressive policy to address fuel poverty and you know, bring a*
318 *whole load of stuff together as part of that transition, and you say so [names operator] is making a lot*
319 *of money but you know someone has got to operate the rig, that's, that's fine. If it is seen as being*
320 *government bending over backwards, if it's seen to be allowing their friends in oil to make even more*

321 *money at the expense of people in Easterhouse, who can't afford to pay for anything, but that is a*
322 *completely different situation so it is about the reality and the perception of that reality is crucial to*
323 *this in terms of public acceptability, in my view (sustainability consultant, Edinburgh climate*
324 *professionals, M)*

325

326 This theme of what the purpose of CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS is – and in particular what
327 advantages it may offer to society – leads into the second theme identified as driving perceptions.
328 Namely, who benefits from CO₂-EOR?

329

330 4.2.2. Who benefits from CO₂-EOR?

331

332 Similar to findings into research on 'conventional' CCS (e.g. Mabon and Shackley, 2015), publics in
333 particular expressed concerns over CO₂-EOR being used not for climate change mitigation, but for
334 operators to continue generating large profits without reflection on the potential environmental and
335 social effects of their practices:

336

337 *I think you would have to find something really, really positive to offset that we are not subsidising oil*
338 *companies per se but we are subsidising their research to help climate change or to extract more oil*
339 *etcetera (citizen, Edinburgh public, F)*

340

341 *So okay this is [names operator], this the [names operator] that is literally pulling out of Aberdeen,*
342 *four rigs offshore or something and they've set aside their money, for their putting down on, this is a*
343 *company that, will we make a couple of bucks here as we are leaving sort of thing, the oil and gas*
344 *thing, isn't it? (citizen, Edinburgh public, M)*

345

346 At a rather more abstract level, questions were also raised over who ought to be allowed to benefit
347 from EOR. Participants suggested that if CO₂-EOR were to be perceived as 'acceptable', those
348 benefitting ought to be those from less economically developed nations, developers of other kinds of

349 low-carbon energy (in particular renewables), or communities that relied on oil and gas industries for
350 employment and may be at risk were these industries to close down or decline rapidly:

351

352 *An interesting question that comes up is should we be investing in CCS in other countries where they*
353 *actually have moral permission to use fossil [fuel] for longer? Maybe that's the way we approach*
354 *CCS because if we do it in the UK we know that it will have tighter regulations to make it more*
355 *challenging (youth activist, London NGOs, F)*

356

357 *I was just wondering if that could be done in the North Sea but that value reinvested in other sources*
358 *of our energy, wind turbines, tidal wave energy and so on, I think that is it important to have a*
359 *balance of where our energy is coming from, and alternative sources as well (citizen, Edinburgh*
360 *public, M)*

361

362 *I think you have also got to remember that the oil companies are in many cases rightly portrayed as*
363 *pariahs but they make an awful lot of money that pays an awful lot of people's pensions, because they*
364 *are shareholders and the main shareholders are pension companies, financial and the likes, it is not*
365 *just Russia, or somebody sitting at the top counting all the cash that is made and you have to make*
366 *sure that these companies remain profitable eh so you don't want to cut them off completely because*
367 *so many people rely directly on them (citizen, Aberdeen public, M)*

368

369 The key idea here is that CO₂-EOR ought to benefit society as a whole, rather than the profits of
370 private developers. Within this, there is also a sense that CO₂-EOR and CCS should be used for
371 purposes viewed as morally 'good', such as allowing less economically advantaged nations to develop
372 economically; generating funds for research, development and deployment of renewable energy
373 sources; and aiding communities heavily dependent on oil and gas industries for employment.
374 Suggestions made as to how this 'ethical' use of CO₂-EOR could be facilitated included ring-fencing a
375 share of the tax revenue generated through continuation of oil extraction, or the establishment of a
376 national CO₂ storage company to oversee developments:

377

378 *We thought for [the CO₂-EOR focus] to be done we would offer incentives, maybe a tax break or*
379 *something like that. And we also thought that there would be more, there would be more tax because*
380 *there's more oil, so we would set aside a portion of that to invest in the low-carbon focus, that was our*
381 *long-term plan* (student, Aberdeen young professionals, F)

382

383 *Going back to the public body thing, I guess the remit for that public body makes a massive difference,*
384 *because they could just sort of be in the pocket of the oil and gas industry versus a public body with a*
385 *really robust remit and a priority to tackle climate change versus one who's not. In that situation it*
386 *seems preferable to just being led by industry* (youth activist, London NGOs, F)

387

388 Underneath these discussions on the 'right' purpose of CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS was an even
389 bigger question on whether society even ought to be spending time and resources pursuing such
390 developments. This issue of the appropriateness of CO₂-EOR formed a third cluster of discussion.

391

392 4.2.3. Is CO₂-EOR appropriate in terms of being viable and/or worthwhile?

393

394 What 'appropriateness' meant in the context of participants' responses concerned (a) if CO₂-EOR was
395 technically, economically and politically viable; and (b) whether CO₂-EOR was ultimately worthwhile
396 in terms of the positive effects it offered. This acknowledgment of the finite nature of fossil fuels,
397 limited global progress on CCS and the perceived inevitable need to switch to renewable energy
398 sources led some participants to question whether CO₂-EOR and indeed CCS as a whole system were
399 even worth pursuing:

400

401 *How much of a difference is that going to make globally if nobody else is doing anything else, if you*
402 *are only storing the CO₂ in these fields there and the rest globally, the rest are going to say you know*
403 *what we are not going to bother with this, would that make any difference to the climate then? Just*

404 *this wee pocket in the North Sea, storing you know the carbon storage and using it for enhance oil*
405 *(citizen, Aberdeen public, F)*

406

407 *How much gas, how much oil is there left there, from what we've got at the moment? [...] This*
408 *government, the governments are very good at doing knee-jerk reactions like five years in front or ten*
409 *years but we should be thinking about twenty or thirty or fifty years in front, where we are going with*
410 *the thing before they start putting money into projects (Edinburgh public, M)*

411

412 Opinions on the finite nature of fossil fuels tended to come from members of the public or less
413 technically engaged stakeholders. By contrast, in the more specialised focus groups (especially
414 offshore stakeholders and carbon finance professionals), concerns were raised over the viability of
415 CO₂-EOR in relation to current political, economic and technical regimes:

416

417 *CO₂-EOR still doesn't make economic sense because I can guarantee you that if it did make economic*
418 *sense oil companies would already be doing it (energy analyst, Aberdeen offshore stakeholders, M)*

419

420 *I think on that point part of the problem is that the oil companies won't touch this, because it's just*
421 *magma, you couldn't build a strategy round it at the moment (finance stakeholder, London finance, F)*

422

423 *90% of the platforms offshore won't be suitable [...] viable with regards to what you might want to do*
424 *it may be viable to do it, the small congested platforms and if you gotta put a whole new whole bridge*
425 *next to it [laughter] it becomes even less economically viable (oil and gas engineer, Aberdeen offshore*
426 *stakeholders, M)*

427

428 By contrast, just as there was acknowledgment of the declining timeframe for continued use of fossil
429 fuels in the context of acting on climate change and also the potentially large political and fiscal
430 challenges required, there was also acknowledgment of the need for *some* continued fossil fuel use and
431 the challenges of decarbonising industrial sources of CO₂-EOR emissions. Building on the above

432 points about CO₂-EOR forming part of a managed transition away from fossil fuels, it was also the
433 case that ongoing oil extraction – and also other CO₂-intensive processes – were sometimes not seen
434 as viable unless linked to CO₂ injection:

435
436 *It depends what you're comparing it to. Comparing CCS to renewables is different to comparing CCS*
437 *to a power plant with no CCS on it...one of the things I do think about CCS is that it is a good idea for*
438 *industrial applications for chemicals and cement and paper and all that list of things (energy advisor,*
439 *London NGOs, F)*

440
441 *When a company is applying for licences you can tie that to the licence and encourage companies to*
442 *explore CCS technologies. In the end they are not losing, because they can use this carbon dioxide to*
443 *pull out more oil. So the government gains and industry also gains, because they are getting to*
444 *improve climate change, and industry is also going to get more oil out of the ground (employee of*
445 *west African operator, Aberdeen young professionals, M)*

446
447 Whilst many participants did not necessarily see CCS and CO₂-EOR as being viable in and of
448 themselves, it was nevertheless suggested that CO₂-EOR injection had a pivotal role to play in
449 bridging the tension between continuing oil recovery and climate change mitigation. Indeed, the fact
450 that CO₂-EOR was only one type of EOR (and the only one with immediate climate benefits via CO₂
451 storage) was new information to many participants, including a number of the environmentally-
452 focused stakeholders. A policy challenge that arose out of this was to find ways to encourage – or even
453 mandate – CO₂ injection as part of ongoing extraction operations. Key to note as well is the perception
454 that national governments are seen as having a responsibility to create the conditions in which CCS
455 and CO₂-EOR become viable for industry, and to ensure such developments are governed in the public
456 interest. The implications of our findings for the governance of CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS form
457 the final section of our paper.

458


459 5. Discussion - implications for governance of CO₂-EOR

460

461 Any consideration of CO₂-EOR by policy makers will need to include an assessment of how it will be
462 perceived by stakeholders, and whether this provides opportunities for policy options – or indeed risks
463 that should be managed in advance. As a foundation for any such consideration, we present here an
464 overview of key themes identified across focus groups, with particular emphasis on what the broader
465 implications from this North Sea study may be for CO₂-EOR – and indeed CCS – more widely.

466 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the main barriers and enablers to CO₂-EOR identified across the focus group
467 discussions, giving an indication of the extent to which these arguments arose in each group.
468

469 Figure 2: groups’ perceived barriers to support for CO₂-EOR deployment (adapted from Mabon and
470 Littlecott, 2015)




471

472

473 Figure 3: policy initiatives perceived by groups as engendering support for CO₂-EOR deployment

474 (adapted from Mabon and Littlecott, 2015)

	Aberdeen public	Aberdeen offshore stakeholders	Edinburgh public	Edinburgh climate professionals	London finance	London NGOs	New field early career professionals
Benefit to society rather than profits		■	■	■		■	■
Managed by national storage company	■		■	■	■	■	
Pragmatism: fossil fuels embedded in society for now	■	■		■	■	■	■
CO ₂ -EOR as managed transition from fossil	■	■	■	■		■	■
Narrative of de-carbonisation & renewables	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Situated in context of social sustainability	■			■		■	■



476

477 5.1. Barriers and challenges for CO₂-EOR deployment

478

479 One key barrier to CO₂-EOR deployment coming across strongly from the data was concern over
 480 technical and economic viability. Some stakeholders and publics did speak positively about CO₂-EOR
 481 prolonging the life of the North Sea whilst helping towards climate goals through associated CCS.
 482 This included not only those directly involved in oil and gas, but also others (such as fishers and
 483 shipping operators) who enjoyed mutually beneficial and economically positive relationships with oil
 484 and gas operators, and saw CO₂-EOR as a way of sustaining these relationships whilst meeting climate
 485 challenges. Nonetheless, whereas previous studies tended to show higher support for CO₂-EOR among
 486 stakeholders with experience of the oil and gas industries, in this study those with greater experience
 487 and knowledge of offshore operations were among the more sceptical of the likelihood of CO₂-EOR
 488 linked to CCS occurring in the North Sea. This stemmed from such participants' concerns over the
 489 technical suitability of existing North Sea infrastructure for CO₂ injection, and scepticism over

490 whether CO₂-EOR would ever be viable in the North Sea given the complexities and perceived
491 investment risks involved. The fact these concerns come from stakeholders closer to the policy,
492 economics and practice of CO₂-EOR serves as a reminder that scenarios for CO₂-EOR and CCS seen
493 as socially desirable must be tempered with a recognition of what is viable given complex market and
494 political realities.

495

496 Secondly, stakeholders with a more environmental focus tended to emphasise the links between EOR,
497 CCS and what they viewed as the deleterious effects of a fossil-fuel based economy. At a general
498 level, these stakeholders saw a risk that the usage of captured CO₂ for EOR could lead to ‘mission
499 drift’, shifting from a bridging technology for a low-carbon energy future to a means of allowing
500 continued extraction of oil without reflection from end-point users on the implications of perpetuating
501 dependence on fossil fuels. The ‘low-carbon energy future’ such participants ultimately envisioned
502 involved not only renewable energy sources, but also reduction in energy demand through behaviour
503 change at the personal level and re-consideration of how society is governed more widely. This is in
504 line with comments from Scottish non-governmental organisations which saw CO₂-EOR as a ‘bad
505 price to pay for a good thing’ (Mabon and Littlecott, 2015), with a preference for other forms of CO₂
506 storage.

507

508 Thirdly, a topic of discussion across all focus groups was the perceived clash between short term
509 decision making (linked in particular to electoral cycles) and the need for longer term planning for
510 infrastructure deployment and the delivery of a credible North Sea transition plan. This reinforces the
511 above finding about scepticism over the efficacy of policy interventions and the gap between desired
512 and expected outcomes across all stakeholder constituencies – something that the UK government
513 decision in autumn 2015 to withdraw support for the UK CCS Commercialisation competition will
514 have done little to redress.

515

516 If CO₂-EOR is to garner public and stakeholder support, there is thus the need for policymakers to
517 envision scenarios that positions CO₂-EOR within long-term, integrated thinking on the governance of

518 climate change and renewal of energy systems, in a way that perhaps transcends short-term political
519 cycles. It is worth noting the expectation among participants that governments would lead on creating
520 the conditions for CO₂-EOR to facilitate this transition, ideas such as the formation of a national CO₂
521 storage company or the creation of fiscal regimes being raised by participants themselves. Doubts over
522 whether global oil, gas and coal markets would support the capture and storage of low-cost CO₂, even
523 in the face of some existing climate change policies, further reinforces the need for policy that
524 instigates CO₂ storage and shows coherence between energy provision and climate change obligations.

525

526 5.2. Opportunities for CO₂-EOR deployment

527

528 Concerns about the negative connotations of a fossil fuel-driven energy system reported in previous
529 research were repeated – especially among more environmentally-focused stakeholders and citizens.
530 However, our data illustrates there may nonetheless be cautious and qualified support for some CO₂-
531 EOR if framed strictly in terms of producing and utilising remaining fossil fuel resources in a more
532 controlled and sensitive manner (e.g. maximising use of existing domestic fields rather than further
533 exploration in new and/or potentially sensitive environments), and regulated and governed in such a
534 way as to be embedded within a transition to renewable energy sources and more sustainable forms of
535 energy use and behaviour.

536

537 Our dataset also revealed a certain degree of pragmatism as regards the UK's current energy
538 (electricity, heat and fuel) situation. Even among more cautious stakeholders such as environmental
539 professionals and some citizens, there was a pragmatic recognition – which perhaps does not come
540 across so explicitly in previous studies – that some oil would continue to be required during the
541 transition to a low-carbon economy, and that CCS offered a means of decarbonising existing gas- and
542 coal-fired power stations (and heat provision and industrial sources) during the transition. Publics too
543 – including those in Aberdeen who may have been expected to strongly focus on the economic and
544 employment prospects of CO₂-EOR – widely acknowledged the need for climate change mitigation
545 and the move towards renewable sources of energy as part of this. Yet set against this in our data was

546 scepticism towards both the technical and economic viability of CO₂-EOR, and also the ability of
547 policymakers and developers to deliver in the context of climate change mitigation. Alongside the goal
548 of maximising economic return of oil reserves, therefore, for support for CO₂-EOR to emerge it ought
549 to be the case that more than ‘demonstrating’ storage capability, there is from the outset a clear climate
550 imperative for undertaking CO₂-EOR as part of CCS. Related to this but only raised peripherally in
551 our dataset – perhaps as a result of the focus on North Sea transitions – is also the role CO₂-EOR could
552 play in building capability and driving down costs for the capture and transport stages of the CCS
553 chain, for instance by giving incentives for CO₂ sources to capture and/or connecting up EOR
554 operators with a source of CO₂.

555

556 Returning to the points made in Section 5.1., crucial to the emergence of support for CO₂-EOR as part
557 of CCS is the public interest case – benefitting society at large through climate change mitigation, job
558 creation/retention and manageable energy costs. Key here is that regardless of whether or not oil and
559 gas companies would significantly profit financially from CO₂-EOR in the North Sea or elsewhere, if
560 operators come to be *perceived* as the primary beneficiaries of CO₂-EOR then support may be limited.

561 This data thus suggests a role for governments in overseeing (or even directly delivering) CO₂-EOR
562 and associated CO₂ storage plus CCS capacity building is crucial in building positive perception.

563 Increasing volatility in oil prices and subsequent effects on North Sea jobs since the completion of the
564 empirical research in this study – coupled with intensifying concerns over energy security and fossil
565 fuel imports – could serve to further reinforce support for CO₂-EOR as part of a just transition for the
566 North Sea, squaring climate change obligations with support for domestic oil production and its
567 associated jobs.

568

569 This parallels Mabon and Shackley’s (2015) exploration of CCS as potentially the ‘lesser of two evils’
570 – that is, citizens and stakeholders may view the pursuit of CO₂-EOR in relation to CCS in a way that
571 is ‘less bad’ than the alternatives outlined above. There is thus an opportunity for policymakers to
572 frame CO₂-EOR as making the most efficient use of existing domestic oil fields whilst simultaneously
573 reducing atmospheric CO₂ emissions from electricity generation and industrial sources. To retain

574 credibility this must however be couched in a wider framework of transition and a clear pathway for
575 how CO₂-EOR will help to accelerate a move towards low-carbon technologies.

576

577 5.3. Limitations and directions for future research

578

579 It is important to acknowledge some of the limitations of our research technique and framework.

580 Given the limited time available to discuss CO₂-EOR in the context of CCS with participants, it was
581 necessary to take a focused approach to the discussion – in this case, we elected to follow scenarios for
582 the future of the North Sea. Participants' views on the North Sea and CO₂ storage may however be
583 influenced by a much wider range of political, social and economic forces that cannot be explored
584 fully within the bounds of a two-hour discussion. Methodologically, there is also a tension between the
585 flexibility of a qualitative approach and the inevitable subjectivity this introduces – particularly
586 because as per normal ethical procedures for social research (protection of participant anonymity and
587 confidentiality) the 'raw data' of the transcripts themselves cannot be included with the paper.

588 Processes such as assessing inter-coder reliability (Viera and Garrett, 2005) or more quantitative
589 analysis techniques for social data like emotional textual analysis (Vercelli et al, 2014) may offer more
590 systematic analysis for subsequent research, following on from broader-based studies like ours that
591 allow the key themes and ideas to be identified. Nonetheless, we believe the broad range of themes
592 raised by participants – from specific policy and finance matters to social justice through to ethical and
593 moral contestations – justifies a research design that allows participants to raise issues they themselves
594 deem to be of importance and understand the issue at hand on their own terms. This is especially true
595 when awareness of the more technical aspects of CCS may be low (see Malone et al, 2010) and hence
596 it may be important not to 'close down' discussion or pre-empt what participants consider significant.

597

598 Further research may wish to explore further what the end goal is of the 'managed transition' many
599 participants spoke about. Issues that may be assessed here include the kinds of low-carbon energy
600 technology that could be involved and the time frames/costs associated with their deployment, how
601 changes to governance and individual behaviours may be enacted in practice, and how CO₂-EOR may

602 facilitate this transition through contribution to physical infrastructure or financial returns to the
603 government and/or private sector. There may also be value in going beyond this study's focus on
604 storage to assess the contribution CO₂-EOR could make to the capture and transport parts of the CCS
605 chain, particularly given the emerging interest in industrial emissions and the withdrawal of UK
606 government support for full-scale power sector CCS. Such work could enlist further engagement with
607 environmental NGOs and professionals, and also experts in energy analysis and energy systems.

608

609 It may also be worthwhile considering the difference between other parts of the world – where there is
610 familiarity with CO₂-EOR and a ready source of CO₂ – and Scotland. Of particular interest in this
611 regard is the fact that development of CO₂-EOR in, say, North America was initially an economic
612 decision, whereas in Scotland the motivation is more likely to be climate change mitigation. It may
613 thus be of value to explore how publics and stakeholders' perceptions of CO₂-EOR relate to their
614 perceptions of coal/gas or industrial CCS, and to consider the extent to which policy and engagement
615 lessons from CO₂-EOR in other parts of the world are transferrable to Scotland. Conversely, the
616 difference in perception between onshore CO₂-EOR in North America and the mixed picture reported
617 here for offshore CO₂-EOR in Scotland is a reminder that public and stakeholder reception may vary
618 dramatically depending on socio-cultural background, which should be factored into any application
619 of these results onwards to a non-Scottish/UK/EU context.

620

621 6. Conclusions

622

623 Whilst the context upon which the empirical data on which this paper is based – the potential for
624 offshore CCS deployment in the UK – has changed with the withdrawal of UK CCS competition
625 funding, our findings still hold relevance for the future of the North Sea, CO₂-EOR and CCS more
626 generally. Within the UK, the need to decarbonise industrial sources remains, and CO₂-EOR *may* be
627 one way of helping to fill the finance gap. Further afield, CO₂-EOR projects also continue to emerge
628 globally, hence there is a need for understanding the societal implications of such deployments. The
629 responses presented here suggest that if CO₂-EOR is to be deployed in the context of CCS, policy

630 makers will need to consider a broad canvas of policy options and public interest framings. It is
631 important to repeat that a noticeably negative response was observed for a narrow ‘Wood Review’-
632 type focus on using CO₂-EOR solely as a means of maximising economic recovery of oil and gas.
633 Instead, broader narratives of transition and future vision for a mature basin like the North Sea in the
634 context of a need for action on climate change had greater appeal and were seen to provide a framing
635 within which the scale of (public) investment in CO₂-EOR could be economically and socially
636 justifiable. Further, the scepticism across stakeholder groups as to the deliverability of desired
637 outcomes underlines the need for policy solutions to be technically robust as well as attractive to a
638 range of stakeholders, and in many cases the expectation was that governments would lead on creating
639 the contexts for this to emerge. This need for CO₂-EOR to be framed within broader narratives of
640 decarbonisation and a managed transition away from fossil fuel if it is to garner societal acceptance is
641 a key finding from the North Sea research, and one that ought to be further evaluated through similar
642 enquiry elsewhere.

643

644

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646

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654

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