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Abstract:

The EU's dependence upon exchanges with organised civil society as a proxy for popular participation makes its procedures for participatory governance critical for input legitimacy. The most recent of these is the European Transparency Initiative. The paper examines the development of the lobby regulation element of the ETI, the detail of its operation, and the concepts upon which it is founded, in order to consider its potential to contribute to wider goals of participatory legitimacy. The main energies devoted to creating the initiative were spent in the struggle to get it established, with relatively less attention given to the implications of operational issues involved in registration. Whilst transparency is the main focus, a legacy of predecessor initiatives on interest group representativeness, primarily spatial in concern, remain embedded in the scheme, which place limitations on advocacy based groups. An alternative regulatory device to representativeness is that of accountability, which can be accommodated within the EU's existing framework of liberal democracy with elements of deliberative overtones, and of which traces can be found in the Code of Conduct associated to the registration scheme.

Keywords: European Transparency Initiative; lobby regulation; interest group representativeness; accountability; liberal and deliberative democracy.

What is the potential of the lobby regulation element of the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) to contribute to wider goals of participatory based legitimacy? To answer this question requires analysis of where the initiative came from, the detail of its operation, and the concepts upon which key operational elements are founded or embedded.

The European Transparency Initiative, announced by European Commission vice-President Kallas in 2005, is founded on the premise that transparency is a pre-condition for popular legitimacy. It has core components covering financial transparency for EU funding recipients, the ethical behaviour of EU officials, and lobby regulation (Cini, 2008). Thus, the principle focus of lobby regulation is transparency. In sum, the lobby regulation element, opened in 2008, involves incentivised voluntary registration to a public web database involving disclosure for organisations (other than public authorities) which seek to influence public policy. The key transparency elements involve disclosure elements surrounding: organisational contact etc details; interest categorisation; who is represented; mission/interest areas; spending on interest representation; and, for NGOs and think-tanks, budget and sources of funding. Entry is conditional upon signing up to an associated code of conduct. The European Parliament has for some time had a different registration system for individuals, with a web based listing. The two institutions have agreed a common register effective from June 2011, with pooled incentive systems to encourage registrations.

The origin of the ETI lobby regulation scheme

The regulatory nature of policy making, where costs are distributed to specific interest constituencies (Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1995), make much of the EU's underlying politics centred around interest groups. The functions of the European Commission make it the principal interlocutor with organised interests, and thus the key architect of the structures in which interest groups participate. A key distinguishing feature of the Commission system is that its procedural democracy regime is based on the premise that organised civil society – as proxies in the

face of a lack of engagement for wider civil society – are the key agents likely to operationalise it. The regime is primarily based on pluralist principles in which a wide-ranging landscape of interest groups has been deliberately developed to create a series of checks and balances and countervailing forces, on each-other and as accountability agents acting on EU institutions. A series of accompanying measures empower agents of organised civil society, such as funding for (primarily) citizen interests, and transparency measures such as the 2001 Access to Documents Regulation¹ which enable interests to address asymmetries of information with EU institutions and eachother.

In the public justificatory rhetoric of its movers, the European Transparency Initiative has from the outset been placed in the policy frame of participatory legitimacy. The press release announcing the adoption of the ETI by the European Commission was headed 'Greater transparency in EU affairs will strengthen legitimacy' (European Commission, 2006a). Kallas drew explicitly upon the participatory democracy frame as justification on the day he announced the initiative:

'Transparency is needed to gain the trust of the public. Political institutions cannot perform without public confidence... legitimacy is only ensured when political institutions are exposed to transparency, when people know that what they see is what they get' (Kallas, 2005, p.4).

The lobby regulation element reads as the latest measure in a tradition mostly developed by the 2001 White Paper of Governance of building a recognisable procedural framework of liberal democracy. Yet the emphasis upon transparency is a shift from (though not an abandonment of) the regulatory focus about the representativeness of interest groups contained in the White Paper on Governance (Smismans, 2009; Kohler Koch, 2010). Thus, in the initial Kallas speech

'Lobbyists can have considerable influence on legislation...but their transparency is too deficient in comparison to the impact of their activities' (p.6)"

while the Green Paper launching the ETI reasoned:

'External scrutiny can act as a deterrent against improper forms of lobbying. Transparency measures can provide information about who is engaged in lobbying activities and the positions they take when lobbying the European institutions' (European Commission, 2006b, p.6).

Thus, the explicit connection made to participatory legitimacy went along the lines that: if the EU system is dependent upon its exchanges with organised civil society for democratic legitimacy, so wider civil society must be assured as to the probity of those exchanges. In this frame, the potential negative externalities of engaging with organised civil society therefore need to be addressed, of which transparency related elements are a recognisable step. The ETI therefore has a web based search instrument providing for public transparency of grant holders, and a lobby regulation element.

Seen in these terms, the ETI is an incremental progression within a recognisable line of inheritance. Yet there is another context which helps explain key deficits in its conceptualisation and operation, and which may ultimately serve to limit its democratic legitimacy potential. This is because the principal efforts devoted to it were those invested more in the political establishment of the scheme than in the detail of its operation.

The political establishment of the scheme fits Kingdon's (1984) agenda setting model, in which an a-priori solution is attached to a problem by a policy entrepreneur drawing on the support of a key stakeholder constituency. A leader from an anti-globalisation 'alternatives' organisation, then recently active on the Brussels scene, took the opportunity presented by a new Commission to write to President Barroso in October 2004 seeking a comprehensive lobby regulation scheme similar in kind to that in operation in the United States. The activist

received a reply in November 2004 from the Secretariat General, stating that the Commission saw no need to change its present arrangements, based around self-regulation for lobbyists and codes of conduct for officials.² He tried his luck elsewhere, sending a similar letter to the European Commission vice-Presidents on 18 January 2005. One of these 'hit the spot' with a new Commissioner seeking to agenda-set his term of office at a very early stage; Cini concludes that "the interest group regulation component of the ETI came directly from (the)...letter" (Cini, 2008, p.752).

Commissioner Kallas's portfolio embraced administrative affairs, and his political career was developed in Estonia, a country with a substantial recent tradition of administrative reform based around transparency. He invited the author of the January 18 letter, Erik Wesselius of the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), to a meeting in February 2005, which was also attended by Kallas's Deputy Head of Cabinet, Kristian Schmidt (who was to take on political responsibility for helping to develop the dossier), to discuss the idea. In March 2005 Kallas announced the European Transparency Initiative in a keynote speech in Nottingham, UK. Chabanet records that

'the speech...basically used the...demands, concerns and alarmist, not to say vehement, tone" of the campaigners' (Chabanet, 2007, p.33).

The speech made explicit reference to '15,000 lobbyists,' a figure mentioned in the advocacy letter he had received from CEO.³ Whereas the contents and announcements of the speech seemed to take just about everyone by surprise, Wesselius was early off the mark in the press the following morning in greeting the initiative as 'good news for democracy.'⁴ In July 2005 Commissioner Kallas attended the launch event of ALTER-EU (Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation) as a keynote speaker, sitting alongside Wesselius, whose organisation had played a key part⁵ in the formation of the ALTER-EU coalition. An ALTER-EU steering committee member of the time later reflected that

"Kallas has been receptive to the ideas of ALTER-EU from its very launch."6

Similarly, Balme and Chabanet reflect that

'since late 2004 Alter-EU has set up a precise programme which is closely drawn upon by the Commission for its thinking' (Balme and Chabanet, 2007, p.3).

The ETI initiative as a whole was formally launched by the Commission in November 2005, following its announcement for internal discussion in May 2005. The relationship between ALTER-EU and the Cabinet of Commissioner Kallas continued through to 2007, including a further meeting (May)⁷, and reflected in a statement in an ALTER-EU brochure of around the same time that it had 'built a confident working relationship with key EU officials, including Commissioner Kallas'.⁸

Testimony to this working relationship is a trail of (one-time public domain) e-mails exchanged in 2007 between the two parties, of which the single most frequent exchanges are between Wesselius and Schmidt. This correspondence was among 172 separate entries which appeared on the Commission's web pages from 2008-2010, initially introduced by a dedicated web link on the ETI pages, linking to a register of correspondence, with each register entry hyperlinked to the correspondence item itself. The penultimate correspondence item related to an Access to Documents request submitted by Wesselius in April 2008 seeking all correspondence exchanges with Commissioner Kallas/his Cabinet and 'outside lobbyists' on the ETI. The episode seems to have triggered the disclosure of correspondence on the Commission web pages, and seemingly marked the end of the apparently harmonious working relationship with Cabinet Kallas on the lobby regulation element of the ETI evident in the 2007 correspondence.

In sum, the correspondence includes: mutual supply of, and request for, materials ahead of speeches by Commissioner Kallas; briefings and advice seeking on the positions of other stakeholders; holiday tales, and the exchange of 'smiley' emoticons denoting shared understandings between correspondents on first name terms; reassurances of support; an 'in-confidence' notation; and

support for the Kallas team position not to undertake an impact assessment on the ETI in line with standard procedures for new proposals, a persistent line of criticism by commercial public affairs practitioners.¹⁰

Nonetheless, Cabinet Kallas and ALTER-EU did take a different view about the means to achieve the regulatory goals, particularly (but not only) about the issue of voluntary versus mandatory registration. This became increasingly evident from 2008 onwards in the tone of critical press statements issued by ALTER-EU, particularly about the voluntary nature of the scheme. The ETI continues a tradition adopted by the European Parliament's earlier scheme of avoiding definitional traps as to what constitutes 'lobbying' by relying instead on a system of incentives. The ETI incentives involved: consultation alerts matching the registrant's identification of interest areas; responses to consultation exercises received from non-registrants would be given the same weight as that of a private individual, rather than a collective body; and that Commission officials meeting with non-registrant's are asked to invite the organisation to register, and where the proposed meeting did not involve consultation covered by Treaty provisions, may decide to decline it. In practice these incentives have been somewhat weak. Upcoming consultations are already announced in advance in public, assigning weighting to consultation responses is fraught with practical difficulty, and there is highly uneven implementation within the Commission of the 'invitation to register' guidance. There are some notable absences of players active on the Brussels scene in the register 11. Consequently, when the Commission register is merged with that of the Parliament in 2011 the additional incentive used for sometime by the Parliament will be added. This involves the issue of a twelve month building entry pass, rather than the alternative of a day pass issued to a member of the public attached to a specific MEP host. This will preserve the 'voluntary' approach and thus consistent with the wish to avoid creating a formal system of accreditation. Kallas asserted that

"I have been very attentive to this danger of giving special privileges to an accredited group of lobbyists. There will be no accreditation." (Kallas, 2007, p.4)

For CEO, the reality of a political system responsive to its requests did not altogether chime with its messages of an EU agenda driven by business demands. A related notable observation is that an advocacy organisation which had initially positioned itself as an 'outsider' 'think tank' based outside Brussels (possibly better encapsulated with origins as part of a broader anti-globalisaton social movement) had itself become institutionalised in the Brussels circuit of interest groups by its immersion in the ETI campaign, with an established niche for lobbying about lobbying, later registering in the NGO category of the ETI database and finding a shared office facility in Brussels. This general process of institutionalisation over time is well noted in the literature, whether the starting point was as a social movement (Rawcliffe, 1998), an interest group, (Jordan and Halpin, 2003), or a mix of strategies (Wilson, 1995).

The strategic use by political institutions of allies in organised civil society to achieve policy ends is likewise unremarkable. Taking a voluntary approach to the scheme meant that the introduction of the initiative would need the support of the various constituencies upon whom the measure was directed. Kallas used a variety of strategies to do this, requiring careful positioning in which his deputy Head of Cabinet, Schmidt, appears to have been instrumental. Opposition from segments of the wider 'public affairs' community was anticipated. To these, Kallas and Schmidt used a variety of approaches, including: meetings with targeted organisations; persuasion framed in public discourse of transparency and democratic legitimacy, and that the measures were not intended to be either 'anti-business' nor indeed 'anti-lobbying' but rather in the interests of all, not least as a measure to prevent a future 'scandal' likely to tarnish all13; tactics of divide and rule between and within key types of stakeholders; and, where necessary, confrontation. A key component of the latter approach was to use ALTER-EU, both as a 'Rottweiler' against the most entrenched opponents, and as a means to bring the wider NGO community on board. All of these tactics are established mechanisms of everyday political manoeuvring. The key point is that they highlight how the principal energies devoted into the scheme were primarily spent on building political support for its establishment. There was less time for a Commissioner (who had other demanding portfolios) to spend on the detail of the

operation of the scheme. This has resulted in a number of 'rough edges' in the detailed operation of the ETI, which carry consequences of varying degrees of significance.

Operating the lobby regulation element of the ETI

Once the scheme was launched in June 2008, a mutual preoccupation of both the media and Kallas/Schmidt was with the 'headline' figure of the number of registrations. This is because of the citation by Kallas at the 2005 announcement of the scheme that 'around 2,600 interest groups have a permanent office in the capital of Europe' (Kallas, 2005, p.5), which subsequently became used as a (crude) yardstick of success for the registration scheme by various media. Seemingly less important were the type of organisations signing up to it, of which a significant number are of interests not organised at EU level, nor primarily addressed to the EU level. In the most populated category, 'professional associations', embracing business/trade associations, just over one third of entries (310/850)¹⁴ are of associations organised at EU level, with most entries constituted by national, and sub-national, associations. In other categories there are small service enterprises in far-flung provinces of the EU whose entries take the opportunity of free advertising space, as well as organisations from third countries where links to EU interest representation can only be highly tenuous, such as a University in Peru. There have also been organisations registering because they believed that their chances of grant funding would be increased 15, and entries of non-existent organisations claiming an annual lobbying spend of €250 million, attributed to the work of a 'prankster'. 16

As the quirkiness of entries suggests, there are few Commission resources devoted to monitoring entries. Since the 'prankster' entries attracted media attention, the Commission has allocated part of the time of one member of staff to scrutinising the worst excesses. However, less prominent infractions, such as the failure to enter information on funding, seemingly goes without Commission initiated intervention. Rather, the database relies on the principle of checks and balances. CEO scrutinises the detail of new entries, and together with its key

alliance partners launches strategic complaints. One of these, filed by Friends of the Earth Europe, concerned the lobbying spend entry for the European Chemical Industry Association (CEFIC) for 2007, which clearly constituted a fraction of the costs of political representation incurred by the organisation. CEFIC's entry of €50,000 followed a template of many early registrants, resulting from a lack of detailed guidance for how the expenditure should be calculated. Thus, the declarations of annual expenditure for representing interests to the EU institutions range from zero to €1.3 million, while some organisations claim to be spending more in doing so than the entire organisational budget they declare. Some registered organisations simply do not respond to the question about spending on interest representation to EU institutions. There are EU business associations registered in categories that the one designed for them.

There has been persistent criticism of lack of attention to detail in the scheme from the outset, with Kallas and his Cabinet extremely reluctant to become drawn into detailed questions of operationalisation. For instance, the advice from Schmidt to requests for clarification as to how the expenditure on lobbying the EU institutions should be calculated was to make a 'good faith estimate' (Hood, 2009) ¹⁹, resulting in large variations in declaration. The key point is that Kallas and his cabinet were less interested in operational questions than in the establishment of the scheme, assessed most importantly for them in the number of registrations attracted. For one commentator, Kallas had been seeking to 'maximise his legacy and reputation' before changing his portfolio of responsibilities in-between the Barroso 1 and 2 Commissions. ²⁰ Most effort was devoted to drawing attention to pockets of poor registration rates, such as law firms and think tanks, and to 'naming and shaming' high profile absentees when Schmidt and Kallas made public speeches.

The predecessor public web database of interest groups was CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society). CONECCS started life as a 'telephone directory' of groups for use by the Commission services so as to assist different departments with knowing who the relevant groups were for consultation. Thus, non-inclusion on the database carried consequences. A highly significant rule was that access to the database required a prior declaration

that the organisation had members in at least 3 member, or candidate member, states. This threshold defined a concept notably pursued in the White Paper on Governance that groups able to furnish guarantees on representativity might enjoy privileged partnerships with the Commission:

'With better involvement comes greater responsibility. Civil society must itself follow the principles of good governance, which include accountability and openness. The Commission intends to establish a comprehensive online database with details of civil society organisations active at European level, which should act as a catalyst to improve their internal organisation.' (European Commission, 2001, p.15)

'Creating a culture of consultation ...should be underpinned by a code of conduct that sets minimum standards...These standards should improve the representativity of civil society organisations and structure their debate with the Institutions.' (op. cit., p.17)

'In some policy sectors, where consultative practices are already well established, the Commission could develop more extensive partnership arrangements. On the Commission's part, this will entail a commitment for additional consultations compared to the minimum standards. In return, the arrangements will prompt civil society organisations to tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity, and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the Member States' (ibid.p.17).

Predictably, 'more extensive partnership arrangements' for some was supported by civil society organisations well capable of playing this game, i.e. 'who' rather than 'what' organisations with a geographic spread of members. The concept has been actively pursued by civil society organisations whose position at the top of the tree would thus be elevated. The lead organisation in the social field, the Platform of European Social NGOs ('Social Platform'), has frequently asserted a preference for an accreditation system (based on representativeness),

despite consistent policy statements from the Commission that there should be no such system²¹ (European Social Platform, 2000; Platform of European Social NGOs, 2001; Cullen, 2005). Other EU civic organisations with rival claims to leadership and which are more based around advocacy than geographic membership, such as the European Citizen Action Service, and Permanent Forum of Civil Society, have consistently argued against the use of representativeness or accredited criteria.²² Organisations like *Statewatch* complained that the CONECCS rule excluded them from the database, and therefore restricted their institutional access (Friedrich, 2006; Kendall, Will and Brandsen, 2009).

Whilst there were no enforcement procedures during the period when CONECCS was in operation which prevented dialogue between the Commission services and non-registered organisations (and in practice would not have had an impact upon already well recognised NGOs in the 'Brussels circuit'), the denial of access would have restricted knowledge about lesser known potential consultation partners. This reflects a secondary strand of worries about interest groups beyond geographic representativeness, about the 'professionalisation' of Brussels based groups, i.e. the extent of their roots to civil society:

'the issue of representativeness at European level should not be used as the only criterion when assessing the relevance or quality of comments. The Commission will avoid consultation processes which could give the impression that 'Brussels is only talking to Brussels' as one person put it.'

(European Commission, 2002a, pp. 11/12)

The transition from CONECCS to the ETI seems to have softened the position on both geographic and constituency representativeness, but not altogether removed it. Gone is the insistence on membership threshold as a pre-condition for entry, although this can be linked to the eagerness of the ETI movers to maximise registrations. Instead, the focus is upon using transparency as an exposure device as a means to address the issues. NGOs are asked to list their members, a requirement which is not made of other categories of entrants such as business associations, who are apparently assumed to have the desired quality of representativeness. There is no trace of this principle being developed further,

since the ETI remains in the 'establishment' phase, with the emphasis upon stronger incentives to sign up.

Beyond this, one clause contained in the Code of Conduct linked to ETI registration²³ is set apart in terms of significance from the anodyne content such codes tend to carry. Clause 4 of the code states that

'interest representatives shall always ensure that, to the best of their knowledge, information which they provide is unbiased, up-to-date, complete and not misleading. ²⁴

This carries overtones of public accountability, recognising that stakeholders who become institutionalised policy participants (rather than simple public advocates) carry wider responsibilities. This principle is also reflected in the International NGO charter (recently re-branded as the 'International NGO Accountability Charter' 25), and in some of the 'Compact' codes to be found at member state level setting standards for, and agreed by, the consultative partners 26. The One World Trust has identified 309 civil society self-regulatory initiatives (Murgado, 2010), and for most of these accountability norms feature as a standard element 27.

Conclusion: beyond representativeness, towards accountability

Norms of 'geographic representativeness' only embrace one type of interest group organisation, and if linked to access criteria or consultation status by regulatory devices would limit participation by advocacy based NGOs, and thus participatory legitimacy. The continued legacy of geographic representativeness in the lobby regulation scheme, whilst not operationalised as an access criteria but rather as a transparency device for others to pass judgement on, still carries implied consequences. The ETI has shifted emphasis from 'hard' representativeness to 'softer' transparency, but also seems to have 'copied and pasted' the cruder legacy agenda for groups of geographic representativeness dating back to the White Paper on Governance, only removing the use of it as

access criteria (as per the predecessor CONECCS database) in deference to the greater need to attract registrations.

For Pitkin, whilst different norms of representativeness can be attached to different categories of representatives, ultimately representation always involves a disjuncture between the represented and the representative (Pitkin, 1967). At one end of Pitkin's spectrum, closely controlled 'mandated delegates' in membership organisations involve issues of responsiveness and sanction, while at the other pole of Pitkin's categories, substantive representation (the representative as trustee, acting for others in the interests of others) – is not necessarily democratic (Kohler Koch, 2010). This latter trustee category is however well fitted to organisations advocating for a cause (such as prison conditions, the environment for future generations, animal welfare, etc) for which the 'members' are not the core reference point. Where advocates 'cross the boundary' and become agents of policy participation, so issues of accountability do arise to those upon whom such policies impact. Bovens defines accountability as

'a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences' (Bovens, 2007, p.447).

Whilst this definition has recently attracted currency, a key question in operationalising it is to meet the challenge of defining who the 'forum' is. Inevitably, the forum is diversely constituted, and no less so where organised civil society is a proxy for civil society. The ability to pose questions and pass judgement on organisations in this context resides in political institutions, in other civil society organisations, and among wider civil society. The same applies to sanctions, ranging from various degree of exclusion and isolation. The challenge is to develop these concepts of accountability for use as regulatory devices. In the 2006 ETI Green Paper, accountability was a form of transparency:

'Openness and accountability are important principles for the conduct of organisations when they are seeking to contribute to EU policy development. It must be apparent which interests they represent, and how inclusive that representation is' (European Commission, 2006, p.7).

The Green Paper also proposed developing the accountability mechanism through sanction via an external monitoring body (European Commission, 2006), although the follow up Communication argued against this on the basis that it would itself blur the Commission's own accountability for its relations with representatives of outside interests (European Commission, 2007). However, in the Code of Conduct, finalised in 2008, the concept of accountability developed beyond the limited notion of transparency (through which others have the capacity to reach a judgement), by the inclusion of the clause on evidence based standards. This standard is a pre-requisite for a participatory system which aspires to deliberative norms of public reasoning as a basis for policy development. Whilst the EU is no 'deliberative democracy', its liberal democracy is founded upon checks and balances in which impact assessments are first placed in the public domain by political institutions for open debate. These then becomes the public battleground between protagonists, as they ultimately inform the premises on which policy is based. From these public consultations, the European Commission is supposed to make policy choices on the basis of public reasoning.

EU liberal democracy procedures thus embrace key processes of external review and mediation through public debate, which carry overtones of public deliberation. Liberal democracy places more demands upon groups than do deliberative democracy norms, in that the latter has a more relaxed focus upon ensuring diverse contributions to public debate through ensuring a teeming population of groups, and their contribution to public reasoning (Kohler Koch, 2010); thus, demands for group representativeness and accountability might restrict the flow of these elements. Thus, liberal democracy and deliberative democracy represent different points on the regulatory spectrum, with the latter occupying a more laissez-faire perspective. The European Commission system is somewhere in between these points. It has no system of accreditation, yet the

concerns it has about groups means that it is not laissez-faire. It worries more about representativeness, but a little about diversity, as reflected in the European Commission's 2002 Communication on Consultation:

Moreover, minority views can also form an essential dimension of open discourse on policies. On the other hand, it is important for the Commission to consider how representative views are when taking a political decision following a consultation process' (European Commission, 2002, pp. 12).

The Commission system has more emphasis upon procedural participation than it does upon public reasoning, though its procedures are oriented towards delivery of public reasoning through impact assessments etc. Whilst the role of groups in traditions of liberal and deliberative democracy can be difficult to reconcile (Kohler Koch, 2010; citing Steffek and Ferretti, 2010 - 'watchdogs don't deliberate'), they can also be complementary. The approach indicated here - to suppress the pursuit of geographic representativeness in favour of developing norms of accountability based upon standards of behaviour in public discourse - is entirely consistent with a system founded upon liberal democracy, but with deliberative elements. The requirement upon organised civil society contained in clause 4 of the ETI lobby registration scheme Code of Conduct, to ensure that information is unbiased, up-to-date, complete and not misleading, is deliberative in effect, and accountability oriented. The potential of the lobby regulation element of the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) to contribute to wider goals of participatory based legitimacy seem to depend partly upon the shift from representativeness, to accountability based criteria.

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Appendix: List of correspondence with Cabinet Kallas relating to the Commission's register of interest representatives.

Date	From	То	Subject
28/02/2007	Simon Plasmeijer	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Question relating to the Transparency Initiative
1/03/2007	Ana Zunic	Siim Kallas	Seminar Practice and Ethics of Lobbying
6/03/2007	Schmidt Kristian	SIMON@DIGISIMON.NL	Question relating to the Transparency Initiative
7/03/2007	Erik Wesselius	Siim Kallas	ALTER-EU letter on forthcoming Communication ont the European Transparency Initiative
7/03/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	ETI and media attention for release of list Commission special advisers
13/03/2007	Alter-EU	Siim Kallas	Meeting with representatives of Alter-EU
19/03/2007	Lyn Trytsman-Gray - President of SEAP	Henrik Hololei	European Transparency Initiative and Communication
19/03/2007	Antonio Paiva - CoR	Kristian Schmidt	CoR opinion on the "European transparency initiative
19/03/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Can I call you today?
23/03/2007	Daniel Guéguen - ETI	Siim Kallas	Book "European Lobbying"
26/03/2007	Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - Omniconsul	Siim Kallas	European Transparency Initiative/Portuguese Presidency/Lobbying
27/03/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Daniel Guéguen - European Training institute	Thank you for the book "European Lobbying"

27/03/2007	Marco L. Sorgetti - CLECAT	Kristian Schmidt	Transparency Initiative
28/03/2007	Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics	Siim Kallas	"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne Lobby?"
29/03/2007	Helen O'Sullivan - SEAP	Kristian Schmidt	SEAP General Assembly
30/03/2007	Christof Schramm	Siim Kallas	Lobbyist register
3/04/2007	Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics	Siim Kallas	"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne Lobby?"
4/04/2007	Raabe Beate - OGP EUROPE	Kristian Schmidt	Transparency and Lobbying
4/04/2007	Joanna Benfield - AER	Kristian Schmidt	Regions and the European Transparency Initiative
11/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics	"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne Lobby?"
11/04/2007	John Wyles - Interstate	Siim Kallas	Interstate Programmes N°8 - Brussels June 4-6 2007
12/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - Omniconsul	Portugal Transparency
12/04/2007	Jack Thurston	Kristian Schmidt	Beneficiaries of EU funds under central management
15/04/2007	Fabian Bauwens	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Lobbying within EU Institutions
16/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Antonio Paiva - CoR	Thank you for CoR's opinion on ETI
16/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Christof Schramm	Lobbyist register
16/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	John Wyles - Interstate	Interstate Programmes N°8 - Brussels June 4-6 2007
17/04/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Fabian Bauwens	Lobbying within EU Institutions
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18/04/2007	Jack Thurston	Kristian Schmidt	Transparency and CAP
19/04/2007	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	Kristian Schmidt	Press release and possible quote from Commissioner Kallas
24/04/2007	Henrik Fallesen	Kristian Schmidt	Fra DI/Transparens
26/04/2007	EPACA - IPRA - SEAP	Siim Kallas	Core Principles for a Common Code of Conduct
3/05/2007	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	Siim Kallas	EPACA RESPONSE TO ETI
3/05/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - EULOBBY-NETWORK	Siim Kallas	EULOBBY - NETWORK
9/05/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	For profit lobbyists challenge ETI financial transparency requirements
9/05/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - EULOBBY-NETWORK	Kristian Schmidt	Historic Summit
10/05/2007	Siim Kallas	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	EPACA RESPONSE TO ETI
10/05/2007	Lyn Trytsman-Gray - President of SEAP	Siim Kallas	Follow-up to the Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative
14/05/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics	"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne Lobby?"
15/05/2007	Craig Holman- Lobbyist Public Citizen	Karen Campbell	Meeting request with Kallas
15/05/2007	Georg Brodach	Henrik Hololei	Ravenstein Lunch May 31 , 2007
20/05/2007	Siim Kallas	Lyn Trytsman-Gray - President of SEAP	Follow-up to the Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative
22/05/2007	Jean-François Bernardin - Président de l'ACFCI	Siim Kallas	communication COM(2007) 127 Final Suivi du livre vert Initiative européenne en matière de

			<u>transparence</u>
25/05/2007	Kathryn Seren	Craig Holman - Dr Thurber	Visit to Brussels 24-30 june
29/05/2007	Pierre B. Meunier - Avocats Fasken	Kristian Schmidt	Ma visite à Bruxelles le 11 juin prochain
30/05/2007	Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - EULobby Portugal President	Siim Kallas	PTI - Portuguese Transparency
11/06/2007	Pierre Boulanger - Groupe d'économie mondiale at Sciences PO	Kristian Schmidt	Transparency in farms subsidies to French Farmers
19/06/2007	Siim Kallas	Jean-François Bernardin - Président de l'ACFCI	communication COM(2007) 127 Final Suivi du livre vert Initiative européenne en matière de transparence
20/06/2007	John Wilkinson - The Cinema Exhibitor's Association Itd	Siim Kallas	letter to VP Kallas from The Cinema Exhibitors' Assoc Ltd
20/06/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Siim Kallas	Volunteer register for lobbyists
20/06/2007	Catherine Stewart - Cabinet Stewart	Kristian Schmidt	SEAP's position on registration
21/06/2007	André De Schutter - President FAIB	Siim Kallas	Thank
22/06/2007	Arnaldo Abruzzini - Eurochambres	Siim Kallas	European Transparency Initiative: Comment from Eurochambres
22/06/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Some thoughts and a question
27/06/2007	Business Europe-Cefic-Copa- Cogeca-UEAPME	Siim Kallas	Code of conduct for Interest representatives
28/06/2007	Gérard Legris	John Wilkinson - The Cinema Exhibitor's Association Itd	Register of interest representatives

29/06/2007	Marie José Grilo Rosa - Businesseurope	Hanna Hinrikus - Kristian Schmidt	European Transparency Initiative
29/06/2007	John Vassallo - AMCHAM EU	Siim Kallas	INVITATION TO ADDRESS AmCham ON THE EUROPEAN TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
2/07/2007	Kathryn Seren	Marie José Grilo Rosa - Businesseurope	European Transparency Initiative
6/07/2007	Rudi Thomaes - FEB	Siim Kallas	Transparency initiative-Code of conduct and register
7/07/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - EULOBBY-NETWORK	Kristian Schmidt	EPACA, SEAP
9/07/2007	Siim Kallas	John Vassallo - AMCHAM EU	INVITATION TO ADDRESS AmCham ON THE EUROPEAN TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
9/07/2007	Anne Jourdain - EUROCORD	Siim Kallas + others	Green paper on trade defence instruments - sollicitation of a meeting
9/07/2007	Ann-Katrin Bauknecht - President of FUECH	Margus Rahuoja	request for admission of the F.U.E.C.H. Association into the Data Bank of the European Commission
9/07/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - AALEP	Kristian Schmidt	<u>ETI</u>
11/07/2007	Siim Kallas	Arnaldo Abruzzini - Eurochambres	European Transparency Initiative: Comment from Eurochambres
11/07/2007	Siim Kallas	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Volunteer register for lobbyists
11/07/2007	Siim Kallas	Business Europe-Cefic-Copa- Cogeca-UEAPME	Volunteer register for lobbyists

11/07/2007	Kathryn Seren	Anne Jourdain - EUROCORD	Green paper on trade defence instruments - sollicitation of a meeting
11/07/2007	Patrick Maison - Brusselsinternational	Karen Campbell	Doing Business in the European Union, Business Summit, Exhibitions and Events
11/07/2007	Kathryn Seren	Patrick Maison - Brusselsinternational	Doing Business in the European Union, Business Summit, Exhibitions and Events
16/07/2007	Kathryn Seren	Olivier Bailly	Letter to the Cabinet from F.U.E.C.H.
24/07/2007	Pearly Raynal - social platform	Siim Kallas - Catherine Day	european transparency initiative and beyond
31/07/2007	Christoph Köppchen - AMCHAM EU	Kristian Schmidt	AMCHAM EU RESPONSE TO FOLLOW-UP TO EUROPEAN TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
3/08/2007	Siim Kallas	Rudi Thomaes - FEB	Transparency initiative-Code of conduct and register
16/08/2007	Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI / BDA The German Business Representation	SIIM KALLAS	<u>Transparency</u>
17/08/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	EPACA on collission course with Commission on ETI
21/08/2007	Georg Plamen	Kristian Schmidt	Question from Prof. Plamen K. Georgiev - Freiburg / Germany
21/08/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	BNA: US Lobbying bill means a "sea change"
21/08/2007	Ulrich Tiburcy	Kristian Schmidt	Invitation
23/08/2007	André De Schutter -	siim kallas	European transparency initiative

	President FAIB		
23/08/2007	Matt Rogerson - Senior Parliament Assistant	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	EU Lobbying regulation
23/08/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Advice on response to EPACA claims and questions?
24/08/2007	Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - Omniconsul	Kristian Schmidt	Event Transparency Lisbon
27/08/2007	Siim Kallas	Fintan Farrell - Roshan Di Puppo - Social Platform	European transparency initiative and beyond
31/08/2007	Siim Kallas	André De Schutter - President FAIB	European transparency initiative
9/09/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI / BDA The German Business Representation	<u>Transparency</u>
12/09/2007	Jo Leinen - Committee on constitutional Affairs - the Chairman	Siim Kallas	<u>Lobbyists</u>
13/09/2007	Siim Kallas	Jo Leinen MEP- Committee on constitutional Affairs - the Chairman	<u>Lobbyists</u>
19/09/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Kallas speech at AMCHAM and ETI implementation process
19/09/2007	Gergana Grancharova - Republic of Bulgaria - Minister for Foreign Affairs	Siim Kallas	<u>Visit Bulgaria</u>
25/09/2007	Albert Takacs - Minister of Justien and Law Enforcement Republic of Hungary	Siim Kallas	Invitation to the Conference entitled "How does the Lobby Act regulate Lobbying?

26/09/2007	Siim Kallas	Albert Takacs - Minister of Justien and Law Enforcement Republic of Hungary	Invitation to the Conference entitled "How does the Lobby Act regulate Lobbying?
26/09/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Kallas speech at AMCHAM and ETI implementation process
1/10/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Kristian Schmidt	European transparency initiative and Germany
1/10/2007	Andres Tupits - Legal Counsel	Kristian Schmidt	Standards of professional ethics for public office holders
3/10/2007	MEDEF - AFEP - Cercle de l'industrie	Siim Kallas	Livre vert sur la Transparence
5/10/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	German industry statement on ETI
10/10/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Kristian Schmidt	degepol event Berlin 19 October
16/10/2007	Uli Müller - Lobbycontrol	Kristian Schmidt	Lobbying in Germany
17/10/2007	Siim Kallas	Gergana Grancharova - Republic of Bulgaria - Minister for Foreign Affairs	<u>Visit Bulgaria</u>
17/10/2007	Siim Kallas	MEDEF - AFEP - Cercle de l'industrie	Livre vert sur la Transparence
18/10/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - EULOBBY-NETWORK AISBL	Siim Kallas - Hanna Hinrikus - Kristian Schmidt	ELNET position paper
24/10/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Christian D. de Fouloy - EULOBBY-NETWORK AISBL	ELNET position paper
29/10/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Kristian Schmidt	Mr. Kallas in Germany
16/11/2007	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	Siim Kallas	Request for a meeting with Commissioner Kallas

16/11/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Interview with José Lalloum in EurActiv
20/11/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	Request for a meeting with Commissioner Kallas
27/11/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	Worst EU Lobby Award
27/11/2007	Aive Levandi - Lhconcept	Kristian Schmidt	Lobbying in Estonia
29/11/2007	Rudi Thomaes - FEB	Siim Kallas	<u>Transparency initiative</u>
3/12/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Kristian Schmidt	degepol statement
3/12/2007	Mel Morris - Secretariat	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Invitation to give a keynote presentation at the ESAE Annual Conference - Brussels
3/12/2007	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	Kristian Schmidt	degepol statement
7/12/2007	Fabrizio Rovedi	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	European Transparency Initiative
7/12/2007	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Kristian Schmidt	BBC documentary on EU NGO funding
7/12/2007	Paul de Clerck - Friends of the Earth Europe	Kristian Schmidt	press review 7-12-2007
11/12/2007	Christian D. de Fouloy - AALEP	Kristian Schmidt	Code of Conduct
12/12/2007	Siim Kallas	Dominiek Meier - de ge pol	degepol statement
12/12/2007	Siim Kallas	Rudi Thomaes - FEB	<u>ETI</u>
20/12/2007	Kristian Schmidt	Mel Morris - Secretariat	Invitation to give a keynote presentation at the ESAE Annual Conference - Brussels
20/12/2007	John Monks - ETUC - CES	Siim Kallas	Consultation sur le projet de

			Code de déontologie pour les groupes d'intérêts
21/12/2007	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	Siim Kallas	ETI - EPACA
21/01/2008	Siim Kallas	John Monks - ETUC - CES	Consultation sur le projet de Code de déontologie pour les groupes d'intérêts
25/01/2008	Pekka Eskola - Political Assistant to MEP Anneli Jäätteenmäki	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Meeting request
28/01/2008	Carsten Vennemann - AIJA	Siim Kallas	AIJA Workshop 28 augustus 2008
29/01/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Carsten Vennemann - AIJA	AIJA Workshop 28 augustus 2009
30/01/2008	Kathryn Seren	Pekka Eskola - Political Assistant to MEP Anneli Jäätteenmäki	Meeting request
1/02/2008	Philippe de Buck - Businesseurope	Siim Kallas	BusinessEurope letter on draft code of conduct
4/02/2008	Gh. De Coninck - A. De Schutter - FAIB	Siim Kallas	Consultation "A code of conduct for interest representatives"
5/02/2008	Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI / BDA The German Business Representation	Siim Kallas	Transparency
6/02/2008	Markus Knigge - WWF	Kristian Schmidt	Disclosure of EFF Spending by Member States
6/02/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Markus Knigge - WWF	Structural Funds article in Europolitics 14 january
7/02/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Gh. De Coninck - A. De Schutter - FAIB	Consultation "A code of conduct for interest representatives"
7/02/2008	Bankenverband	Siim Kallas	Kodex

8/02/2008	E. Jonnaert - ECPA; Jose Lalloum - EPACA; Lyn trytsman-Gray - SEAP	President Barroso, Poettering and Jansa	Transparency
11/02/2008	Siim Kallas	Jose Lalloum - EPACA	ETI - EPACA
13/02/2008	Siim Kallas	Philippe de Buck - Businesseurope	BusinessEurope letter on draft code of conduct
14/02/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI / BDA The German Business Representation	Transparency
15/02/2008	Siim Kallas	E. Jonnaert - ECPA; Jose Lalloum - EPACA; Lyn trytsman- Gray - SEAP	Transparency
15/02/2008	Siim Kallas	Manfred Weber	Kodex
15/02/2008	J. Creyssel - MEDEF; A. Tessier - AFEP; J. Leflon - Cercle de l'Industrie	Siim Kallas	Code de conduite
27/02/2008	Christof Demmke - EIPA NL	Kristian Schmidt	Invitation for a conference on the practical management of Ethics on 9 and 10 June 2008 in Maastricht
28/02/2008	Carmen Wagner - Südwestrundfunk	Cab Kallas Web Feedback - Valerie Rampi	<u>Interviewanfrage</u>
4/03/2008	Ruth Casals - ECCJ	President Barroso; Siim Kallas; Margot Wallström	lobbying transparency register
5/03/2008	Siim Kallas	J. Creyssel - MEDEF; A. Tessier - AFEP; J. Leflon - Cercle de l'Industrie	Code de conduite
11/03/2008	Erik Wesselius - ALTER EU	Jose Manuel Barroso	Can we expect an answer to our open letter of 13 February

12/03/2008	Michal Wiktorowicz - ISDA	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Code of Conduct for Interest representatives
13/03/2008	Legrand Lydie - Europavertretung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Communication of the Commission regarding the transparency Initiative
13/03/2008	Thomas Henöki - EIPA NL	Kristian Schmidt	Seminar Programme: Ethics and Integrity management in the Public Services 9 and 10 June 2008
14/03/2008	Georges H. de Veirman - AECA	Siim Kallas	AECA Conference - Luncheon with Commissioner Siim Kallas
14/03/2008	Pekka Pesonen - COPA - COGECA	Siim Kallas	Code of conduct
17/03/2008	Cook Kyung-bok - The National assembly Budget Office Republic of Korea	Kristian Schmidt	<u>Korea</u>
18/03/2008	Etienne Douat - University of Montpellier	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Initiative européenne pour la transparence
19/03/2008	Síím Kallas	Erik Wesselius - ALTER EU	Open letter of 13 February
26/03/2008	Geoffrey Morbois	Karen Campbell	Interview Lobbying
28/03/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Cook Kyung-bok - The National assembly Budget Office Republic of Korea	Korea
28/03/2008	Stella Brozek - FORATOM	Kristian Schmidt	Lobbyists' register and code of conduct
31/03/2008	EU Civil Society Contact Group	Siim Kallas	Implementation of European Commission Lobbying Register
1/04/2008	Kathryn Seren	Geoffrey Morbois	Interview Lobbying

3/04/2008	Siim Kallas	Ruth Casals - ECCJ	lobbying transparency register
3/04/2008	Bodo Lehmann	Geoffrey Morbois	Interview Lobbying
3/04/2008	Kristian Schmidt	Stella Brozek - FORATOM	Lobbyists' register and code of conduct
3/04/2008	G. Zadra; N. Jeanmart - EBIC	Siim Kallas	EBIC - request
8/04/2008	Georges H. de Veirman - AECA	Siim Kallas	Confirmation of Enrolment
9/04/2008	Siim Kallas	Rebecca Chen - University of California	Interview Request with PhD
9/04/2008	Rebecca Chen - University of California	Siim Kallas	Interview Request with PhD
9/04/2008	Gérard Legris	Etienne Douat - University of Montpellier	Réponse au professeur Douat
10/04/2008	Jens Nymand-Christensen	Stella Brozek - FORATOM	European transparency initiative - Register and Code of conduct
10/04/2008	Siim Kallas	EU Civil Society Contact Group	Implementation of European Commission Lobbying Register
10/04/2008	Edite Melo	Erik Wesselius - CEO	Request for access to Commission documents relating to lobby contacts with regards to the ETI
10/04/2008	Sandra Barghoorn - EUFIS	Cab Kallas Web Feedback	Question on ETI

Source:

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/work/eu_transparency/correspondence_en.htm, last accessed on 22.3.2010, now archived.

¹ Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents

and the speech to the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM-EU) on 18.9.2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/544&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en accessed on 14 July 2010.

15 http://www.epha.org/a/3247 accessed on 5 July 2010

² http://www.archive.corporateeurope.org/barroso.html

³ Kallas 'Nottingham speech', p.5. This figure can be traced back to a similar figure stated in a European Parliament report in 2003 (European Parliament, 2003), although the report itself did no more than assert this rather than providing a basis for its calculation. These figures have entered into folklore as a result of the frequency with which they have been quoted. When challenged on the 15,000 figure, a Commission spokesperson responded by stating that it was an estimate produced by an external source, and that Commissioner Kallas had always declared the figure as estimated (see http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/eu-lobbyists-scramble-exact-numbers/article-173152).

⁴ http://euobserver.com/?aid=18597&rk=1

⁵ An (undated, estimated 2007) ALTER-EU brochure describing itself and its work lists CEO as its contact address. In a March 7 2007 correspondence item (see endnote 9) Wesselius writes to Kallas 'On behalf of the ALTER-EU' Steering Committee'.

⁶ P de Clerck (2007) 'A Matter of Interest', *Public Affairs News*, March, p.33

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/kallas/doc/eti/07a408.tif

⁸ ALTER-EU (undated, c.2007) 'The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation', unpaginated. The quote appears on the penultimate portfolio.

⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/work/eu_transparency/correspondence_en.htm. The correspondence was last accessed on 22.3.2010, but was archived alongside other web pages of the Barroso 1 Commission in spring 2010, which has the effect of removing them from public view. The author holds a copy of this correspondence for inspection; a list of it as it appeared on Europa is here included in the Appendix.

¹⁰ See, for instance, the Society of European Affairs Practitioners (SEAP) response to the European Commission Communication follow up to the Green Paper 'European Transparency Initiative', http://www.seap.eu.org/linkdocs/ETI position paper.pdf accessed on 14 July 2010

¹¹ such as Nokia, still unregistered after two years of operation of the register, despite being highly active on the Brussels scene.

¹² The category of registration selected in the *European Public Affairs Directory* 2007, rather than the available alternative 'interest groups.'

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/speeches_articles/speeches_archives_en.htm accessed on 14 July 2010. See, in particular, the speeches to the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (25.01.2006) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/speech_250106_en.pdf accessed on 14 July 2010; the Society of European Affairs Practitioners (23.04.2007) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/speech_230407_en.pdf accessed on 14 July 2010;

¹⁴ On 6 July 2010

¹⁶ http://euobserver.com/9/27602 accessed on 6 July 2010

¹⁷ http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/chemicals-group-suspended-eu-lobby-register/article-184291 accessed on 7 July 2010

¹⁸ such as 'other/other organisations'

¹⁹. Some revisions to spending disclosure guidelines were made in the October 2009 review for the category of public affairs practitioners (European Commission, 2009)).

²⁰ http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/transparency-initiative/article-140650 accessed on 7 July 2010

²¹ See, for instance, the 1992 policy paper from the Secretariat of the European Commission, 'An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups' at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/docs/v_en.pdf accessed on 14 July 2010; and the statement by Kallas in 2007 at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/544&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed 14 July 2010.

²² See the responses of these organisations to the Commissions consultation on consultation standards, at http://ec.europa.eu/civil society/consultation standards/histo en.htm, accessed 14 July 2010.

²³ https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/infos/codeofconduct.do.

²⁴ https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/infos/codeofconduct.do, accessed 14 July 2010.

²⁵ http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/, accessed 14 July 2010.

http://www.thecompact.org.uk/information/100022/101508/101517/theconsultationandpolicyappraisalcode/., accessed 14 July 2010. 'Compacts' are public statements of commitments to standards which generally (though not always) fall short of legal status.

²⁷ http://www.oneworldtrust.org, accessed 14 July 2010.