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        <identifier>oai:rgu-repository.worktribe.com:2801124</identifier>
        <datestamp>2026-09-04T14:47:31Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:type>Thesis</dc:type>
          <dc:title>Protecting vehicles from cyberattacks: context aware AI-based intrusion detection for vehicle CAN bus security.</dc:title>
          <dcterms:abstract>Modern automobiles are equipped with a large number of electronic control units (ECUs), which are interconnected through the controller area network (CAN) bus for real-time data exchange. However, the CAN bus lacks security measures, rendering it susceptible to cyberattacks, endangering passenger safety. Although artificial intelligence (AI)-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can detect these attacks, achieving higher detection rates in near-real-time poses challenges. This research aims to enhance in-vehicle network (IVN) attack detection by developing a deployable AI-based IDS. First, a lightweight context-aware IDS named CAN-CID is introduced, employing a combination of a gated recurrent unit (GRU)-based recurrent neural network (RNN) model and a time-based model. CAN-CID is designed to detect injection and masquerade attacks on the CAN bus. It achieved an F1 score of over 99% on three publicly available CAN attack datasets for 10 injections and three masquerade attacks, outperforming baseline models. To overcome the challenge of requiring a large dataset for effective attack detection with the GRU-based model for medium and low frequent IDs, CAN-ODTL, a novel on-device transfer learning technique, is introduced. CAN-ODTL outperformed the pre-trained and baseline models with over 99% detection rate for realistic attacks. CAN-ODTL is designed to be trained with a larger dataset compared to CAN-CID model to learn the majority of benign patterns of medium and low-frequency IDs, thus enhancing its ability to detect attacks targeting such IDs. As streaming learning approaches such as CAN-ODTL are susceptible to data poisoning attacks, an anomaly detection method leveraging the Mahalanobis distance is employed to identify and eliminate poisoned data samples before model retraining. Evaluation on a real dataset with varying percentages of data poisoning attacks demonstrates the method's high accuracy of 100% in detecting poisoned samples. While CAN ID-based CAN-ODTL is effective against injection and certain masquerade attacks, it faces challenges in detecting attacks that only alter the payload field. To address this limitation, an improved autoencoder (AE)-based model, known as Latent AE, is introduced for detecting attacks aimed at the payload data. The ensemble of the GRU-based RNN model and Latent AE demonstrated its superiority over baseline models, exhibiting near-real-time detection latency. In response to the current lack of realistic attack datasets, a novel CAN bus dataset is presented. The improved models of proposed CAN-ODTL and Latent AE models are then deployed in a real vehicle and evaluated with real-world attacks. This demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed IDS by achieving over a 99% attack detection rate for 23 attacks with near-real time detection latency of 25ms. These results highlight the effectiveness of employing multiple IDSs, each utilizing distinct fields of the CAN data, in detecting attacks and achieving near-real-time detection.</dcterms:abstract>
          <dc:creator>Rajapaksha, Sampath</dc:creator>
          <dcterms:dateAccepted>2024-08-31</dcterms:dateAccepted>
          <uketdterms:advisor>H. Kalutarage, O. Al-Kadri, A. Petrovski, G. Madzudzo and M. Cheah</uketdterms:advisor>
          <dc:identifier>oai:rgu-repository.worktribe.com:2801124</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier xsi:type="dcterms:URI">https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/2801124/1/RAJAPAKSHA%202024%20Protecting%20vehicles%20from%20cyberattacks</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://doi.org/10.48526/rgu-wt-2801124</dc:identifier>
          <uketdterms:sponsor>HORIBA MIRA Ltd</uketdterms:sponsor>
          <dc:subject>Vehicle systems</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Controller area networks (CANs)</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Cybersecurity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Systems security</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Intrusion detection</dc:subject>
          <dcterms:isReferencedBy>https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/output/2801124</dcterms:isReferencedBy>
          <dcterms:issued>2024</dcterms:issued>
          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
          <dc:licence>openAccess</dc:licence>
          <dcterms:accessRights>Public</dcterms:accessRights>
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