Analysing chindōgu: applying defamiliarisation to security design.

Faily, Shamal

Abstract

Envisaging how secure systems might be attacked is difficult without adequate attacker models or relying on stereotypes. Defamiliarisation removes this need for a priori domain knowledge and encourages designers to think critically about system properties otherwise considered innocuous. However, questions remain about how such an approach might fit into the larger design process. This paper illustrates how security requirements were elicited by building a security chindōgu, and using defamiliarisation to help analyse it. We summarise this technique before briefly describing its use in a real-world setting.

Citation

FAILY, S. 2012. Analysing chindōgu: applying defamiliarisation to security design. Presented at the Workshop on defamiliarization in innovation and usability, part of the 30th ACM SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems (CHI 2012), 5 May 2012, Austin, Texas.

• Presentation Conference Type: Conference Paper (unpublished)
• Conference Name: Workshop on defamiliarization in innovation and usability, part of the 30th ACM SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems (CHI 2012)
• Start Date: May 5, 2012
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 21, 2021
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Keywords: Defamiliarisation; Security risk analysis; Software engineering
• Public URL: https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/output/1427774
• Additional Information: This paper was submitted to the ACM SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems (CHI 2012), 5-10 May 2012, Austin, Texas.