Evaluating the implications of attack and security patterns with premortems.

Faily, Shamal; Parkin, Simon; Lyle, John

Abstract

Security patterns are a useful way of describing, packaging and applying security knowledge which might otherwise be unavailable. However, because patterns represent partial knowledge of a problem and solution space, there is little certainty that addressing the consequences of one problem won't introduce or exacerbate another. Rather than using patterns exclusively to explore possible solutions to security problems, we can use them to better understand the security problem space. To this end, we present a framework for evaluating the implications of security and attack patterns using premortems: scenarios describing a failed system that invites reasons for its failure. We illustrate our approach using an example from the EU FP 7 webinos project.

Citation

FAILY, S., PARKIN, S. and LYLE, J. 2014. Evaluating the implications of attack and security patterns with premortems. In Blackwell, C. and Zhu, H. (eds.) Cyberpatterns: unifying design patterns with security and attack patterns. Cham: Springer [online], chapter 16, pages 199-209. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04447-7_16

• Online Publication Date: May 14, 2014
• Publication Date: Dec 31, 2014
• Deposit Date: Sep 17, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 7, 2021
• Publisher: Springer
• Pages: 199-209
• Book Title: Cyberpatterns: unifying design patterns with security and attack patterns
• Chapter Number: Chapter 16
• ISBN: 9783319044460 ; 9783319352183
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04447-7_16
• Keywords: Security patterns; Attack patterns; Systems security; Security risk analysis; Software engineering
• Public URL: https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/output/1446736