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The association between corruption and analyst coverage.

Hassan, Omaima; Giorgioni, Gianluigi

Authors

Gianluigi Giorgioni



Abstract

Corruption is a social evil and a widely spread unethical practice in many countries, to a different extent, around the world. Although the literature on corruption at the country level is rich, relatively fewer studies have focused on the impact of corruption at firm level due to data limitations. This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ self-reported policies for combating bribery on the number of analysts following a firm. It employs a panel data analysis on a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010 to 2015. The results show that companies that operate in clean countries, i.e. countries with low level of corruption, attract high analyst coverage. The results also show that companies that adopt policies to tackle corruption at firm level stimulate high analyst coverage. However, firms’ efforts to tackle corruption cannot mitigate the negative impact of high corruption at country level on analyst coverage. These results send a warning message to decision makers that country-level corruption is damaging the economic performance of firms in terms of low analyst coverage.

Citation

HASSAN, O. and GIORGIONI, G. 2018. The association between corruption and analyst coverage. Presented at the 41st Annual congress of the European Accounting Association (EAA 2018), 30 May - 1 June 2018, Milan, Italy.

Presentation Conference Type Lecture
Conference Name 41st Annual congress of the European Accounting Association (EAA 2018)
Conference Location Milan, Italy
Start Date May 30, 2018
End Date Jun 1, 2018
Deposit Date Nov 15, 2021
Publicly Available Date Jul 25, 2022
Keywords Corruption; Bribery; Financial analysis
Public URL https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/output/1464964
Related Public URLs http://hdl.handle.net/10059/3025

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